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Executive Summary 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCOB) Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the 
Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (EAGDA) commissioned this evidence review entitled 
Review of evidence relating to harms resulting from security breaches or infringements of 
privacy involving sensitive personal biomedical and health data (including any knock-on effects 
on beneficial data sharing). The purpose for the evidence review was to allow the NCOB and 
EAGDA to better understand, for example: the nature of the actual harms resulting from data 
misuse or security breaches involving sensitive personal biomedical and health data; the 
relevant, regulatory definitions; the appropriate context in which to assess harm; the 
effectiveness of sanctions and remedies; and the opportunity costs to institutions or individuals 
of not sharing or linking data. The scope was broad with a tight timeframe (February-April 
2014). This piece of work was to be regarded as a scoping exercise and the approach was as 
follows:   
1. The research: This research was conducted by a multi-disciplinary team from the Mason 
Institute at University of Edinburgh’s School of Law and the Farr Institute’s CIPHER based at 
Swansea University’s College of Medicine. Evidence was sought from three types of source; 
legal websites (‘hard evidence’), websites of newspapers, charities and citizens’ voice groups 
(‘soft evidence’), and the social media site Twitter. Each piece of evidence was examined to 
establish where possible the category ‘type’ of abuse (e.g. non-secure disposal), the category 
‘cause’ of the abuse (e.g. to meet NHS targets) and the resultant category ‘harm’ (e.g. individual 
distress). Because the evidence was in the form of unstructured, qualitative data, thematic 
content analysis was undertaken. One limitation of this analysis tool is that some categories 
were broad (e.g. maladministration, human error). 
2. Terms of Reference: Because the scope of the review examined evidence in the regulatory 
and psychosocial contexts, there were some definitions that were context-dependent. The 
regulatory definitions that apply to the protection of sensitive, personal biomedical and health 
data set the parameters. There is, however, a distinction between hard evidence harms as 
defined by the law and legal institutions that set the thresholds high and soft evidence impacts, 
the subjective affect that is triggered by a harm.    
3. The added value of three sets of findings. Hard evidence findings contributed greatly to 
our understanding of the types of circumstance that lead to abuse of health or biomedical data, 
and especially for governance concerns. However, what was often lacking was insight into the 
individuals’ perspective on the abuse and harm/impact. Harm to broader public interests, such 
as loss of public trust in public bodies such as the NHS or in the confidentiality of doctor-patient 
relations are simply not provided for in law. Soft evidence findings illustrated well the real 
psychosocial and social impact that an instance of harm can have on an individual and their 
significant others. Here and only here evidence was found regarding the impact of 
falsification/fabrication of patient data. Twitter evidence findings were US-centric. As such, the 
incidents offered good insight into general data breach trends and a contrast to the UK-based 
results, which offered more insight into governance. Theft was found to be far more common in 
the US, whereas non-secure disposal of data was more prevalent in the UK.  
4. Implications and recommendations for Governance: The number one cause contributing 
to abuse of health and biomedical data was maladministration, which can also be understood as 
the epitome of poor governance practices. Key recommendation: Thus there is an apparent 
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need for improvement over the effective monitoring of personnel, and standards and procedures 
that are already in place in the NHS and other healthcare organisations. This includes: a need 
for random spot checks for compliance; robust auditing procedures for how data are accessed, 
transferred and generally used on and off premises; and specific guidance on particular uses of 
data and especially for more sensitive data (e.g. faxes, emails, use of portable media etc.).  
However, there is an equal need to be wary of simply adding more bureaucratic burdens 
specifically on the NHS. Governance must be fit-for-purpose and proportionate. Where there 
are failings, underlying systemic organisational issues need to be identified. Key 
recommendation: Where there are failings that lead to abuse of health and biomedical data, a 
360° appraisal of the organisation will identify more precisely where weaknesses lie.  
Mere compliance to legal rules or official guidance might not be enough to secure the social 
licence required for trusted and effective data use, linkage, sharing and transfer. A governance 
system that shows awareness of, and responsiveness to, likely impacts of data management is 
more likely to meet this objective. Key recommendation: Among other things, on-going and 
transparent engagement with data subjects and public groups is central. Such engagement 
must show a true willingness to engage in dialogue and a demonstrated ability to learn from the 
public experience.   
5. Implications and recommendations for Sanctions and Remedies: The evidence shows a 
narrow range of sanctions available when health or biomedical data have been abused. The 
sanctions available are not entirely ineffective, but equally they are not fully capable of offering 
robust disincentives for further abuse. As a large portion of abuses are addressed at an earlier 
stage of a complaints process or otherwise go unreported, it is not possible to assess the 
effectiveness of a potentially wide portion of ‘sanctions’ available. The effectiveness of 
sanctions imposed at later stages (usually post-abuse) is limited in the UK. In this regard, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) serves an extremely important role in providing an 
alternative forum to address abuses that could be overlooked within any domestic system. Key 
recommendation: The ECtHR makes important contributions to how the UK should 
conceptualise the notion of privacy and concomitantly protect against prospective violations of 
individuals’ Article 8 rights, outwith the more narrow confines of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Our assessment of the limited scope of legal remedies is, nonetheless, complemented by our 
broader understanding and conceptualisation of harm and impact. Given that the abuse of data 
can result in multiple types of harm (financial, legal, physical, social, and psychological), the 
prevention of harmful processing and/or award of damages can only address a small aspect of 
harm caused to individuals. Furthermore, these remedies cannot rectify harm caused to broader 
public interests such as diminishment of public trust in the health services they receive or in the 
confidentiality of relationships e.g. between doctors and patients. The overall effectiveness of 
remedies for harm is considered ineffective given the broader understanding of harm provided 
for in this report. Key recommendation: Earlier and closer attention must be paid to the 
identification of the range of interests at stake. This should include more explicit engagement 
with all population groups, but particularly with hard-to-reach groups, and an enacted 
recognition of their sensitivities within governance mechanisms.   
6. The cost of non-use of data and recommendations: This review produced little/no proven 
instances of harm due to the non-use of data, and this is indicative of how elusive it is to prove 
non-use, and thus determine the cost of opportunities lost. Further, harm due to non-use of data 
is not simply the opposite of benefit due to data use. There are a considerable number of multi-
faceted reasons for this. Non-use of clinical records: non-entry of data; input errors; the 
complexities of coding. Non-use in research: publication bias; researchers and organisations 
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unwillingness to share data; pharmaceutical companies wanting to present only positive results. 
Non-use through Governance: Governance too plays a role in the lack of data sharing, where 
particular pieces of legislation or regulation have been criticised for over-caution. Without 
disputing in any way the necessity and correctness of Governance, there is a heightened risk of 
clinical error through a lack of joined-up information. Non-use of data can have far-reaching 
consequences for the patient’s care, for the healthcare professional, for the future of medical 
advancement and for the NHS economically. We have addressed above that Governance alone 
cannot always ensure correct data usage. Key recommendation: We strongly recommend 
further research, including listening to data handlers’, researchers’ and healthcare practitioners’ 
stories, that give more insights into the cost of opportunities lost.  
7. Incentives and disincentives to misuse and recommendations: Incentives: Causes for 
abuse were identified in the search, and a section considered the prospect for large-scale 
abuse such as found on the data black market, and in re-identification attacks. Although no 
direct evidence was found in these fields in the UK, the importance of constant vigilance 
remains given the potential economic and professional motives that might drive such attempts 
for abuse.  
Disincentives: It was suggested that there are, broadly, three types of ‘offender’. The first is 
incorrigible; there is little likelihood of correcting such behaviour and future intentions. Here, 
harsh sanctions are necessary up to and including dismissal. The second offender type has 
acted intentionally, but attitude and behaviour change is possible. The third is the unintentional 
offender. Key recommendations: For types two and three offenders, the action must be 
considered in context. It is crucial that these individuals can speak without fear about their 
motivations, which must be established clearly in order to put the best and most appropriate 
corrective measure in place. Corrective measures should aim to foster conformity (attitude and 
behaviour changes) and not compliance (only behaviour changes, the attitude regarding 
abuse/misuse of data remains). Re-training measures should reflect real-life situations, such as 
group work with patient stories.  
8. Future research: The evidence review highlighted several areas where further research 
would be warranted outwith the scope and limitations of this report. We strongly recommend 
reducing the scope of any piece of future work, giving opportunity to explore in-depth and 
exhaustively. Here we provide indications of the topic and nature of potential areas of interest 
for both NCOB and EAGDA in future. 
• The deeper exploration of sub-categories where our methodological design and scoping 
exercise have identified areas of particular concern regarding the abuse/misuse of health 
and biomedical data, such as ‘maladministration’ and ‘human error’.  
• Depending on the topic under investigation, an array of other sources could be drawn up in 
the evidence gathering phase. We have provided an example of alternative sources and 
their potential as an evidence source. 
• Based on the extensive findings from newspapers, future research examining the social 
construction of issues around health data misuse and abuse, and the symbiotic relationship 
between the media and the public would contribute to an understanding of the wider, social 
context of data protection.  
• Establishing the opportunities lost due to non-use of biomedical and health data is elusive. 
There would be value in a prospective study to identify, and supply more robust evidence 
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on, causes of data non-use in research There would be value in a prospective study to 
identify, and supply more robust evidence on, causes of data non-use in research. A piece 
of research similar to this review – examining abuse and misuse of genetic data – more 
narrowly defined and therefore more in-depth.  
• Further examination of risks, threats and vulnerabilities in processing health and biomedical 
data prior to harm/abuse. This could be a series of qualitative, in-depth interviews with data 
controllers and other personnel from selected sites 
• Opening the debate to the wider public, perhaps in the form of consultation workshops and 
as a qualitative piece of research.  
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1. Methodology/Approach 
1.A Background to the evidence review 
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCOB) Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the 
Expert Advisory Group on Data Access (EAGDA) commissioned this evidence review. The 
tender provided for a final report of approximately 15,000 – 20,000 words, with a turn-around 
time of eight weeks. The purpose for the evidence review was to allow the NCOB and EAGDA 
to better understand: 
a) the nature of the actual harms resulting from data misuse or security breaches involving 
sensitive personal biomedical and health data, 
b) the relevant, regulatory definitions, 
c) the nature and significance of any conditions incentivising misuse of data, 
d) how the incidence and prevalence of such harms is assessed, 
e) the inherent limitations to methodologies of assessment, 
f) the appropriate context in which to assess harm, 
g) the robustness of available governance mechanisms, 
h) the effectiveness of sanctions and remedies and 
i) the opportunity costs to institutions or individuals of not sharing or linking data. 
In winning the bid competitively, a multi-disciplinary team was formed between the Mason 
Institute at the University of Edinburgh’s School of Law1 and Farr Institute’s CIPHER2 at 
Swansea University’s College of Medicine.   
The multi-disciplinary remit was extensive, and included: 
1. an overview of the relevant regulatory definitions of data, harm and abuse,  
2. consideration of ‘abuse’ in the psychosocial context,  
3. a bespoke, methodological design to undertake a three-stranded evidence review, 
4. the undertaking of said research,  
5. the development of a series of typologies of harm and abuse,  
6. a comparison of the evidence between and within the three evidence strands, 
7. drawing conclusions from each evidence strand and  
8. a discussion of the implications of these findings in the wider legal, social and psychological 
contexts.  
                                               
1 The Mason Institute <http://masoninstitute.org/> accessed 10 June 2014. 
2 The Farr Institute at CIPHER <http://www.farrinstitute.org/centre/CIPHER/34_About.html> accessed 10 
June 2014. 
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This was, therefore, an ambitious project and, to our knowledge, the marrying of findings from 
the three evidence strands (the legal perspective, the grey literature and Twitter) has not been 
attempted before. Against this backdrop and especially in light of the timescales involved, the 
review was understood as a scoping exercise, not an exhaustive evidence review. Further and 
as per the Brief for Tender, the focus was to be UK-centric in the main, looking beyond to a 
lesser degree.  
We operated under extremely tight time-constraints, which did not come at the price of 
academic rigor. Ultimately a report of 71620 word length emerged. Post-review we now include 
Section 10 Future Research where we address important issues and questions that emerged 
from this scoping exercise. 
1.B Scope 
The review was undertaken using a multi-disciplinary approach encompassing the disciplines of 
law and social psychology, as well as areas of expertise around information governance and 
data linkage security. The legal expertise was in the fields of medical law, jurisprudence, ethics 
and data protection, ensuring that there was a firm understanding of the tenets and legislation 
on which data protection and other legal issues in the health and biomedical context are 
founded. Expertise in information governance and data linkages gave the team a firm basis 
regarding the translation of law into governance, additionally with a high awareness of potential 
hazards regarding security breaches. Expertise in social psychology brought a humanistic 
understanding into play, which enabled speculations on individuals’ and social groups’ 
motivations, fears and behaviours from the standpoint of the perpetrator and the subject. 
The Introduction (Section 2.A Context of the evidence review) provided the contextual backdrop 
to the evidence review in light of the core questions guiding the review. This section concluded 
with the research questions and our pathway to answering these. Section 3.A offered an 
overview of the regulation of health and biomedical data in the UK, setting the definitional 
parameters for the review on health and biomedical data as understood within the UK and EU’s 
regulatory context. Relevant conceptions of harm were also discussed, in the narrow, legal 
context as well as the broader, psychosocial context.  
Section 6 Method discusses the specific search parameters for each of the three evidence 
strands – legal, grey literature and Twitter – each with its own scope. 
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The legal databases (‘hard’ evidence) searched were:  
Table 1: Legal databases and websites  
Site Time 
frame 
Search terms 
UK Case Law within LexisNexis: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/ 
 
1998-
2014 
'health or medical PRE/1 data and breach' 
‘biomedical and data’ 
‘biological data’ 
‘genetic and data and breach’ 
‘health and data and non-use’ 
UK Information Tribunal Cases: 
http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/P
ublic/search.aspx 
 
- jurisdictional area 'DPA 1998' 
'sensitive personal data' 
'confidentiality of information' 
‘right to prevent processing likely to cause damage 
or distress' 
  jurisdictional area 'HRA 1998' 
'right to private and family life' 
  jurisdictional area 'FOI 2000' 
'information provided in confidence' 
UK Information Commissioner’s Office 
Prosecutions, Monetary Penalty Notices 
and Decision Notices: 
http://ico.org.uk/enforcement 
- Prosecutions and Monetary Penalty Notices:         
no search terms used; read case by case 
Decision Notices: ‘health data’, ‘biomedical data’ 
EU Case Law within LexisNexis: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/ 
1995-
2014 
'health or medical PRE/1 data and breach'  
'genetic or biomedical and data and breach' 
‘biological data’ 
‘health and data and non-use’ 
 
The grey literature search (‘soft’ evidence) consulted: 
Table 2: Soft evidence – list of newspaper, charity and citizens’ voice websites  
Newspapers Charities ‘Citizens’ Voice’  
Express Age UK Big Brother Watch 
Guardian Carers UK Citizen’s Advice 
Independent Lesbian and Gay Foundation  Digital Right Ireland 
Mail Mind GeneWatch 
Mirror Prisoners’ Advice Service Healthwatch 
Sun Prison Reform Trust Liberty 
Telegraph Race Equality First medConfidential 
Times Race Equality Foundation Patients’ Association 
Belfast Telegraph (NI) Stonewall Patient Care (Watchdog) 
The Herald (Scotland) Terrence Higgins Trust Patient Concern 
Western Mail (Wales)   
Search terms* Search terms* Search terms* 
medical; patient; record; 
data; breach; misuse; 
biomedic; genetic 
data, breach and/or misuse data, breach and/or misuse 
*Because these were only in part possible using Boolean operators, we do not include any search terms in single 
brackets 
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The Twitter evidence search: 
We also searched the social media website Twitter (after excluding Facebook as a viable 
search tool). Twitter’s advanced search function was employed for the terms ‘health data 
breach’, excluding the words ‘care.data’. This search returned over 1,000 hits, whilst the search 
for ‘biomedical data breach’, ‘biological data’ and ‘genetic data breach’ (excluding ‘care.data) 
returned zero results.3 The search was revised to search for: ‘medical data breach’, excluding 
the words ‘care.data’ and limiting the search to tweets posted within Scotland, UK.4 
1.C Methodology/Approach 
This section addresses the methodology of the research design, and the choice of search type. 
1.C.1 Research design 
To our knowledge this was the first piece of work aiming to compare ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ evidence 
and evidence from social media (Twitter).5 The evidence uncovered was in the form of raw, 
qualitative data that posed difficulties in making comparisons in terms of specific languages 
used (e.g. legal, newspaper articles from broadsheets to tabloids, the demographic diversity of 
tweeters). Therefore we rejected taking a top-down, deductive approach, because this would 
have meant that we had pre-conceived ideas of what we would find. Rather, we chose a 
bottom-up, inductive approach. This was crucial in order to keep an open mind as to what sorts 
of evidence would emerge, and this was the most auspicious way to be able to later compare 
and contrast findings between the evidence strands.  
The goal was to collapse our findings (raw, textual data) into short summaries of each event or 
incident, and then to assess and group together summaries that were similar.6 This was first 
performed within each strand (see e.g. Section 7.A.1 Hard Evidence) and then between the 
strands (see Section 7.C Merged evidence). 
Team discussions were held to create the best labels for these groups of summaries 
(categories and sub-categories). This was a cyclic, non-linear and iterative process. It is 
generally acknowledged that one should develop as many valid and reliable categories as are 
                                               
3 Due to space constraints and to facilitate data analysis the search was narrowed. 
4 Scotland, UK as opposed to the entirety of the UK was chosen as the limiting variable to the search 
because it was not possible to select tweets posted from within the whole UK – only specific cities, zip 
codes or countries. 
5 Please see Section 2.B Research questions and pathways to answers for the rationale behind our 
approach. 
6 See for example: David R Thomas, ‘A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation 
Data’ (2006) American Journal of Evaluation, 27(2), 237-246; Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using 
thematic analysis in psychology’, (2006) Qualitative Research in Psychology 3 (2) 77-101; Jennifer 
Fereday and Eimear Muir-Cochrane, ‘Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid Approach 
of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development’ (2006) International Journal of Qualitative 
Methods 5(1) 80-92; Richard E Boyatzis, Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and 
code development  (Sage 1998). 
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necessary, but only as many as would pass scrutiny. By using this method we were able to 
create the typologies of, for example, abuse by cause (see Table 12 and Table 14).  
1.C.2 Search type 
This section will detail fully how we conducted our searches and under what conditions to 
ensure transparency, thus allowing the interested reader the option to replicate the study.  
There were three stages in our approach to identifying evidence of harm (see Figure 1 below). 
Stage one comprised three searches. These were undertaken in parallel and employed 
systematic or narrative search techniques (legal and Twitter the former, grey literature the 
latter). In broad terms, a systematic search involves setting clear inclusion and exclusion criteria 
(e.g. time frame to be searched). The search terms and the databases to consult are decided 
upon in advance. The search terms are key; they ensure that only relevant evidence will be 
found. The databases are those that provide quality results (e.g. official governmental sources, 
legal databases etc.).  
This is in contrast to a narrative search, which in broad terms differs from a systematic search in 
that it sets to capture anecdotal evidence. The investigator chooses websites that are 
considered appropriate and useful in the context of the research. The search terms are pre-
defined, but these can be amended to a more appropriate language common to the website 
searched. The results are often anecdotal and observational.  
Note that we classify the Twitter search as systematic. The resulting evidence was better 
informed than that generated by the grey literature. This could be accounted for because over 
90% of incidents were US based, and thus coming out of an environment used to mandatory 
data breach reporting. In contrast, UK data breach reporting is not mandatory and potentially 
not noticed and described by the press in the same way. A further reason could be the 
demographics of tweeters; using the search terms we did, they appeared to produce hits from a 
well-informed public. 
Stage Two comprised three sets of thematic analyses (also undertaken in parallel), where we 
categorised harm types, causes and harm/impacts into typologies.  
In Stage Three, the typological evidence was merged, so that harms (hard and Twitter 
evidence) and impact (soft evidence) could be examined in the contexts in which they occurred 
(i.e. regulatory and social).  
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Figure 1: Searches for the three evidence strands 
Stage One 
 Search One  Search Two  Search Three 
 Hard evidence  Soft evidence  Social Media 
Typical sources UK Case Law; ICO  Newspapers; charities  Twitter 
Search type Systematic search  Narrative search  Systematic search 
Stage Two 
 Thematic analysis 
One 
 Thematic analysis 
Two 
 Thematic analysis 
Three 
      
 Emergent typography  Emergent typography  Emergent typography 
Stage Three 
 
Merged evidence 
 
1.D Limitations 
Our approach has drawn upon evidence ranging from ‘hard’ sources (such as court rulings, 
tribunal judgments, enforcement notices and monetary penalties) and social media (Twitter) to 
‘soft’ sources (newspaper articles, charities’ and citizens’ voice groups’ websites). Given time 
limitations and the breadth of this review, this scoping exercise (as opposed to a systematic 
literature review) produced a sound reference base dating from the enactment of relevant data 
protection legislation (the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC in 1995 and the DPA 1998). 
There were five major limitations in this methodology: 
1. The brief was to examine the evidence from the standpoint of the UK facing outwards, 
and this was realistic given the time restraints. As such, the search was a scoping 
exercise and does not claim to be exhaustive. In real terms, there are other UK-based 
sources that we did not consult, and other evidence from the EU and beyond are not 
pursued in great detail in our hard and soft searches. However, the Twitter evidence did 
produce a preliminary body of US-based evidence.  
 
1.A With a longer time frame and a more narrowly defined focus, a search for hard 
evidence could have included the enforcement actions of other European data 
protection authorities, especially those that have strong histories of data protection 
jurisprudence, namely Germany and the Nordic countries. As such, more in-depth 
evidence from the EU and internationally could have been produced. It is likely that 
cases would have been identified where practice is poorer than, and better than, in the 
UK. 
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2. With regard to the soft evidence search, the newspapers listed in Table 2 were 
searched, but these newspapers only. In real terms and again due to the time 
restrictions for the review, this excluded any evidence that could be found in other 
newspapers, or in trade magazines or in peer-reviewed journals.  
 
2.A It was challenging to pursue the soft evidence strand, due to the nature of the sites 
investigated. Firstly, it was not possible to use Boolean operators on every site. 
Secondly, a common term such as ‘data breach’ was sometimes alien to the language 
used (e.g. newspapers: the tabloids). To counteract this, we used the same multiple 
terms for each source (see Table 5). 
 
3. As described under Research Design, it was the use of thematic analysis that allowed 
us to compare findings between and within the three evidence strands. As will become 
apparent later, the categories we devised were sometimes quite specific (particularly so 
in the hard evidence strand), but sometimes quite broad. A case in point is the category 
‘maladministration’. Particularly in the soft evidence strand, there was insufficient 
evidence to break incidents around maladministration down further (e.g. failure to 
consider the risks or potential problems, failure to develop suitable systems and 
procedures). Simultaneously, if we had employed further sub-categories, then many 
cells in the typology tables (e.g. Table 14) would have been empty. This would have 
implications for the inferences we could make.  
 
4. The review sought to cross-verify findings by adopting a merged evidence approach. 
Marrying the hard and soft evidence with good conscience meant that we identified 
fewer matches than was probably the case. On the one hand, we often had clear 
statements of fact and process (hard evidence) and on the other, non-regulatory 
language open to interpretation (soft evidence). At the same time we gathered Twitter 
evidence, which regularly referred to more traditional media websites, trade magazines 
etc. This limitation also goes some way to explain why certain categories were very 
broad when generating the typologies. 
 
5. After initial searches it became apparent that searching for ‘harm’ (or, indeed, ‘abuse’) 
would not lead us to the evidence. Rather, we had to extend our search, and seek out 
‘harm’ through ‘proxy’ search terms such as ‘data breach’ but also employ wider more 
generic searches for anything involving the terms health, medical, biomedical or genetic 
data.7  
                                               
7 Further details on search terms used are provided in Section 6.A Hard evidence Method below.  
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1.D.1 Care.data 
In our proposal, we had intended to consider care.data and its implications for this review. Since 
undertaking the review, concerns were raised particularly around the selling of health data to 
commercial bodies, so much so that the scheme has been postponed and will be subject to 
further consultation. Due to this suspension of activity, we could not conduct a more meaningful 
survey of the incidence of harms arising out of the care.data scheme or the resultant 
implications for governance. However, we do note that the suspension of care.data was in 
response to strong public outcry – but not because of evidence of harm as such. This having 
been said, the passing of individually identifiable data to actuaries by the previous data 
custodians, might indeed have been perceived as some as a form of ‘harm’. Care.data is a 
salutary lesson in the need for robust and timely public engagement – as opposed to mere 
communication – and in understanding the range of ways in which data subjects might perceive 
harms arising from uses of their data.  
1.D.2 Limitations inherent to the judicial and regulatory system 
As the DPA falls within the remit of both civil and criminal jurisdiction,8 it is important to highlight 
the relatively few cases overall that goes to trial and thus these few cases only would be found 
within the hard evidence review. Between January and March 2014, whilst there were over 
424,500 new claims filed in civil courts in England and Wales, only 11,800 trials or hearings 
were held and importantly, only 3.0% to 3.5% of civil claims (historically) go to trial.9 
Furthermore, of the 96.5% to 97% of trials that do not go to trial, the settlements could be 
subject to stringent confidentiality agreements further restricting the flow of information.10 
Criminal offences under the DPA may only be brought forward by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the Information Commissioner in England and Wales11 - whereby such 
responsibility lies with the Crown in Scotland and the Director of Public Prosecutions for 
Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland – which again necessarily narrows the amount of evidence 
to be found. Given that ‘there is no stand-alone offence of failure to comply with the data 
                                               
8 Criminal offences under s 21(1), 21(2), 47(1), 55, or 56 of the DPA. 
9 Ministry of Justice, ‘Court Statistics (Quarterly) January to March 2014’, 19 June 2014 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/321352/court-statistics-
jan-mar-2014.pdf> accessed 19 June 2014.  
10 Although the use of ‘gagging’ clauses in the NHS were banned in 2013 in England and Wales, as well 
as in Scotland, previous use of gagging clauses may have impacted the number of cases brought forward 
by former staff of various NHS Trusts. This will have influenced the flow (lack thereof) of information 
regarding poor patient care practices and standards; information that may have been used in court by 
affected patients and/or their families. The 2014 House of Commons Library Standard Note 
‘Whistleblowing and gagging clauses: the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998’ considered the use of 
gagging clauses in the NHS to silence whistle-blowers and the subsequent ban of gagging clauses in 
2013. <www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn00248.pdf> accessed 19 June 2014. See also: House of 
Commons Committee of Public Accounts ‘Confidentiality Clauses and Special Severance Payments’ 
(June 2014) <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpubacc/477/477.pdf> 19 
June 2014; and on Scotland’s banning of confidentiality clauses in NHS Scotland settlement agreements, 
‘Confidentiality clauses’ (Scottish Government, 2014) <http://news.scotland.gov.uk/News/Confidentiality-
clauses-9d2.aspx> accessed 19 June 2014. 
11 DPA, s 60. 
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protection principles’,12 the amount of harm that may go unchecked is potentially quite high. 
 
Within this context, it should also be recognised that each year the ICO receives ‘tens of 
thousands of enquiries, written concerns and complaints about information rights issues,’13 of 
which only the most serious will warrant enforcement action of the type that would be publicly 
reported (e.g. decision notices and monetary penalty notices). Thus, the evidence from the ICO 
is far from representative of the whole spectrum of harms experienced by individuals. When the 
ICO provides ‘advice and instruction to help ensure the organisation gets it right in future’14 in 
response to a complaint received, this will unlikely be made public unless or until more serious 
or persistent contraventions of the DPA occur in relation to that original complaint. Whilst in the 
more serious and limited number of cases where the ICO imposes a monetary penalty of up to 
£500,000 or for criminal breaches of the DPA where individuals or organisations are 
prosecuted, such enforcement actions are publicised on the ICO website.  
 
 
  
                                               
12 Gillian Black, ‘Data Protection Re-issue’, para 324. 
13 ICO, ‘Handling concerns and complaints’ <http://ico.org.uk/what_we_cover/handling_complaints> 
accessed 25 April 2014. 
14 ICO, ‘Handling concerns and complaints’. 
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2. Introduction 
2.A Context of the evidence review 
In this digital age of growing interconnectivity and digital advances, there are now opportunities 
in place that are exceptionally beneficial to world citizens in terms of information, 
communication and improvements to quality of life. Medical advances, clinical interventions, and 
access to these are progressing at great speed; indeed, personalised medicine is now on the 
horizon. Particularly in the biomedical and healthcare settings, there is on the one hand a 
knowledge base that can and, many would argue, should be shared. On the other hand, there is 
the individual whose sensitive personal data must be treated with appropriate respect and care. 
An array of regulations are in place to facilitate the twin aims of both promoting data sharing in 
the individual and public interests, and of protecting the core privacy interests that are at stake.  
In this context, it is important to consider the prevalence of data breaches across sectors as it 
illuminates the broader landscape within which the abuse of health and biomedical data is 
located. Therefore we briefly consider breach rates both within the UK health sector and 
between sectors. Firstly we present the figures on breach rates between sectors in the UK. In its 
recent publication, the ICO presented its figures for the three quarters April to December 2013. 
A total of 43 sectors are listed, and for the sake of brevity we report here only a selection of 
these for comparison purposes. In Table 3 we have calculated the percentage of breaches by 
sector based on the total number of breaches in all sectors, that is, 406 breaches. 
Approximately four out of ten breaches occur in the health sector. 
Table 3: Number of breaches in Q3 2013 by sector  
Sector  Number % 
Health 160 38.1% 
Local Gov 55 13.1% 
Education 36 8.6% 
Solicitors/Barristers 17 4.0% 
Police & Crim records 15 3.6% 
Housing 14 3.3% 
Cent Gov 13 3.1% 
Charities 10 2.4% 
Insurance 8 1.9% 
Lenders 6 1.4% 
Social services 6 1.4% 
Financial Advisors 5 1.2% 
Courts/Justice 2 0.5% 
Debt Collectors 2 0.5% 
Pensions 1 0.2% 
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Probation 1 0.2% 
Regulators 1 0.2% 
Prisons 0 0.0% 
 
Turning to trends within the health sector, Figure 2 shows an increase of breaches by 23 
between Q2 and Q3 and 60 between Q1 and Q3.15 This trend is clearly of concern, so much so 
that the ICO conducted an audit on the health sector from August 2012 to January 2014, 
however in England only.16 
Figure 2: Health sector – Q1 to Q3 trends in 2013 
 
As the ICO reported, it was encouraged by some improvements to the Information Governance 
Toolkit (then Version 11, Version 12 now live).17 However and realistically, in the audit of 19 
sites (NHS Trusts, Health Boards, Health & Social Care Trusts and companies with a focus on 
health services) only one was rated with ‘high assurance’ (5.2%), nine with ‘reasonable 
assurance’ (47.3%), eight with ‘limited assurance (42.3%), and indeed one with ‘very limited 
assurance’ (5.2%). From this very small England-only sample, we can ascertain that just over 
half operate under conditions that comply with the Data Protection Act 1998 with high or 
reasonable assurance, and just under half with limited or very limited assurance.  
The results of this audit emphasise that, given the complex nature of hardware, software, end-
to-end connectivity protocols, administrative procedures, human error, social engineering and 
the interactions between these, facilitating appropriate use of sensitive personal data, while 
delivering suitable levels of technical security and thus privacy can be challenging. Breaches do 
occur, and these can be harmful in a range of ways to those affected. Although such breaches 
are being recorded with increasing rigor in the UK (as briefly discussed above), very little is 
                                               
15 ICO, ‘Trends’ <http://ico.org.uk/enforcement/trends> accessed 21 June 2014. 
16 ICO, ‘Good Practice. Audit of outcomes analysis: Health – August 2012 to January 2014’ 
<http://ico.org.uk/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Research_and_reports/outcomes_report_h
ealth.pdf> accessed 21 June 2014. 
17 ‘IG Toolkit Version 12 is Now Live’ (2014) <https://www.igt.hscic.gov.uk/whatsnew.aspx> accessed 25 
June 2014. 
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known about the nature and scope of the actual resultant harms to the individual(s) whose 
interests have been breached, or, indeed, of wider public or societal harms that might occur.  
The brief for this report, a scoping exercise, was to provide a review of evidence relating to 
harm resulting from security breaches or infringements of privacy involving sensitive personal 
biomedical and health data, as well a search for any evidence of opportunity costs from 
reluctance or failure to link, share or use data. A major focus was to identify the effect of 
resultant harms on the data subject. Thus, this review provides: 
(a) An examination of the relevant definitions of health and biomedical data, and harm in the 
regulatory and social context. 
(b) The identification of ‘actual harms’ in the evidence gathered and their prevalence, 
primarily in the UK context. 
(c) A categorisation of the types of uses that resulted in harm and the underlying causes.  
(d) An evaluation of the relative effectiveness of governance, sanctions and remedies 
identified in the evidence. 
(e) The consideration of the implications from the evidence within the broader social and 
legal context. 
(f) An overview of areas where future research would be beneficial. 
The review was taken from a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing upon the disciplines of law, 
information governance, data linkage security and social psychology. The multi-disciplinary 
approach taken adds value in the three-strand approach towards evidence gathering: the ‘hard’ 
evidence strand considered hard sources such as court rulings, tribunal judgments and ICO 
enforcement mechanisms; the ‘soft’ evidence strand considered soft sources such as 
newspapers; and the third strand looked to Twitter (with further detail on the approach taken in 
Section 1 above). The important value added by this three-strand approach offers a broader 
perspective on the types of harm resulting from uses of health or biomedical data, outwith the 
regulatory constraints of court cases and administrative enforcement actions. The soft evidence 
strand in particular, allowed for consideration of comparable incidence of abuse of health and 
biomedical data in the UK (newspapers) and in an international context (Twitter: mainly the EU 
and US). 
Thus, the remainder of the report follows the broad outline: 
a) In Section 3 ‘Definitions’ we review the relevant regulatory definitions for health and 
biomedical data that determines the initial scope of the evidence review, along with 
definitions of ‘harm’ according to data protection law, in comparison to ‘harm’ in a 
psycho-social context.  
b) In Section 4 ‘Abuse and harm – categories, causes and impact’ we provide the 
categories of abuse, causes and spectrums of harm/impact that encompass this review. 
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c) The content of Section 5 ‘Methodology/Approach’ has been moved to Section 1.A 
Background to the evidence review. We keep Section 5 in as a placeholder, so that the 
social scientist reader will be directed to Section 1.  
d) In Section 6 ‘Method’ the search criteria and the constraints encountered for each 
strand are explained.  
e) In Section 7 ‘Results’ the results are presented in three stages: (i) initial findings, (ii) 
emergent typologies, and (iii) merged evidence.  
f) In Section 8 ‘Conclusions’ we infer initial conclusions from our findings.  
g) In Section 9 ‘Implications’ we look at the implications of our findings for governance 
and those who must work with and within them, whilst considering the presence of 
incentives and disincentives to abuse. Section 8 also evaluates the efficacy of the 
sanctions and remedies identified in the evidence. 
h) In Section 10, ‘Future Research’, we identify areas that would warrant further 
research. 
2.B Research questions and pathways to answers  
As made apparent in this section, this was an expansive remit. Here we reiterate the purposes 
and scope of the Brief for Tender insofar as it relates to the questions we posed at the literature 
search stage. The purpose of the evidence review included:  
‘Assisting the commissioning parties to understand: 
The nature of the actual harms resulting from data misuse or security breaches involving 
sensitive personal biomedical and health data. 
How the incidence and prevalence of such harms is assessed, inherent limitations to 
methodologies of assessment, and the appropriate context in which to assess them’.18 
The scope of the review in the Brief for Tender noted that:  
‘The harms that are relevant may … be things such as: 
• discriminatory treatment (whether unlawful or not), for example instances of ‘genetic 
discrimination’;  
• stigmatisation, reputational damage either of individuals or of groups with particular 
characteristics (e.g., linking socio-demographic information with health indicators); 
• psychological harm due to loss of privacy; 
• loss or damage to property (including intellectual property) or income (e.g. from ‘identity 
theft’); 
• reputational damage and loss of public trust in research or healthcare resulting from 
misuses of data or privacy breaches; 
                                               
18 Taken from the ‘Evidence Review: brief for tender’ 1-2. 
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• missed opportunities from reluctance or failure to link, share or use data (e.g. failure to 
identify abuse, improve services or advance scientific knowledge) …’19 
Further it was requested that evidence should be sought in sources such as: 
• ‘… published reports (e.g. ICO/ Information Tribunal proceedings, media reports) … and 
• relevant documented cases of harm, including grey literature and other non-academic 
sources.’ 20 
Therefore in our search, we sought to gather evidence to answer the following questions: 
1. Where do we find evidence of missed opportunities from reluctance or failure to link, 
share or use data and what are the prevalence rates? 
2. Where do we find evidence of discriminatory treatment or stigmatisation and 
reputational damage (to individuals or to groups) and what are the prevalence rates? 
3. Where do we find evidence of psychological harm (due to loss of privacy or 
otherwise) and what are the prevalence rates? 
4. Where do we find evidence of damage to property or income and what are the 
prevalence rates? 
These central questions guided our choice of media to be consulted. The hard evidence strand, 
encompassing legal decisions or enforcement actions, related to the abuse of health or 
biomedical data, and would enable us to discern how robust governance and enforcement 
measures currently operate in the UK. This strand would also allow us to understand how ‘harm’ 
in this context is officially or legally recognised. This required an important contrast, 
encapsulated by the soft evidence strand, which could present evidence without the same 
regulatory constraints. Most importantly, the soft evidence could offer evidence of harm firstly 
that might otherwise not be legally recognised (or thus remedied) and secondly bring in 
anecdotal evidence from the data subjects, including impact statements regarding the harm. 
Finally, the Twitter strand of the evidence review would provide a final ‘check’ for evidence not 
caught through either official, legal channels or traditional media (e.g. newspapers). 
 
  
                                               
19 Taken from the ‘Evidence Review: brief for tender’ 2-3. 
20 Taken from the ‘Evidence Review: brief for tender’ 3. 
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3. Definitions and Initial Classifications of Abuse, Cause for Abuse and Harm 
3.A The regulation of health and biomedical data  
To understand the potential harms that might arise out of the abuse of health or biomedical 
data, the context in which harms are measured and sanctioned must be considered. The 
regulatory landscape that governs the processing of personal data in the UK is the relevant 
context for the hard evidence scoping exercise. The regulatory context is particular to the ‘hard’ 
evidence strand, because harm will be legally recognised only where there is a concomitant 
breach of the relevant laws – in this case, the UK’s Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)21, breach of 
the common law duty of confidentiality, and breaches of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (in particular Article 8’s right to respect of private and family life). A chief aim of the DPA 
is to promote good data protection practice, whilst ultimately serving a regulatory function for 
data processing in the UK.22 As such, the DPA is particularly relevant for this evidence review 
given the structure it lends to more contextual inquiries associated with particular types of data 
and the concomitant obligations that attach to more ‘sensitive’ types including health and 
biomedical data.  
As the DPA represents the UK’s implementation of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC 
(DPD), the dual aims of the DPD must be taken into account – facilitating data processing (for 
the maintenance of internal market) whilst protecting individuals’ fundamental rights and 
freedoms (reflective of the regulatory function).23 This dual-purpose lends to another aspect of 
this evidence review which namely seeks evidence of harm arising from non-use of health or 
biomedical data – the aim of data protection law to ensure the free flow of personal data, whilst 
protecting and promoting individual privacy, reflects the notion that failure to use personal data 
can also be harmful to individuals and/or broader public interests. 
As such, we are concerned with situations where data controllers’ data handling practices fall 
below the standards set forth by the DPA and are thus fined by the ICO, but also where failure 
to use health or biomedical data causes suboptimal use of data from the point of view of the 
development of scientific knowledge, securing health outcomes, promoting economic growth 
                                               
21 Data Protection Act 1998. (DPA) 
22 DPA, Introductory Text;  
23 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
[1995] OJ 281 Recitals 1-3 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML> accessed 17 June 2014. 
(DPD) 
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and wider public benefits etc. It is within this context of regulation that hard evidence of harm 
must be viewed. However and importantly, the hard evidence of harm must be contrasted with 
the soft evidence of harm, whereby the latter includes justifiably wider conceptions of harm that 
are not necessarily recognised or provided for under the existing legal framework.  
3.A.1 Personal and sensitive personal data under the DPA 
To understand the scope of this review, it is important to consider and adopt a working definition 
of health and biomedical data, as per the Brief for this report. Under the DPA, data are 
categorised according to the sensitivity associated with the data in question. In the context of 
this report, the DPA will apply where the health or biomedical data in question meet the initial 
threshold: that the data are personal or sensitive personal data. Personal data are: 
Data, which relate to a living individual who can be identified from those data, or from 
those data and other information, which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into 
the possession of, the data controller. 24 
The DPA enumerates specific categories of sensitive personal data that are considered to carry 
more risk to individual privacy and other personal interests. Only health data of an individual are 
considered sensitive personal data under the DPA and thus enjoy greater procedural 
safeguards when processed.25 Whilst health data are specifically enumerated as a category of 
sensitive personal data, biomedical data, which encompass a wider range of health-related 
data, are not so distinguished. Likewise, genetic data are not enumerated as a category of 
sensitive personal data under the DPA. 
However, in looking to the potential future regulation of data in the UK, a previous draft of the 
European Commission’s proposed Data Protection Regulation (pDPR)26 considered biomedical 
data as a subset of health data including ‘the actual physiological or biomedical state of the data 
subject independent of its source, such as for example from a physician or other health 
professional, a hospital, a medical device, or an in vitro diagnostic test.’27 Genetic data are 
treated as an entirely separate category, defined as ‘…all data, of whatever type, concerning 
the characteristics of an individual which are inherited or acquired during early prenatal 
                                               
24 And thus are not ‘anonymous’ data. DPA, s1(1). 
25 The processing of sensitive personal data requires additional lawful justification under the DPA. DPA, 
s2; ICO, ‘Key definitions of the Data Protection Act’. 
<http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide/key_definitions> accessed 24 February 
2014. 
26 If enacted, the pDPR would have direct effect in the UK, as a regulation does not require national 
legislation to implement it, like with the current Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and thus the UK’s DPA 
1998. European Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individual with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data (General Data Protection Regulation) COM (2012) 11 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf > accessed 6 April 2014. (pDPR)  
27 This definition is from the original draft pDPR, published in January 2012, Recital 26: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/001
1/COM_COM(2012)0011_EN.pdf > accessed 11 June 2014. 
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development’.28 Importantly, both genetic data and health data (the latter encompassing 
biomedical data) were treated as ‘special’ or sensitive categories of personal data.29 
The most recent draft of the pDPR reverts to a definition similar to that which is currently under 
the DPA for health data (i.e. ‘any personal data which relates to the physical or mental health of 
an individual, or to the provision of health services to the individual’).30 Given that this definition 
of health data refers to any personal data concerning health that relates to the physical or 
mental health of an individual or to the provision of health services to the individual, it is 
reasonable to assume this is broad enough to encapsulate biomedical data. Biomedical data 
refer to the ‘actual physiological or biomedical state of the data subject’, as an extension of data 
relating to physical health.31 The definition of genetic data is expanded in this most recent draft, 
but remains categorised as a separate category of ‘special’ or sensitive personal data. 
Overall, the addition of biomedical and genetic considerations to the regulation of processing 
special or sensitive types of personal data is welcome. This demonstrates an acknowledgement 
of the technological advancements made – in medicine, research and information technology – 
since the enactment of the DPD and thus DPA in the UK. Importantly, by categorising health, 
biomedical and genetic data as ‘special’ and thus imposing further regulatory safeguards when 
processing such data, it recognises the greater risks involved if health, biomedical or genetic 
data are abused. The proposed regulatory definitions are in line with the Brief for this report, 
which focuses on health and biomedical data as particularly sensitive categories of data. 
Therefore we adopt and employ the terms given in the Brief for Tender for this report, health 
and biomedical data, to mean in the broadest sense: 
32 
                                               
28 pDPR (January 2012), Article 4(10). 
29 pDPR (January 2012), Article 9(1). 
30 pDPR (as agreed by European Parliament on 14 March 2014), Art 4(12) (2014) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0212+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> accessed 11 June 2014. (emphasis added) 
31 Whereas the DPA is not so inclusive and rather only stipulates that sensitive personal data include that 
which speaks to ‘his physical or mental health or condition’. Arguably, the inclusion of the word ‘any’ in 
the most recent draft of the pDPR offers a much broader allowance for what can be considered health 
data. 
32 Genetic data are traditionally considered as a separate category of sensitive personal data, as it was, 
for example, treated separately from health and biomedical data in the pDPR and in relevant literature 
such as: Graeme Laurie, Genetic privacy: a challenge to medico-legal norms (Cambridge University 
Press 2002); Mark Taylor, Genetic Data and the Law: a critical perspective on privacy protection 
Health and biomedical data: 
Any personal data that relate to the physical or mental health of an individual, or to the 
provision of health services to the individual. This includes biomedical data, gathered 
from any source (e.g. from blood samples, in vitro diagnostic tests) that speaks to the 
actual physiological or biomedical state of the individual. 
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It is important to distinguish between the information derived from a physical sample that can 
speak to an individual’s actual physiological or biomedical state as opposed to the material 
itself,33 which would be governed by laws relating to human tissues and samples, for example 
the Human Tissue Act 2004.34  
We now turn to other regulatory definitions that will help to define the scope of this evidence 
review as well as enhance the understanding of where harm may or may not be legally found or 
thus officially recognised.  
3.A.2 Identifiability and de-identification of data 
The identifiability of an individual from data is a threshold concept for determining whether the 
data in question are personal data, and thus whether data protection law applies. However, 
identifiability of data may also relates to the propensity for the abuse of personal data to cause 
harm – arguably, the more identifiable data are, the greater the chances for causing harm in the 
ways considered in this report.35 It is identifiable data (rather than anonymised data) that could 
be abused in a way that causes actual harm to individuals such as through discriminatory 
treatment or psychological harm due to the loss of privacy – however we recognise that 
masking identifiability may only prevent or protect human interests particular to identification 
and privacy. Nonetheless, the identifiability of data bridges an important, conceptual gap 
between the nature of data and the potential risk of harm:  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Cambridge University Press 2012). We identify genetic data as an area warranting a focused piece of 
future research – see 10.D Future research on genetic data. 
33 Similarly, and in regards to genetic data versus genetic information, see: Mark Taylor, Genetic data and 
the law : a critical perspective on privacy protection (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
34 Given space constraints and this report’s focus on health and biomedical data, we will not investigate 
the regulatory complexities that arise when dealing with human materials (tissues) and the associated 
personal data held together. However key legislation and literature include: Human Tissue Act 2004 (HTA 
2004); Graeme Laurie, Kathryn Hunter, and Sarah Cunningham-Burley, ‘Guthrie Cards in Scotland: 
Ethical, Legal and Social Issues’ (The Scottish Government 2013); Graeme Laurie and Shawn Harmon, 
‘Through the Thicket and Across the Divide: Successfully Navigating the Regulatory Landscape in Life 
Sciences Research’ (2013). 
35 Whereas the identifiability of an individual from data is a threshold concept for application of the DPA, 
the identifiability of data as it relates to a propensity to cause abuse and thus harm to individuals is 
commentary derived from interpretation of the law as it relates to the context of this report. The focus 
on identifiability as a core (or chief) aim of privacy protection is considered in our discussion of the Source 
Informatics case(UKC14) in Section 8.A.4 Harm outwith privacy harms. Here we contend that good 
governance may require accounting for a fuller range of human interests – those that are implicated in the 
processing of health and biomedical data, including dignity, autonomy and identity. 
Data are identifiable if: 
The data present a risk of identification that is greater than a remote possibility 
whether by direct (identification from a single source) or indirect means (identification 
from a combination of sources). 
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De-identification, which includes methods for anonymising data, ‘is an effective way to protect 
the privacy of patients when their data are used or disclosed’,36 and thus enables data 
controllers to minimise the risk of harm to individuals. As the definition of identifiability above 
suggests, the key to effective de-identification lies in a distinction between identifiable data 
(which are fairly, or reliably identifiable) and data which have minimal risk of identification (or 
perhaps no reliable means of re-identification). What is potentially problematic is the case where 
data might possibly be re-identified (at least in some instances) – and then whether such data 
can be considered sufficiently de-identified or thus used safely without increased risk to 
individuals’ privacy. It is especially important to distinguish where there is risk in (re)identifying a 
single record versus an entire data set, whereby the risks are higher if the identifiability of a 
single record can identify the whole set (making all data, therefore, personal data). 
Key literature within the area of de-identification considers the risk to individual privacy (or thus 
the risk of harm to individuals) in terms of access to and the identifiability of individuals from the 
data, whereby the more restricted the access and more de-identified the data, the less risk is 
posed to individual privacy.37 Equally, there is growing literature to suggest that complete 
reduction of this risk – in terms of eliminating all chances of re-identification – is increasingly 
difficult, or indeed impossible.38 Within the specific context of processing health or biomedical 
data, the ability for data controllers to sufficiently de-identify or anonymise data is paramount. 
‘Sufficiently’, In terms of de-identification, ‘sufficiently’ means reaching a point where the data 
controllers are satisfied that ‘the data does not…identify any individual and [are] unlikely to allow 
any individual to be identified through…combination with other data’.39 Thus, there is minimal 
risk of identification (or without a reliable means of doing so).  
De-identification proves key to minimising the risk of harm to individuals, but also can minimise 
regulatory burden (as the DPA does not apply to anonymised data). If data are anonymous, 
there is a much narrower scope for finding ‘breaches’ of the relevant law. Indeed, if the data are 
‘adequately’ anonymised the DPA does not apply at all, but the devil is in the detail of what 
actions must be taken and maintained to secure this level of de-identification.   
                                               
36 Khaled El Emam, Guide to the De-Identification of Personal Health Information (CRC Press Taylor & 
Francis Group 2013) 2. 
37 El Emam, Guide to the De-Identification of Personal Health Information 4. 
38 For example: Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization’ (2009) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701–1777 on the fallacy that is anonymisation. Well known 
re-identification attacks also highlight this issue: Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller, ‘A Face Is Exposed for 
AOL Searcher No. 4417749 - New York Times’, no date; Ryan Singel, ‘Netflix Spilled Your Brokeback 
Mountain Secret, Lawsuit Claims | Threat Level’, December 17, 2009 
<http://www.wired.com/2009/12/netflix-privacy-lawsuit/> accessed 29 April 2014. 
39 The Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of 
practice’, November 20, 2012 6.  
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Pseudonymous data (defined by the ICO as data that distinguish individuals in a dataset by 
using a unique identifier, but that does not reveal their ‘real world’ identity40) is a form of de-
identification that is considered to be at the higher-risk end of the anonymisation spectrum.41 
Neither the DPA nor the Data Protection Directive 95/4642 (DPD) provides a definition for 
pseudonymous data. The ICO considers pseudonymisation as posing a higher privacy risk 
given its production of individual-level records.43 This higher privacy risk entails a higher risk for 
potential harm to arise from the use or abuse of pseudonymised health or biomedical data, 
more so than if more stringent technical anonymisation standards have been used (e.g. where 
anonymised records are provided at population-level rather than individual-level).44 However, 
and importantly, pseudonymous data is (under current interpretations by the ICO) capable of 
being ‘anonymous’ and thus outwith the scope of the DPA.45 
The pDPR has implications for the concept of identifiability; first in regards to whether the 
regulatory regime applies to particular data, and second in how harm is recognised within the 
law. The current draft of the pDPR lowers the threshold for identifiability by defining 
pseudonymous data as a specific subset of personal data.46 Under current interpretations of the 
DPA, pseudonymous data would theoretically only be treated as personal data if, for instance, 
the data controller held the ‘key’ or unique identifier that could re-identify the data set, or in other 
words the data were capable of re-identifying individuals’ real world identity.47 However and 
importantly, the current draft of the pDPR automatically categorises pseudonymous data as 
personal data regardless of whether the data controller in question has the ability to re-identify 
the data subject(s) – the singling out of an individual by means of a unique identifier is enough. 
This is a clear step above the status quo where this determination is made only after 
consideration of the particular circumstances of each case (e.g. such as when a “Trusted third 
                                               
40 The Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of 
practice’ 49. 
41 The ICO considers pseudonymisation as higher risk than other forms of anonymisation ‘because even 
though pseudonymised data does not identify an individual, in the hands of those who do not have 
access to the ‘key’, the possibility of linking several anonymised datasets to the same individual can be a 
precursor to identification.’ The Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Anonymisation: managing data 
protection risk code of practice’ (2012) 21. 
<http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/topic_guides/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protect
ion/Practical_application/anonymisation-codev2.pdf> accessed 12 June 2014. (Hereinafter, 
‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’) 
42 ‘Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data’. (DPD) 
43 ICO, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ 7. 
44 For example, if the health or biomedical data in question were anonymised to only allow aggregate or 
population level analysis, with no individual records produced. 
45 Whereby the ICO considers that pseudonymisation ‘…can present a greater privacy risk, 
but not necessarily an insurmountable one.’ ICO, Anonymisation Code of Practice 7. 
46 Pseudonymous data is defined as ‘personal data that cannot be attributed to a specific data subject 
without the use of additional information, as long as such additional information is kept separately and 
subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure non-attribution.’ pDPR, Art 4(2)(a) (2014). 
47 In the ICO’s ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ the likelihood of pseudonymous data being re-identified 
is directly related to the access (or potential access) to the ‘key’ to unlocking the otherwise anonymous, 
individual level records. ICO, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ 21. 
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party” is used to link personal data sets on behalf of a data controller, such that the data 
controller never has the ability to re-identify the data once pseudonymised48).49 
Ultimately, this definition would mean that pseudonymous data would be caught by the data 
protection regime as would any other form of personal data. The potential effect of this would be 
a broader capacity of the law to recognise breaches involving pseudonymous data and thus 
provide remedies to individuals where there currently are none. However, this could have very 
significant effects on medical and biomedical research.50  
Overall, the level of identifiability and level of anonymisation applied to data can affect the 
likelihood that harm may be caused through use or abuse of such data. Therefore, whether data 
are sufficiently anonymised will remain a key question for data controllers when assessing the 
level of risk posed by a particular use of data. Given the focus of data protection law on the 
informational privacy of individuals and identifiability, this report begins with a working 
assumption that any hard evidence uncovered, as representative of breaches under data 
protection law, would not be characterised as harmful to individuals if data were anonymised.51 
This means that use of anonymised data will not be categorised or considered as harmful to 
individuals, if the data remained anonymised, and individual identity was not revealed or 
otherwise compromised. However, it is understood that the use or abuse of health or biomedical 
data can and does affect a wide range of human interests including autonomy, dignity and 
privacy.52 The effect of abuse of data on these other human interests will be considered under 
                                               
48 An example of a Trusted third party (TTP) service is provided by the Administrative Data Linkage 
Service (ADLS), which ‘…provides researchers and data holding organisations a mechanism to enable 
the combining and enhancing of data for research to which may not have otherwise been possible 
because of data privacy and security concerns.’ In situations where a TTP service is used, it is arguable 
whether the de-identified data set ultimately transferred to the data controller, and that has no ability to re-
identify (as the keys were destroyed by the TTP after transfer), is personal data for the purposes of the 
DPA. 
49 The ICO takes the position that effective anonymisation through pseudonymisation is not impossible, if 
a) pseudonymous are not re-identified; or b) if re-identified, none of the data protection principles are 
breached. This position is contrary to the definition of pseudonymous data in the recent draft of the pDPR, 
which predetermines all pseudonymous data as a subset of personal data without consideration of 
probabilities of re-identification or access to the re-identifying keys. ICO, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ 
21. 
50 It is outwith the scope of this report to consider the full implications of the pDPR upon the health and 
biomedical research sectors; however it is clear that there is concern over how the Regulation would 
impact (negatively) upon the processing of personal data for health and biomedical purposes. The 
Wellcome Trust has consistently opposed drafts of the pDPR, which purport to turn pseudonymous data 
into a subset of personal data that would interfere with publicly beneficial research from being carried out. 
See: 
<http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web_doc
ument/wtp051900.pdf > accessed 12 June 2014. 
51 Assessing whether data is sufficiently anonymised is largely a technical assessment that is dependent 
partially on the state of technology, security developments or changes to the public availability of certain 
records. ICO, ‘Determining what is personal data’ (2012) 9 
<http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection
/Detailed_specialist_guides/PERSONAL_DATA_FLOWCHART_V1_WITH_PREFACE001.ashx> 
accessed 24 February 2014. 
52 For specific discussion of the other human interests at stake when abuse of data, and prospect of harm 
despite the use of anonymous data see: Deryck Beyleveld and Elise Histed, ‘Betrayal of confidence in the 
Court of Appeal’ (2000) 4 Medical Law International 277–311. 
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3.C below when the broader conception of harm is discussed in context of the soft evidence 
strand of this review. 
3.B Harm under data protection law – harm as damage or distress  
Given that the ‘hard evidence’ strand of this report is focused on uncovering evidence of harm 
relating to health or biomedical data within the context of breaches of relevant law, it is vital to 
understand how harm is recognised or compensated for under data protection legislation. Harm 
caused to individuals arising out of contraventions of the DPA is framed narrowly within the Act, 
having the effect that an individual might suffer harm but not to a sufficient degree to constitute 
a breach or warrant a remedy under the law. Under the DPA harm is recognised in terms of 
damage and distress – damage as financial harm and distress as emotional harm. For the 
purposes of this review, the relevant courses of action that an individual can refer to if they 
suffer damage or distress (or will be likely to suffer unwarranted, substantial damage or 
distress) arising out of processing their personal data include: 
• Preventing the processing of their personal data;53 
• Seeking the rectification, blocking, erasure and/or destruction of their personal data;54 
and/or 
• Receiving compensation for a data controller’s contravention of the DPA as it affects 
their personal data.55 
The limited scope of redress available to individuals for ‘harms’ arising out of contraventions of 
the DPA highlight the narrow context within which the hard evidence strand operates. Taking 
each of the above actions in turn, the limits to the regulatory notions of harm and related 
(in)capacity to compensate adequately are considered. 
3.B.1 Preventative measures of redress under the DPA 
Under the DPA section 10, individuals have the power to prevent instances of harm if they feel 
subjectively that the processing of their personal data for a specified purpose or in a specified 
manner is a) causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to them or 
another and b) that the damage or distress is or would be unwarranted. Whilst section 10 
provides individuals with the possibility of preventing harmful processing for himself/herself (or 
someone else), this right of action is severely limited. Firstly, an individual cannot prevent such 
processing if a data controller has satisfied any of the first conditions to processing under 
Schedule 2 of the DPA, or if the processing meets any similar conditions as set forth by an 
                                               
53 DPA, s 10. 
54 DPA, s 14. 
55 DPA, s 13. 
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order of the Secretary of State.56  Secondly, even if the individual can prevent processing, a 
data controller may simply reply within the requisite 21-day period, stating his or her reasons for 
finding the request unjustified and thus their reasons for not complying with the request.57 
Thirdly, if the processing has begun because the request was refused and/or is continuing, 
there is no recourse for the individual but through court order, which may be prohibitive in terms 
of time, costs etc.58 Fourthly and finally, an individual’s request to prevent processing must meet 
an extremely high threshold – the damage or distress must be both substantial and unwarranted 
(neither of which are defined in the DPA).  
While unwarranted and substantial damage or distress are not defined in the DPA, the ICO’s 
guidance provides that substantial damage must result in physical or financial harm, whilst 
substantial distress must affect an individual to a point beyond ‘…annoyance or irritation, strong 
dislike, or a feeling that the processing is morally abhorrent.’59 This already narrow conception 
of harm is further constrained by the fact that the substantial damage or distress must also be 
unwarranted – this allows for the caveat that data controllers might have legally justifiable 
reasons for holding and processing data, including circumstances that might cast individuals in 
a negative light.60 Therefore, even if harm is found to be substantial, it is possible under the 
DPA that this might be justified under the circumstances. This reiterates the point above, that a 
person might in fact suffer harm but not have remedies under the law if harm is not of a 
sufficient degree. These factors will necessarily limit any potential evidence to be found in cases 
where individuals may have simply given up in their attempts to prevent harmful processing of 
their health or biomedical data.  
3.B.2 Seeking redress post-harm under the DPA 
Individuals may also seek redress after harmful processing of their personal data has occurred. 
These actions of redress can be divided in terms of compensatory and non-compensatory 
redress.  
3.B.2.A Non-compensatory redress under the DPA 
Considering non-compensatory redress, an individual may apply to a court to have his/her 
personal data rectified, blocked, erased or destroyed if inaccurate. An individual may also have 
their data rectified, blocked, erased or destroyed if a) they have suffered financial damage due 
to a contravention of the DPA by the data controller; b) they are entitled to receive 
                                               
56 For instance, if the processing of personal data in question is 1) legally justified on the basis of the 
individual’s consent; 2) necessary to perform a contract the individual is party to, or is seeking to be party 
to; 3) necessary to satisfy a data controller’s legal obligations; or 4) necessary to protect the vital interests 
of the individual, s 10 does not apply and the individual cannot prevent the processing. DPA, s 10(2). 
57 DPA, s 10(3). 
58 DPA, s 10(4).  
59 ICO, ‘Preventing processing likely to cause damage or distress’ 
<http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide/principle_6/damage_or_distress> accessed 
24 February 2014. 
60 ICO, ‘Preventing processing likely to cause damage or distress’. 
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compensation (and thus meet the requirements) under section 13; and c) there is substantial 
risk of further contravention of the DPA if the data are not so rectified, blocked, erased or 
destroyed. 
Similar to preventing the potentially/or actually harmful processing of personal data under 
section 10 of the DPA, the rights of an individual to rectify, block, erase or destroy records of 
their personal data are severely qualified and thus limited. First, individuals cannot simply 
provide written notice to the ‘offending’ data controller – they may only seek such recourse 
through the courts system which is prohibitive in terms of times, costs, etc.61 Second, if the 
personal data are not inaccurate but nevertheless cause an individual continuous distress they 
are not able to seek rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction of their data. They must meet 
the extremely high threshold that involves a) proving they suffered financial damage as a result 
of the data controller’s breach of the DPA; b) meeting the similarly high threshold for receiving 
compensation in section 13 (to be discussed further below); and c) proving a ‘substantial’ risk 
that the data controller in question will continue to contravene the DPA.62  
3.B.2.B Compensation under the DPA 
Looking to the final possibility for an individual seeking redress under the DPA, as it applies to 
the context of this report, an individual may seek compensation for a data controller’s 
contravention of the DPA if a) it causes the individual (financial) damage or b) causes the 
individual distress, but he or she also suffers damage by reason of the contravention or c) he or 
she suffers distress and the contravention relates to the processing of personal data for the 
special purposes (journalism, literature, art).63 As neither damage nor distress is defined under 
the DPA, we interpret damage and distress in terms of the ICO’s guidance on the parameters of 
section 13 and the right compensation. Importantly (and similar to section 10 and the right to 
prevent processing), damage is equated with financial loss. The ICO advises in relation to 
section 13 that ‘an individual who has suffered financial loss because of a breach of the Act is 
likely to be entitled to compensation.’64  
As to distress, the ICO provides that:  
If an individual has suffered damage, any compensation awarded may take into account 
the level of any associated distress, but distress alone will not usually be sufficient 
to entitle an individual to compensation (unless the processing was for the purposes 
of journalism, literature or art).65 
                                               
61 DPA, s 14(1). 
62 DPA, s 14(4). 
63 DPA, s 13. 
64 ICO, ‘Compensation’ 
<http://ico.org.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide/principle_6/compensation> accessed 13 
June 2014. 
65 ICO, ‘Compensation’. 
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Thus and similar to the other forms of redress under the DPA, compensation is severely limited. 
First, an individual faces similar barriers in seeking compensation; as such, rights are only 
enforceable through the courts. Second, whilst financial harm is only one of many types of harm 
an individual might suffer due to a data controllers' abuse of their data, distress itself is non-
compensable – the distress must be tied causally to a further financial loss. For example, 
distress caused by reputational damage is not provided for unless a financial loss can be traced 
to the loss of professional reputation.66 Third and most importantly, even if financial loss and 
distress are proven, the defence for claims to compensation provide a remarkably low threshold 
to meet – a data controller need only prove they took all reasonable care in the circumstances 
to avoid the breach in question.67 As a final note, there are no guidelines as to the level of 
compensation that might be appropriate – it will depend entirely on the circumstances of each 
case, to be decided by the courts if the data controller and individual do not come to an 
agreement.68 Thus, even where all requirements are met under section 13, there is little 
precedent in terms of how much compensation individuals can expect to receive. And previous 
case law indicates that where section 13 requirements are met, damages will unlikely go 
beyond a nominal amount and/or are awarded on another legal basis. In fact, the recent Court 
of Appeals case Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd found that the compensation 
provision under section 13 of the DPA was not intended to produce substantial awards of 
damages.69  
However, post Douglas v Hello! No 3,70 a case involving the publication of photos from Michael 
Douglas and Catherine Zeta Jones’ wedding, it appears that courts are more willing to 
compensate for harms arising as a result of breach of confidence (and now often understood as 
misuse of private information71); notably for the distress caused by loss of privacy.72 In Douglas, 
the claimants were awarded £3,750 each for distress, and £7,000 for wasted costs, but only £50 
each in compensation under DPA 1998.73 This ruling is important in context of this report as it 
shows the narrow limits to which compensation for harm may be awarded under the DPA, whilst 
under other common law actions (such as breach of confidence or misuse of private 
                                               
66 Johnson v Medical Defence Union [2006] EWHC 321 (Ch) at [218] ff, 89 BMLR 43, per Rimer J. 
67 In this regard, the ICO advises that taking ‘all reasonable care in the circumstances’ would include 
looking ‘…at the way you process and protect personal data and that you put in place appropriate checks 
to prevent any problems occurring. Your defence may rely on describing these checks. Some form of 
positive action is often necessary and, if a reasonable step or precaution has not been taken, then the 
defence is likely to fail.’ Arguably this is not a high standard to meet. DPA s 13(3). 
68 ICO, ‘Compensation’. 
69 Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance Ltd (CCF) [2013] EWCA Civ 333 [36]. 
70 Douglas v Hello! No 3 [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch). 
71 In Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457, [2004] 2 All ER 995, the focus in breach of confidence shifted 
from the need for a pre-existing confidential relationship to focus on the misuse of private information. 
(Lord Hope) 
72 [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch). 
73 Importantly, the Court determined that the cause for the Douglas’s distress was not due to 
contravention of the DPA and thus only awarded nominal damages (£50 each). [2003] EWHC 786 (Ch) 
para [289]. 
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information) compensation may be wider and thus indicate the law’s recognition of a broader 
conception of harm. 
3.B.3 Final thoughts on the legal notion of harm under the DPA 
In reviewing the three main types of redress an individual may seek for harms caused by the 
processing of their personal data, the narrow conception of harm under the DPA, and similarly 
narrow provisions for compensation/ redress were highlighted.   
In summary, harm under the DPA and thus UK regulatory context is understood as: 
 
The hard evidence of harm uncovered in the evidence review and specifically those incidents 
that relate to breaches of the DPA, will take this working definition of harm into account.74 This 
definition acknowledges the narrow provision for harm offered by the law in the UK, whilst 
allowing for contrast between the actual and potential incidents of harm uncovered but that are 
not necessarily legally recognised or compensated for. Importantly, this definition does not 
reflect the broader conception of harm supported in this report – rather, it reflects the legal 
realities governing use of personal (health and biomedical) data in the UK. As such this narrow, 
regulatory notion of harm and the related provisions for redress/compensation will be contrasted 
to the wider definition of harm underpinning the soft evidence strand of this report in Section 3.C 
Harm in other contexts. 
3.B.3.1 Harms to the public interest or organisations 
As the discussion regarding the legal notion of harm concludes, it is important to highlight that 
any harmful impact caused through abuse of data to broader, public interests or organisations is 
simply not provided for in the regulatory context (or at least not explicitly so). This is so, as the 
application of the DPA is limited to personal data that can be found only where data relate to a 
living individual. Thus it excludes entities such as business or third sector organisations. 
Importantly, this evidence review does take into account the possibility for broader public 
interests and organisations to be harmed from abuse or non-use of health or biomedical data. 
                                               
74 This notion of harm is especially relevant to the UK-focused nature of this report and as it applies to the 
legal context. However, wider conceptions of harm are considered and uncovered in the context of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and specifically the factors accounted for in the ECtHR’s 
judgments. 
Harm: 
Harm that causes financial damage (loss) to the individual, whereby if distress is 
suffered, it must a) be beyond mere discomfort – physical, emotional or otherwise and 
b) to be compensable, be connected causally to a financial loss. 
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3.B.3.2 Redressing ‘harm’ to broader, public interests under the DPA 
In considering the lack of recognition or provision for harms to the broader public interest or 
organisations under the DPA, we will discuss briefly the ICO’s ability to issue monetary 
penalties for serious contraventions of the DPA and the role these penalties play in the 
regulatory framework relevant to this review.75  
The ICO has statutory authority76 under the DPA to issue monetary penalties (which must not 
exceed £500,00077). The ICO issues monetary penalties in a quasi-judicial fashion, effectively 
applying data protection rules within the law, without judicial intervention, if a data controller has 
seriously contravened78 the DPA, and:  
1. The contravention was of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress, 
and;  
2. The contravention was deliberate or the data controller or person must have known or ought 
to have known that there was a risk that a contravention would occur and failed to take 
reasonable steps to prevent it.79  
In determining whether the contravention is likely to causes ‘substantial’ damage or distress, the 
ICO will consider whether the situation is of ‘considerable in importance, value, degree, amount 
or extent’; whether the damage or distress ‘is merely perceived or of real substance’; and where 
the damage or distress is less than considerable, if a large number of people have suffered and 
thus the totality of damage or distress is nevertheless substantial.80  
Whilst finding harm (in substantial damage or distress) is required before the ICO imposes a 
monetary penalty, such penalties do not serve the purpose of compensating individuals but 
rather to ‘…promote compliance with the [DPA]... The possibility of a monetary penalty notice 
                                               
75 DPA, s 55C(1). 
76 DPA, s 55(a). 
77 The fines are paid must be paid into the Consolidated Fund owned by HM Treasury. ICO, ‘Data 
Protection Act 1998: Information Commissioner’s guidance about the issue of monetary penalties 
prepared and issued under section 55C (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998’, 2012) 4 
<http://ico.org.uk/enforcement/~/media/documents/library/Data_Protection/Detailed_specialist_guides/ico
_guidance_on_monetary_penalties.pdf> accessed 13 June 2014. (Hereinafter ‘ICO Monetary Penalty 
Guidance’) 
78 The ICO advises that a serious contravention of the DPA will be determined on a case by case basis, 
with the aim of reflecting ‘the reasonable expectations of individuals and society and ensure that any 
harm is genuine and capable of explanation. It is possible that a single breach may be sufficient to meet 
this threshold.’ A specific example given of a ‘serious’ breach of the DPA includes 
‘[t]he failure by a data controller to take adequate security measures (use of encrypted files and devices, 
operational procedures, guidance etc.) resulting in the loss of a compact disc holding personal data.’ ICO, 
‘Monetary Penalty Guidance’ 13. 
79 ICO, ‘Monetary Penalty Guidance’ 4. 
80 ICO, ‘Monetary Penalty Guidance’ 14-15. 
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should act as an encouragement towards compliance, or at least as a deterrent against non-
compliance, on the part of all data controllers or persons’.81 
As such, the ICO’s issuance of monetary penalties, which is an important part of the regulatory 
framework, arguably does recognise and provide for harms affecting broader, public interests. 
Issuing monetary penalties to promote general compliance with the DPA’s principles recognises 
the broader public interests at stake if personal data are not treated accordingly. Furthermore, 
the monetary penalties operate as a sanction or penalty for sub-standard data processing. 
Sanctions and penalties will be assessed for effectiveness as a deterrent to harmful (or 
potentially harmful) data processing in Section 9 Implications.  
This understanding of the narrow, legal framework within which harm is legally recognised 
provides the necessary backdrop from which the hard evidence can be understood. This brief 
overview has highlighted the value added from the soft evidence, which provides a more holistic 
understanding of the types of harms that should be recognised and provided for (as opposed to 
what is legally recognised) when processing health or biomedical data. 
3.C Harm in other contexts  
Here we look at harm, specifically damage and distress, in the wider, psychosocial context. The 
term ‘distress’ covers an array of negative emotional states such as feelings of hopelessness, 
despair, anger, shock, sadness, guilt and shame, and all of these states, as we argue later, are 
perceived/subjective.  
To clarify at the outset, those who are affected by data breaches could be referred to as targets 
or victims. However, in this review we refer to those affected as subjects. Although this term 
strays away from psychology, we use it because it is neutral and bears no relevance on whether 
the abuse is intentional and deliberate or not. Harm can take several forms, such as financial, 
legal, physical, social and psychological. The subject of a harmful action can experience more 
than one form of harm resulting from that action. For example, if an individual living with HIV 
has been the subject of a data breach and the HIV status becomes known to others, he or she 
can experience social harm in that colleagues/neighbours avoid or disparage the subject, and 
psychological harm in that such experiences cause upset and distress. If that individual in 
addition then becomes unemployed (e.g. constructive or unfair dismissal), financial harm also 
comes into play, and this could culminate in existential fear.  
It goes beyond the remit of this report to discuss individual, intra- or intergroup processes, 
emotions and coping strategies in any depth. This section is to be understood as a brief 
excursion into the disciplines of individual and social group psychology, where we draw on the 
                                               
81 ‘Data Protection Act 1998: Information Commissioner’s guidance about the issue of monetary penalties 
prepared and issued under section 55C (1) of the Data Protection Act 1998’ 5. 
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highly cited literature of acknowledged authorities. Below we discuss the subject as (a) a unique 
individual with a personal identity and as (b) a member of a social group with a social identity. 
3.C.1 Personal identity and coping mechanisms  
As individuals, we each have a unique personal identity and there is an array of inherent 
personality factors that may influence how well we deal with specific situations. Therefore 
nature sets out to some degree who we are and who we could become. At the same time our 
upbringing, social circumstances, interactions with peers etc. can influence our beliefs, attitudes 
etc. Therefore, nurture too plays a role in who we are and who we could become. It is generally 
acknowledged that there is an interaction between nature and nurture (although it is still very 
much under debate which of the two is more influential).82  
Thus, individuals differ in how well they are equipped to cope with the stress resulting from a 
challenging situation,83 and this ability can change over the lifespan.84 Further, coping strategies 
can range from adaptive in that the individual pursues a course of action that is useful to 
him/her (e.g. seek qualified advice, take action) to maladaptive in that the individual pursues a 
course of action that has a detrimental effect on him/her (e.g. alcohol consumption, revert to the 
powerless victim role).85 A subject might employ both mechanisms over time.86 
3.C.2 Social identity and vulnerable social groups 
In addition to unique personal identities, simultaneously we have a series of social identities. 
These are based on our memberships in social groups, for example age-based, gender-based 
and ethnicity-based. Some of these social groups can be considered vulnerable, and some 
individuals possess more than one vulnerable social identity (e.g. an older female living with a 
chronic condition in an area high in social deprivation). In this sense, an individual can 
experience multiple disadvantages based on social group memberships. For the purpose of this 
review, we refer to those who are vulnerable (multiple) group members as belonging to lower-
power/lower-status groups. In doing so, we draw on Social Identity Theory, a European-based 
model developed since the late 1970s.87 This model has currency and seems to offer a very 
                                               
82 See, for example, Thomas J Bouchard ‘Genetic Influence on Human Psychological Traits: A Survey’ 
(2004) 13:4 Current Directions in Psychological Science 148-151; cf Arnold Sameroff ‘A Unified Theory of 
Development: A Dialectic Integration of Nature and Nurture’ (2010) 81:1 Child Development 6-22. 
83 Richard Lazarus and Susan Folkman, Stress, Appraisal, and Coping (Springer Publishing 1984);  
Igor Kardum and Jasna Hudek-Knežević, ‘The relationship between Eysenck's personality traits, coping 
styles and moods’ (1996) 20:3 Personality and Individual Differences 341-350; Richard Lazarus, ‘Toward 
better research on stress and coping’ (2000) 55:6 American Psychologist 665-673; Julie Penley and Joe 
Tomaka ‘Associations among the Big Five, emotional responses, and coping with acute stress’ (2002) 
32:7 Personality and Individual Differences 1215-1228. 
84  Susan Folkman et al, ‘Age differences in stress and coping processes’ (1987) 2:2 Psychology and 
Aging 171-184. 
85 Charles Carver et al, ‘Assessing coping strategies: A theoretically based approach’ (1989) 56:2 Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 267-283. 
86 Richard Lazarus and Susan Folkman, ‘Coping as a mediator of emotion’ (1988) 54:3 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 466-475. 
87 Henri Tajfel, ‘Social identity and intergroup behaviour’ (1974) 13:2 Social Science Information 65-93; 
‘Interindividual behaviour and intergroup behaviour’ in Henri Tajfel (ed), Differentiation between social 
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plausible explanation for (inter-)group processes in neo-liberal societies such as ours (e.g. 
Australia, Europe, North America). 
3.C.3 Higher-power/higher-status groups 
Strong evidence suggests that the quality of the relationship between a higher-power/higher-
status and a lower-power/lower-status social group is determined by the interaction between 
perceived status, legitimacy and stability,88 as well as power differentials between these.89 
Generally, the higher the status, the higher the power. A more powerful group may abuse its 
power, because it has not only the ability but also the means to do so. An example of this might 
be senior NHS management falsifying waiting list times. When a lower-power/lower-status 
group questions the legitimacy of the higher-power/higher-status group, it might be moved into 
taking action. An example of this is the collective action resulting in the formation of the group 
The Big Opt Out.90 However, it is often the case that a lower-power/lower-status group may not 
be in a position to challenge realistically the higher-power/higher-status group or the status quo. 
An example here would be a Health Board ignoring complaints to the degree where the 
complainant simply ‘gives up trying’. 
3.C.4 Lower-power/lower-status groups 
Given that each social group is, broadly speaking, anchored in its own norm-specific culture, 
here we give three examples (older people, IV-drug users, Black and Minority Ethnic citizens) of 
specific psychosocial challenges and beliefs that may co-determine how well the lower-
power/lower-status group member is equipped to deal with an abuse.   
Research suggests that some older people might feel that they do not deserve to be treated as 
well as younger people.91 Firstly, ageist attitudes may have been internalised and therefore the 
belief that younger individuals are more entitled to better treatment that they are. Secondly, 
older people are or might be more likely to accept the status quo that institutional power is 
                                                                                                                                                       
groups: Studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations (Academic Press 1978) 27-60; Henri 
Tajfel and John Turner ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’ in William Austin and Stephen Worchel 
(eds), The social psychology of intergroup relations (Brooks/Cole 1979) 33-48; 
Henri Tajfel and John Turner ‘The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour’ in Stephen Worchel and 
William Austin (eds), Psychology of intergroup relations (Nelson-Hall 1986). For the most current 
developments and thinking regarding Social Identity Theory, see: Matthew J Hornsey and Michael A 
Hogg ‘Assimilation and diversity: An integrative model of subgroup relations’ (2000) 4:2 Personality and 
Social Psychology Review 143-156; ‘The effects of status on subgroup relations’ (2002) 41 British Journal 
of Social Psychology 203-218. 
88 John C Turner and Rupert J Brown ‘Social status, cognitive alternatives and intergroup relations’ in 
Henri Tajfel (ed), Differentiation between social groups. 
89 Although power and status are similar, these are two distinct constructs. Power is defined typically, as 
‘the degree of control one group has over its own fate and that of outgroups’ (Jones, 1972, 416). Status 
reflects the standing a group has within an intergroup setting. It can be expressed in terms of prestige, 
power, privileges and so forth (Hornsey et al, 2003). James M Jones  Prejudice and racism (Addison-
Wesley 1972); Matthew J Hornsey et al, ‘Relations between high and low power groups: The importance 
of legitimacy’ (2003) 29:2 Psychology and Social Psychology Bulletin 216-227. 
90 ‘TheBigOptOut.Org’ <http://www.thebigoptout.com/about-nhs-confidentiality/> accessed 18 June 2014. 
91 British Institute of Human Rights, Your human rights: A guide for older people (2nd ed, British Institute 
of Human Rights 2010). 
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unquestionable. Thirdly, they are part of the ‘make do and mend’ generation, so whether 
subjects would seek restorative justice is questionable.  
Intravenous drug users are, by definition, criminalised in our society. Some are high functioning 
(i.e. maintain employment and residence), and the emotion of shame and/or fear of prosecution 
might hinder them in seeking restorative justice.  
Black and Minority Ethnic groups can be multiple disadvantaged, and seeking restorative justice 
might be less likely. Namely, some might be embedded in a collectivist and not an individualist 
culture, be confronted with linguistic barriers and lack knowledge of rights and complaints 
procedures.  
3.C.5 Perpetrators and prejudice/discrimination 
The Equality Act 2010 seeks to protect individuals with protected characteristics from 
discrimination in the workplace and in wider society. According to the Act, discrimination can be 
direct or indirect, taking the form of harassment or victimisation. However, discrimination (the 
act or behaviour) is fuelled by prejudicial beliefs and attitudes (the ‘rationale’ for such acts or 
behaviour), and these in the main can take two forms. Blatant prejudice is ‘hot, close and direct’, 
whilst subtle prejudice is ‘cool, distant and indirect’.92 In the context of this report, prejudice is 
more likely to be subtle. Tactics involve rejecting the subject (and his/her social group) for 
reasons that are apparently non-prejudicial (for example, a public consultation that pays lip 
service only). Some perpetrators act alone, others in groups – indeed, some with organisational 
backing such as is the case with institutional discrimination. It is notoriously difficult to prove 
instances of indirect, subtle discrimination, particularly because it may comply with social 
norms.93 Further, the discrimination might not be hostile, but benevolent, that is, ‘we are doing 
this for your own good’.94  
3.C.6 The harm versus the impact 
We do not dispute that there might be cases where subjects of data breach feel ‘no harm done’ 
(in legal terms, no actual harm). A hypothetical example: were a dentist to lose a patient’s 
record, one individual might be satisfied if a new set of x-rays were taken. Another – with HIV-
positive status – might be very distressed at the loss. From this, we propose that the actual 
harm (the lost dental record) can have two entirely different impacts. The impact itself can range 
from mild/benign to severe/traumatic. In broadest terms, there are two explanations for this. 
Firstly, the effect experienced is based on the subject’s individual and social identities, as well 
as their personal circumstances, life stories, etc. In this sense, it is wholly correct to refer to 
                                               
92 Thomas Pettigrew and Roel Meertens, ‘Subtle and blatant prejudice in western Europe’ (1995) 25:1 
European Journal of Social Psychology 57-75.  
93 Thomas Pettigrew and Roel Meertens, ‘Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western Europe’; ‘Is Subtle 
prejudice really prejudice?’ (1997) 61: Public Opinion Quarterly 54-71. 
94 Peter Glick and Susan Fiske, ‘The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent 
sexism’ (1996) 70 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 491-512. 
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‘perceived distress’, because it is subjective. Secondly, the degree of perceived distress is 
linked to an individual’s coping strategies, which again are linked to their individual identity, lived 
experiences etc. 
3.C.7 Impact in the psychosocial context 
It is clear, then, that several factors need to be considered if we are to shed light on what harm 
and distress can mean in social reality terms, and if and how subjects can be protected, 
supported and, perhaps, compensated. Data protection law (or other laws) offer redress for 
incidents that (some) subjects have experienced and, potentially, which have changed their 
circumstances? Financial harm (damages) is recognised by the courts, but it seems that the 
legal notion of ‘distress’ goes no way to describing the pain and misery that subjects of 
discrimination, stigmatisation or other harms can suffer.95  
We conclude here: 
1. The subject has financial recourse for distressed suffered only if the breach has resulted in 
financial harm or can casually connect the distress suffered to the use of their data in 
journalism, literature or the arts (for the ‘special purposes’ under the DPA). Both options go 
no way to covering psychosocial harm that a subject might experience. 
2. It is acknowledged that two factors interact in determining how well an individual might be 
able to cope with an adverse situation.96 One of these is ‘perceived control’. If there is no 
feasible or realistic course of action available to a subject, perceived control will be low and 
this can diminish the ability to cope significantly. 
3. Some subjects will not come forward, because they do not personally perceive any harm, do 
not feel it is their right to come forward, have too many stressors to deal with that this would 
increase their stress and/or feel too disempowered to come forward. Here it is in the hands 
of the law to protect such individuals. 
4. Because distress is a subjective experience, it could be argued that it is in the hands of the 
subject and not the law to decide what constitutes harm or not.  
5. However, there are limits in how the law both recognises and compensates for harms 
caused. Arguably, this neglects the broader spectrum of harms that the psychosocial 
dimension elucidates. 
                                               
95 However, the individual data subject can recover for suffering distress if either of the requirements 
under s 13 of the DPA are met – namely – if (a) the individual also suffered damage (financial) as a result 
of the contravention of the Act; or (b) if the individual suffered their distress due to the use of their data in 
journalism, literature or art (the “special purposes”). DPA, s 13(a),(b). 
96 Sheldon Cohen and Thomas A Wills ‘Stress, social support, and the buffering hypothesis’ (1985) 98:2 
Psychological Bulletin 310-357. 
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Actual harm – versus impact: 
The remit of this report was to identify ‘actual harm’. It is contended that this is not possible in 
the psychosocial context because subjectivity is key. For this reason we refer to the ‘harms’ 
identified in the soft evidence (newspaper) review, as “impact” which can range from none at 
all, to mild irritation, to extreme distress. Therefore the term ‘impact’ is used in Sections 7.B.2 
Soft evidence typology and 8.B Soft evidence. 
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4. Abuse and harm – categories, causes and impact  
In Section 3.B we considered harm as it is understood in the narrower, regulatory context and 
the related procedures for seeking legal compensation for damage or distress. In Section 3.C 
the concept of harm was considered through the wider lens of social reality. At this point it is 
essential to present our understanding of categories of abuse, its causes and the impact it can 
have or harm it can cause.  
For the purposes of this evidence review, it was crucial to adopt a conception of harm that 
encapsulated both the legal and the psychosocial dimensions. Thus as indicated in Figure 3 
below, from this common starting point we could identify an incident, examine its cause and any 
harm to an individual or public interest, within and outside of the constraints of the legal. We 
counted an incident as hard or soft evidence if it: 
• involved health or biomedical data97,  
• irrespective of whether the data was digitalised or in paper-based form, and  
• represented harm98 arising from data use or non-use99.   
Figure 3: Harm in the context of the hard and the soft evidence searches 
 
                                               
97 As defined in 3.A.1 above. 
98 Harm as understood in the narrower, legal context as well as the broader, psychosocial context as 
described in Section 3.C as ‘impact’. 
99 Non-use refers to any opportunity costs to institutions or individuals of not sharing or linking data.  
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Against this backdrop, it became apparent that data could be abused in the legal sense, whilst 
in the psychosocial sense the abuse of data does not necessarily result in harm to the individual 
– and where it did, the consequences could be devastating. We felt that merely the consistent 
use of the term ‘breach’ would imply use of data, rather than any resultant harm to the subject. 
Therefore, we searched broadly for incidents involving health or biomedical data, using terms of 
reference such as data breach but also for specific instances of non-use. In other words, to 
bring the legal and psychosocial perspectives together for the purposes of this evidence review 
we searched for incidents of ‘harm’ as they arose from:  
1. Abuse of data, and/or  
2. Non-use of data.  
4.A Categories of abuse  
We were mindful of the types of abuse mentioned in the Brief for Tender, but we did not seek to 
allocate incidents into pre-determined categories of abuse. Rather, we let the data speak for 
themselves (the inductive approach). As shown in Figure 4 the types of abuse uncovered in this 
evidence review broadly include:  
Figure 4: Types of abuse 
Wilful/intentional 
Negligent/Unintentional100 
                                               
100 Failure to use data (non-use of data) is admittedly considered separately from the types of abuse that 
arise from actual use of data given a) the overall lack of evidence found on harms arising from failure to 
use health or biomedical data and b) the broader nature of harms that could stem from non-use e.g. 
stunting the development of scientific knowledge etc., as opposed to the individual harms uncovered and 
arising from use of data. 
Evidence of harm was then considered in terms of the ‘abuse’ of health or biomedical 
data. Terminology such as ‘breach’ implied use of data and the brief was to conduct 
an evidence review for harms arising both from use and non-use of data. Non-use 
refers to missed opportunities from the failure to use data resulting in e.g. suboptimal 
use of data from the point of view of the development of scientific knowledge, 
securing health outcomes, promoting economic growth and wider public benefits, etc. 
Thus ‘abuse’ was used to refer to both data breaches and cases of non-use in the 
typologies developed. 
1. Fabrication or falsification of data 
2. Theft of data 
3. Unauthorised disclosure of or access to data 
4. Non-secure disposal of data 
5. Unauthorised retention of data 
6. Technical security failures 
7. Loss of data 
8. Non-use of data 
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After a team discussion the categories of abuses identified were ranked on an ordinal scale 
ranging from wilful and intentional abuses of data to more unintentional or negligent uses – both 
of which can result in harm/impact for individuals, organisations or broader public interests. 
Importantly, this spectrum of abuse is not exhaustive – it is informed by the data.101 
4.B Causes for abuse  
The abuse of health or biomedical data was then attributed to a ‘cause’ that may be understood 
as an incentive or motivation leading to harm or impact. Linking the abuse to a specific cause 
was likewise subject to team discussion. There were differences in how easily a cause could be 
established, whereby and as expected, the hard evidence gave a clear understanding of the 
cause, whereas the soft evidence did not. There were other differences in the categorisation 
processes. For instance, the soft evidence findings showed that it would be useful to distinguish 
cause by involvement with NHS staff versus those incidents not involving NHS staff; whereas 
the hard evidence did not require such a distinction due to the wider variety of incidents found. 
As shown in Figure 5 these causes broadly include: 
Figure 5: Causes for abuse of data  
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The causes attributed to abuse or non-use of data are also ranked on an ordinal scale by the 
team, from wilful and intentional abuses of data by the data controller/their staff, moving towards 
                                               
101 In Section 10.E we consider the possibility for future work to take forward an evidence review specific 
to threats, vulnerabilities, risks and potential mitigations whereas this commission focused on evidence of 
actual harm and thus incidents (as opposed to risks contributing to abuses of data). 
• Abuse of data to meet NHS/organisational objectives 
• Abuse of data to protect professional reputation 
• Abuse of data for self-gain (e.g. monetary gain) 
• Abuse attributed to third parties (e.g. hackers) 
• Disclosure by the press or media 
• Unauthorised access without clinical or lawful justification (e.g. 
for curiosity) 
• Against the wishes/objections of the individual 
• Abuse as a result of insufficient safeguards 
• Abuse arising out of a Freedom of Information request 
• Abuse due to maladministration (e.g. failure to follow correct 
procedures) 
• Abuse due to human error (e.g. sending a fax to the wrong 
recipient) 
• Non-use due to misinterpretation of legal obligations 
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involvement of third parties,102 and less intentional, more negligent use or non-use of data that 
can nevertheless be harmful to individuals or broader, public interests.  
4.C Harm types 
Finally, we considered ‘harm’ in terms of individual harm, harm to institutions (including harm to 
an organisation’s reputation or diminishing public trust in the confidentiality of the doctor-patient 
relationship etc.), potential for harm in the future, and findings of no harm (from the perspective 
of the evidence source i.e. the perspective of a judge etc.). Importantly, the list in Figure 6 below 
is not exhaustive as to the types or range of harms that could potentially befall an individual or 
organisation as a result of the abuse of health or biomedical data. Rather, the types of harm in 
Figure 6 are specifically and informed by the data we gathered in this review: 
Figure 6: Harms caused by abuse 
Grievous harm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No evidence of harm 
 
 
Importantly, this spectrum of harm includes incidents where there was simply not enough 
information reported on the nature of the abuse to describe harm caused to either an individual, 
organisation or broader public interest. Such incidents were found typically in the soft evidence 
(newspaper and social media) review. In Section 9.A we will consider the implications from 
findings of ‘no evidence of harm’ as well as the lack of evidence for types of harm not 
uncovered (or thus reflected in Figure 6 above).  
                                               
102 Abuse attributed to the actions of a third party, such as a hacker, can implicate both the 
wilful/intentional abuse by the third party as well as, potentially, the negligence of the data controller who 
may have been able to prevent the abuse through more stringent, technical security/safeguards etc. 
• Receipt of suboptimal care, resulting in detriment to health 
or death  
• Individual distress e.g. emotional, physical, etc.  
• Damage to individual reputation (e.g. societal, personal or 
professional) 
• Individual, financial loss 
• Damage to public interest (e.g. loss of faith in confidential, 
health service, general loss of public trust in medical 
profession, delayed or stunted scientific progress etc.) 
• Damage to organisational reputation (e.g. to NHS) 
• Potential for harm to individual, organisation or the public 
interest in future 
• No evidence of harm found due to lack of reported 
information 
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‘No evidence of harm’: 
For the purposes of this review, where an incident is categorised with ‘no evidence of harm’, 
this does not indicate that the individual, organisation and/or public interest did not in fact 
suffer harm. Rather, ‘no evidence of harm’ merely reflects that the incident was not reported 
with sufficient detail for us to meaningfully describe the nature of 1) the incident and 2) the 
type of harm that may have been caused. 
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5. Approach/Methodology  
Please note: Contrary to convention but at the request of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(NCOB) Working Party on Biological and Health Data and the Expert Advisory Group on Data 
Access (EAGDA), this section appears at the start of this document and not before the Method 
section. 
This includes the sub-sections: 
• Scope 
• Methodology 
• Limitations. 6. Method  
Note: All searches described below took place between February and March 2014.  
6.A Hard evidence  
The hard evidence strand encompassed a systematic review of court and tribunal rulings from 
the UK, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), as well as the administrative enforcement measures undertaken by 
the ICO. This compilation of resources provided a firm evidence base on the sanctions aimed at 
addressing abuses of health or biomedical data, from the standpoint of laws protecting the 
range of data and privacy interests at stake, including the DPA and common law provisions 
such as breach of confidence.103 The databases used for the hard evidence search were 
primarily UK focused, although ECtHR and CJEU cases were searched to seek parallel cases 
of abuse in the EU. As a systematic search method was employed, evidence was limited to 
incidents found under the search criteria and other search parameters chosen (i.e. timeframe, 
database chosen). 
The websites searched are shown in  
Table 4 below. For more in-depth details on the constraints encountered in each website, see 
Appendix, Table 22. 
                                               
103 This refers to the overlap between breaches of the DPA, and actions at common law, namely, 
breaches of confidence (also understood post-enactment of the Human Rights Act as misuse of private 
information). There was further regulatory overlap in court judgments, where the European Convention of 
Human Rights, and in particular Article 8, was often implicated if the abuse of data involved a breach of 
an individual’s right to private and family life. 
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Table 4: Hard evidence: websites consulted  
Site Time 
frame 
Search terms 
UK Case Law within LexisNexis: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/ 
 
1998-
2014 
'health or medical PRE/1 data and breach' 
‘biomedical and data’ 
‘biological data’ 
‘genetic and data and breach’ 
‘health and data and non-use’ 
UK Information Tribunal Cases: 
http://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/P
ublic/search.aspx 
 
- jurisdictional area 'DPA 1998' 
'sensitive personal data' 
'confidentiality of information' 
‘right to prevent processing likely to cause damage 
or distress' 
  jurisdictional area 'HRA 1998' 
'right to private and family life' 
  jurisdictional area 'FOI 2000' 
'information provided in confidence' 
UK Information Commissioner’s Office 
Prosecutions, Monetary Penalty Notices 
and Decision Notices: 
http://ico.org.uk/enforcement 
- Prosecutions and Monetary Penalty Notices:         
no search terms used; read case by case 
Decision Notices: ‘health data’, ‘biomedical data’ 
EU Case Law within LexisNexis: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/legal/ 
1995-
2014 
'health or medical PRE/1 data and breach'  
'genetic or biomedical and data and breach' 
‘biological data’ 
‘health and data and non-use’ 
 
6.B Soft evidence  
In terms of the soft evidence strand, the search to establish evidence of abuse and its impact 
from the standpoint of the subject or the subject’s group required flexibility and creativity. The 
search engine used was Google, where identified sites were explored and relevant sites 
emerging from the original sites were explored further. The sites (see Table 5 below) identified 
as a starting point were (a) newspapers in the UK, (b) charitable organisations representing the 
most vulnerable and therefore potential subject groups of discrimination and (c) ‘citizens’ voice’ 
sites, which were identified through the newspaper searches.  
 
Table 5: Soft evidence – list of newspaper, charity and citizens’ voice websites  
Newspapers Charities ‘Citizens’ Voice’  
Express Age UK Big Brother Watch 
Guardian Carers UK Citizen’s Advice 
Independent Lesbian and Gay Foundation  Digital Right Ireland 
Mail Mind GeneWatch 
Mirror Prisoners’ Advice Service Healthwatch 
Sun Prison Reform Trust Liberty 
Telegraph Race Equality First medConfidential 
Times Race Equality Foundation Patients’ Association 
Belfast Telegraph (NI) Stonewall Patient Care (Watchdog) 
The Herald (Scotland) Terrence Higgins Trust Patient Concern 
Western Mail (Wales)   
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Search terms* Search terms* Search terms* 
medical; patient; record; 
data; breach; misuse; 
biomedic; genetic 
data, breach and/or misuse data, breach and/or misuse 
*Note that there were many differences in search options between these sources, such as the use of Boolean 
operators, searching specific sections, searching specific time spans.  
As listed in Table 6 below, the UK on-line newspapers (including Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales) were chosen because of their high circulation figures and the range of demographic 
readerships, inclusive of daily and Sunday editions. The search covered the longest time span 
that was available. The charities chosen represent the most exposed groups in society who are 
vulnerable to discrimination and/or stigmatisation. The citizens’ voice groups were identified, 
because they were cited in certain newspaper articles. 
 
Table 6: Newspapers, charities and citizen’s voice groups 
Newspapers Web-site Type Circulation Readership 
   104  
Express http://www.express.co.uk/  middle-market 529,648 right-wing, populist 
Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/uk  (former) broadsheet 204,440 centre-left, social liberal 
Independent http://www.independent.co.uk/  compact 76,802 economically liberal, politically centrist  
Mail http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/index.html  middle-market 1,863,151 right-wing, populist 
Mirror http://www.mirror.co.uk/  tabloid 1,058,488 social-democratic, populist 
Sun http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/  tabloid 2,409,811 right-wing, populist 
Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/  broadsheet 555,817 centre right, conservative 
Times http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/  broadsheet 399,339 centre-right 
Belfast Telegraph (NI) http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/  compact 53,847105 In NI context, ‘balanced’106  
The Herald (Scotland) http://www.heraldscotland.com/  broadsheet 47,226107  centre-left 
Western Mail (Wales) http://www.walesonline.co.uk/  compact 32,926108 populist 
Charities Web-site Purpose   
Age UK http://www.ageuk.org.uk/ The largest UK organisation dedicated to ‘inspire, enable and support’ older people. Remit: from 
financial advice to health and wellbeing support.   
Carers UK http://www.carersuk.org/ To support those looking after family/friend who is older, disabled or seriously ill. Remit: from 
debt advice to dealing with caregiver burden 
Lesbian and Gay Foundation  https://www.lgf.org.uk/ To advise and support lesbian, gay and bisexual people. Remit: from coming out advice to 
dealing with sexual violence 
Mind http://www.mind.org.uk/  To advise, support and empower anyone experiencing a mental health problem. Remit: from 
information on drugs and medication to legal rights. 
Prisoners’ Advice Service http://www.prisonersadvice.org.uk/ To provide legal advice and information to prisoners in England and Wales. Remit: from 
temporary release to mother and baby units. 
                                               
104 ‘List of newspapers in the United Kingdom by circulation’ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_in_the_United_Kingdom_by_circulation> adapted from the Audit 
Bureau of Circulation (access with subscription only), accessed 17 April 2014. 
105 ABC, ‘Belfast Telegraph ABC Audited Figures’ <http://www.abc.org.uk/Products-Services/Product-Page/?tid=20868> accessed 29 April 2014. 
106 TGI,  <http://www.tgisurveys.com> accessed 29 April 2014.  
107 Jamie McIvor, ‘Scottish daily paper sales slip’ (2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-14509435> accessed 29 April 2014. 
108 ABC, ‘Audit Bureau of Circulation: Summary Report - The Western Mail’ (2009) <http://www.abc.org.uk/Products-Services/Product-Page/?tid=20940&epslanguage=en-GB>  
accessed 29 April 2014. 
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Prison Reform Trust http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/ To inform prisoners, to influence the Judiciary and the Executive. Remit: from citizenship to 
prisoners with learning difficulties.  
Race Equality Foundation http://www.raceequalityfoundation.org.uk/ To explore discrimination and disadvantage, in order to develop interventions. Remit: from 
health to gun and knife gang crime. 
Stonewall https://www.stonewall.org.uk/ A major campaigner and lobbyist, representing the lesbian, gay and bisexual community. Remit: 
from education to health. 
Terrence Higgins Trust http://www.tht.org.uk/ To promote sexual health, minimise HIV rates, to empower those living with HIV. Remit: from 
sexual health education to immigration and healthcare. 
Citizens’ Voice groups Web-site Purpose   
Big Brother Watch http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/ To challenge policies that threaten privacy, freedom and civil liberties 
Citizen’s Advice http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/  To provide advice on issues such as debt, employment, housing and discrimination  
Digital Right Ireland http://www.digitalrights.ie/  To defend civil, human and legal rights in a digital age.  
GeneWatch http://www.genewatch.org/  To monitor developments in genetic technology development (not only) from the public interest 
perspective 
Healthwatch http://www.healthwatch.co.uk/  To deliver the consumer voice to the commissioners, regulators and providers of health and care 
services. England only. Has statutory powers. 
Liberty http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/  To campaign to protect basic rights and freedoms through the courts, in Parliament and in the 
wider community.  
medConfidential http://medconfidential.org/  To campaign for confidentiality and consent in health and social care 
Patients’ Association http://www.patients-association.com/  To advocate for better access to accurate and independent information for patients and the 
public, and for patient rights and decision-making  
Patient Concern http://www.patientconcern.org.uk/  To promote choice and empowerment for all health service users 
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6.C Twitter evidence  
The method for searching for evidence on social media began with a search for the world’s 
most popular social media website, Facebook (as ranked in March, 2014).109 However, 
due to the way Facebook’s privacy settings are enabled, the search conducted would not 
return any relevant hits within the profiles of individuals, that is, hits that were native to the 
Facebook website. Rather, Facebook conducted the search automatically via Google’s 
search engine. 110  
Therefore, the second most popular social media site – Twitter – was used. Twitter’s 
advanced search function was employed for the terms ‘health data breach’, excluding the 
words ‘care.data’. This search returned over 1,000 hits, whilst the search for ‘biomedical 
data breach’, ‘biological data’, and ‘genetic data breach’ excluding care.data returned no 
hits.111 The search was revised to search for: ‘medical data breach’, excluding the words 
‘care.data’ and limiting the search to tweets posted within Scotland, UK as medical was 
determined to be a more common and less technical term suited to the social media nature 
of Twitter.112 
  
                                               
109As of 7 March 2014, Facebook received an estimated 900,000,000 unique monthly visitors, 
whereas Twitter received 310,000,000 and LinkedIn 250,000,000. eBizMBA, ‘Top 15 Most Popular 
Social Networking Sites March 2014’ (2014) <http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-
websites>  accessed 27 March 2014. 
110As a result a search was conducted via Facebook’s general search bar, whilst being logged in 
under an individual user profile. The terms ‘health data breach’, ‘medical data breach’ and 
‘biomedical data breach’ were searched for and returned no hits which were ‘native’ to the 
Facebook website. 
111 Due to space constraints and to facilitate data analysis the search was narrowed. 
112 Scotland, UK as opposed to the entirety of the UK was chosen as the limiting variable to the 
search because it was not possible to select tweets posted from within the whole UK – only specific 
cities, zip codes or countries. 
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 7. Results 
Under 6.A, initial findings are presented from the hard evidence, the soft evidence and 
Twitter, where we discuss frequencies and percentages. Under 7.B, we present the 
emergent typologies of abuse, cause and harm, where findings are differentiated by abuse 
type, and cross-matched by cause and by harm/impact. Under Section 7.C the merged 
evidence is presented. 
7.A Initial findings 
7.A.1 Hard Evidence 
The hard evidence uncovered 705 total hits, of which fifty-one incidents fit the criteria as 
hard evidence of abuse of health or biomedical data (see Table 7 below). Each incident 
was assigned a unique incident number (e.g. UKC1, ICOP1 etc.), case name (where 
appropriate), date, source, abuse type (with synopsis of the incident), cause and synopsis 
on the harm caused (if any evidence of harm was indicated). A detailed list of the fifty-one 
relevant hits is provided in Table 23 of the Appendix. 
Table 7: Hard evidence results 
Target Time 
frame 
Search terms Total hits Relevant 
hits  
UK Case Law113 
within LexisNexis 
 
1998-
2014 
'health or medical PRE/1 data and breach' 
‘health and data and non-use’114 
‘biomedical and data’ 
‘biological data’ 
‘genetic and data and breach’ 
Total hits for UK Case Law: 
 
65  
33 
34 
4 
147 
283 
14 (20%) 
0 (%) 
0(0%) 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
14 (5%) 
UK First-tier 
Tribunal 
- jurisdictional area 'DPA 1998' 
'sensitive personal data' 
 
6 
 
0 (0%) 
                                               
113 All cases searched from Privy Council, Supreme Court, House of Lords, Court of Appeal (All), 
CA, Civil Division, CA, Criminal Division Family Division, Queen's Bench Division (All), QBD, 
Administrative Court, QBD, Admiralty Court, QBD, Commercial Court, QBD, Divisional Court QBD, 
Technology and Construction Court, Chancery Division (All), ChD, Patents Court, ChD, Companies 
Court, Employment Appeal Tribunal, Lands Tribunal, Special Commissioners, VAT and Duties 
Tribunal, High Court of Justiciary, Scotland, Court of Session, Scotland, Northern Ireland Court of 
Appeal, Northern Ireland Queen's Bench Division, First-tier Tribunal (Tax), Upper Tribunal (Tax and 
Chancery Chamber), Competition Appeal Tribunal, Court of Protection, Upper Tribunal 
(Administrative Appeals Chamber), Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), Upper 
Tribunal (Lands Tribunal). 
114 The search for non-use of data was expanded to incorporate all case law available in the 
LexisNexis database. Thus these results (0 relevant hits) for non-use reflect both UK and EU case 
law. 
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Target Time 
frame 
Search terms Total hits Relevant 
hits  
(Information 
Rights)115 cases: 
'confidentiality of information' 
‘right to prevent processing likely to cause 
damage or distress' 
2 
3 
0 (0%) 
0 (0%) 
  jurisdictional area 'HRA 1998' 
'right to private and family life' 
 
4 
 
1 (25%) 
  jurisdictional area 'FOI 2000' 
'information provided in confidence' 
Total hits for Information Tribunal: 
 
8 
23 
 
0 (0%) 
1 (4%) 
UK Information 
Commissioner’s 
Office 
Prosecutions, 
Monetary Penalty 
Notices and 
Decision Notices  
- Prosecutions: read case-by-case  
Monetary Penalty Notices: read case-by-case 
Decision Notices: ‘health data’ and ‘biomedical 
data’ 
Total hits for ICO enforcement: 
17 
51 
 
6 
74 
4 (24%) 
14 (27%) 
 
6(4) (6%) 
22 (30%) 
EU Case Law116 
within LexisNexis 
Database 
1995-
2014 
'health or medical PRE/1 data and breach'  
'genetic or biomedical and data and breach' 
‘biological data’ 
Total hits for European case law: 
271 
47 
7 
325 
13 
1 
0 (0%) 
14(4%) 
Cumulative Total   705 51 (7%) 
 
Of the 283 total UK case law hits a mere 5% were relevant, fitting the criteria for hard 
evidence. Out of the total fourteen relevant incidents found in UK case law all fourteen 
related to health data.  
The First-tier Tribunal cases considered only uncovered twenty-three relevant hits, of 
which only one (4%) was relevant.  
The ICO enforcement measures uncovered more relevant hits by percentage compared to 
any other source considered because of the narrow focus of the ICO on data-related 
incidents. Out of a total seventy-four hits, 30% of these met the hard evidence criteria, with 
monetary penalty notices carrying the most hits and most relevant hits (4%: fourteen), with 
prosecutions and decision notices both providing four relevant hits.  
Finally, the European court judgments reviewed had the most top-level hits, producing 325 
cases to consider. However, only 4% were relevant and met the hard evidence search 
criteria (fourteen incidents), all of which were from the ECtHR. This was expected given 
the role played by Article 8 protections of privacy, by virtue of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Only one hit involved genetic data.(EUC7) We consider this case separately 
and in depth in Section 9.A.7 Genetic data as well as highlighting abuse of genetic data as 
an area warranting further and future research in Section 10.D. 
                                               
115 In 2010 the ‘Information Tribunal’ became part of the General Regulatory Chamber of the First-
tier Tribunal, and thus is now named the First–tier Tribunal (Information Rights), as part of the 
restructuring of the Tribunal system, mandated by the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. 
116 The European searched included judgments from: the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), General Court of the EU (formerly CFI) and European 
Union Civil Service Tribunal (First Chamber). 
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Overall, incidents relating to health data produced significantly more results than similar 
searches for biomedical data. This is unsurprising, given the variability in how courts use 
scientific terminology – terms are often interchanged. Furthermore, whereas health or 
medical data are mentioned specifically in both UK and European data protection 
legislation, neither biomedical nor genetic data are.117 Thus, there is even less precedent 
for use of these terms in the legal context.118 
7.A.2 Soft evidence  
7.A.2.A Newspapers 
In we list the search conditions and number of hits for each newspaper. The number of hits 
were categorised initially and broadly as ‘abuse’ or ‘other’. The types of abuse were those 
indicated in Figure 4 (i.e. data loss, data theft etc.), and were not limited to specific types of 
data (i.e. electronic and/or hard-copy). The category other comprised articles that we felt 
might be useful for this review.119 Irrespective of category type, we also noted any 
references to (a) the ICO, (b) a FoI request, and/or (c) to other organisations that had the 
potential to offer more evidence of abuse and harms (citizens’ voice groups, e.g. Big 
Brother Watch, medConfidential).  
A total of 208 articles were identified initially, and given a unique newspaper identifier120 
and article number (e.g. Inx = The Independent, Tex = The Telegraph). The gross total of 
hits revealed 139 abuse articles and sixty-nine other articles. Upon closer scrutiny, the 139 
abuse articles were reduced to eighty-seven. Of those disregarded, thirty-four lacked 
relevance or detail and eighteen were re-categorised as other. 
  
                                               
117 Although there is indication from recent drafts of the pDPR that both biomedical and genetic data 
would be included in future data protection regulation in Europe. 
118 See Section 3.A.1 above for the definitions of health and biomedical data adopted for this 
evidence review. 
119 Examples include academic studies, commercial genetic testing and the phenomenon of 
blagging. 
120 B = Belfast Telegraph, E = Express, G = Guardian, H = Scottish Herald, In = Independent, Ma = 
Mail, Mi = Mirror, S = Sun, Te = Telegraph, Ti = Times, W = Western Mail. 
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Table 8: Search conditions and hits by newspaper  
Newspapers Advanced 
search 
Sections  
searched 
Hits from-to Range of number of 
hits 
Total initial 
hits 
Of which 
‘abuse’  
Of which 
‘other’  
Express No News & Health 2004-2013 1-203 24 14 10 
Guardian121 No No 2001-2014 298-7130 27 20 7 
Independent Yes News 2006-2014 21-551 21 14 7 
Mail No News & Health 2008-2014 71-2451 22 10 12 
Mirror122 No News 2007-2014 5-429 19 14 5 
Sun No News 2007-2013 3-2302 27 25 2 
Telegraph123 No News 2010-2014 ≈87-≈12,100 20 5 15 
Times No News & Health 2002-2014 9-3,182 23 17 6 
Belfast Telegraph (NI) No News 2005-2014 0-431 18 15 3 
The Herald (Scotland) No No 2001-2012 7-43 2 1 1 
Western Mail (Wales) No News 2011-2013 0-627 5 4 1 
Total     208 139 69 
 
 
                                               
121 Reviewed only the first 100 possible. 
122 A relevant hit was generated if the search term appeared anywhere on the webpage containing the article. 
123 Reviewed hits until message ‘no more recommended’ came up on the webpage. 
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A shown in Table 9, over half of the articles identified dated back to 2011 and 2012 (28% 
and 25% respectively). In terms of newspaper type, tabloid articles were the least 
represented (Mirror and Sun combined = 17%), middle-market (Express and Mail) and 
regional national (Belfast Telegraph, Herald, Western Mail) articles marginally more (18% 
each). Thus, half of the articles (49%) came from (former) broadsheet newspapers 
(Guardian, Independent, Telegraph, Times).  
Table 9: Post-scrutiny abuse hits from January 2009 to March 2014 by newspaper by year 
Newspapers 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 Total (%) 
Express 0 2 3 1 0 3 9 (10%) 
Guardian 3 2 2 9 0 2 18 (21%) 
Independent 0 0 6 3 0 1 10 (11%) 
Mail 0 0 2 2 2 1 7 (8%) 
Mirror 2 0 0 1 0 3 6(7%) 
Sun 0 1 3 4 1 4 13 (15%) 
Telegraph 1 3 0 1 0 0 5 (6%) 
Times 1 2 1 2 2 2 10 (11%) 
Belfast Telegraph (NI) 0 4 5 2 0 2 13 (15%) 
The Herald (Scotland) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 (1%) 
Western Mail (Wales) 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 (5%) 
Total 
(%) 
7 
(8%) 
14 
(16%) 
22 
(25%) 
24 
(28%) 
5 
(6%) 
15 
(17%) 
87 
 
The net score of eighty-seven hits was inflated, because some incidents were reported in 
multiple newspapers and/or over several days. To rectify this, the eighty-seven articles 
were then sorted into a total of sixty distinct ‘incidents’. We also noted which incidents 
were reports of multiple instances of abuse, and whether the ICO was aware of the 
incident or not. Please see Table 25 in the Appendix for a list of the incidents. Each 
incident notes the unique article number(s) such as news01, news02 and so forth, date(s) 
of publication, source(s) of the story (e.g. ICO, FoI, member of the public), whether the 
article(s) refer to multiple events, the place of the abuse (where possible), a brief synopsis 
of the incident and, where available, impact statements from the subjects and/or 
commentary statements from other organisations. We also include a separate reference 
list for all newspaper articles, sorted by unique article number in the Appendix Table 27. 
7.A.2.B Charities and citizens’ voice groups  
In Table 10 we list the number of hits and relevant hits for charities and citizens’ voice 
groups. Results from charity websites were disappointing. The search terms – data misuse 
or breach – did bring up 419 hits, but only one of these was relevant. This was accounted 
for in part by the site being closed to ‘outsiders’ (e.g. the Terrence Higgins Trust offers very 
limited access to those not living with HIV), or the site’s focus (e.g. the Prison Reform 
 63 
Trust, where breaches to the European Convention on Human Rights were discussed in 
terms of the prison population banned from voting). The only hit identified was on Age UK, 
informing its readership of NHS waiting-times being recorded incorrectly.  
Table 10: Hits by charity and citizens’ voice groups  
Charities Number of hits No. of relevant hits Total 
Age UK 5 1 1 
Carers UK 0 0 0 
Lesbian and Gay Foundation  225 0 0 
Mind 34 0 0 
Prisoners’ Advice Service No search possible   
Prison Reform Trust 72 0 0 
Race Equality Foundation 40 0 0 
Stonewall 43 0 0 
Terrence Higgins Trust 0 0 0 
Total 419 1 1 
Citizens’ voice groups Number of hits No. of relevant hits Total 
Big Brother Watch 15 1 1 
Citizen’s Advice 0 0 0 
Digital Right Ireland 10 0 0 
GeneWatch 0 0 0 
Healthwatch 0 0 0 
Liberty 1 0 0 
medConfidential 1  0 
Patients Association 5 1 1 
Patient Concern No search possible. One 
article identified under ‘Press 
Releases’  
0 0 
Total 32 4 2 
 
The citizens’ voice groups search produced only two relevant hits from the initial total of 
thirty-two (see Table 10). These were (1) a report by Big Brother Watch,124 citing the I v. 
Finland case, which is captured and discussed elsewhere in this report, and (2) a 
document by The Patients Association,125 where in one patient story the narrator 
commented that ‘patients' notes were routinely left on the ward floor, which we feel must 
be a serious breach of patient confidentiality and a health issue’.  
                                               
124Big Brother Watch, ‘Broken records: The worrying lack of security around your medical history, 
and how it is changing for the worse’ (2010) 
<http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/home/2010/09/why-our-broken-records-report-matters-mk-
ii.html> accessed 29 April 2014. 
125 The Patients Association, ‘Stories from the present, lessons for the future’ (2012) 36 
<http://gallery.mailchimp.com/9dd6577cf3f36af3c2f6682ed/files/Patient_Stories_2012.pdf?utm_sour
ce=Press+List&utm_campaign=64ed66807d-Patient+Stories+Report+2012&utm_medium=email> 
accessed 29 April 2014.  
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7.A.3 Twitter Evidence 
The search on Twitter resulted in 229 hits of which seventy (31%) met the criteria for 
evidence of an abuse of health or biomedical data (see Table 11). The 229 hits were 
reduced to seventy by discarding duplicate tweets on the same incident, tweets where 
follow-on links explaining the incident were faulty and tweets that were marketing ploys by 
companies offering data security services. Of the seventy relevant hits, only eleven were 
related to incidents in the UK. Internationally, there was one incident reported in Ireland, 
one in Zambia, and an overwhelming fifty-seven incidents of abuse in the US. Each 
incident was assigned a unique incident number, date(s) of tweet, the location of the 
abuse, abuse type, cause (with synopsis of the incident) and synopsis on the harm (if any 
evidence of harm was indicated). 
Table 11: Twitter hits using advanced search  
Search terms Total hits Relevant hits (%) 
'health data breach’ 
‘medical data breach’ excluding ‘care.data’ 
‘biomedical data breach’ excluding ‘care.data’ 
‘biological data’ 
‘genetic data breach’ 
1,000+ 
229 
0 
0 
0 
N/A 
70 (31%) 
0 
0 
0 
Total 229 70 (31%) 
 
Given the vast difference in social networking website users in the US and UK, 163 million 
versus 32 million users respectively, and that only 15 million of the UK internet users use 
Twitter (versus 49 million in the US), such disparity is likely to have impacted the US-
centric nature of results.126 Furthermore, numerous US states have mandatory data breach 
notifications legislation,127 making it more likely that data breaches come into the public 
light as opposed to the UK where no such obligation exists, except for the mandatory self-
reporting of data breaches by the NHS Trusts. 
Even more extreme than the hard evidence results, searches for ‘biological’, ‘biomedical’ 
and ‘genetic’ data breach uncovered zero hits. Given the informal and pseudo-social 
environment that is Twitter, technical terms such as biomedical, genetic or biological data 
(versus more broad terms such as health or medical data) will not be used with the 
precision one would expect in e.g. academic journals. Thus, it is likely that terminology 
such as biomedical, biological or genetic was too technical for the Twitter environment 
whereby ‘health’ or ‘medical’ was more suitable for this context. Furthermore, there is a 
                                               
126 Twitter’s outgoing CEO Tony Wang announced the increase in UK Twitter users to 15 million in 
September 2013: <https://twitter.com/TonyW/status/375889809153462272> accessed 25 April 
2014 whilst maintaining 49 million users in the US <http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-has-a-
surprisingly-small-number-of-us-users-2013-10> accessed 25 April 2014. 
127 Numerous states in the US have enacted data breach notification laws since 2002 in response to 
an escalating number of data breaches. California was the first such state to enact data breach 
notification legislation with SB 1386, Cal. Civ. Code 1798.82 and 1798.29 in 2002. 
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140 character limit on ‘tweets’ – biomedical and biological takes up ten characters; health 
six and medical seven. This could also influence the terminology used and exacerbate any 
preconceived notions on the conflated meanings of these terms. 
7.B Typologies of abuse by cause and abuse by harm/impact 
It was our intention to develop two tables – a ‘typology’ where each column represented a 
type of abuse (e.g. non-secure disposal, data loss, etc.), and each row either the cause of 
abuse (e.g. maladministration, human error etc.) or the type of impact or harm (e.g. 
individual distress, financial loss etc.). We then intended to note in the appropriate cells the 
incidents uncovered in all three evidence strands. However, the results were too complex 
to present in such a way, the data too large. Therefore we developed two tables each for 
each evidence strand – Abuse by Cause and Abuse by Harm/Impact – resulting in six 
tables in total.  
Further, the cause was often a question of interpretation or inference in the soft evidence, 
and to a lesser extent in the more factually robust hard evidence. For example, when 
patient records were stored in a public area before being taken to a safe storage area, was 
this human error or maladministration or both?(Inc39-E18) In addition, not all categories 
identified in one strand had counterparts in the other two strands. 
7.B.1 Hard evidence typology 
7.B.1.A Inconsistent reporting across UK and European judgments 
The findings from the hard evidence vary in the amount of detail given in each particular 
case thus influencing the amount of information that had to be deduced from what was 
reported. The UK case law, First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights), ECtHR and CJEU 
judgments were not reported according to any standardised format and thus the amount of 
factual and objective detail about each incident varied extensively. In all cases there was 
sufficient detail regarding the nature of the abuse to assign a cause for abuse (from 
deduction). The same analysis was undertaken when there was sufficient detail allowing 
inferences of harm; where there was simply no discussion of harm, this was recorded as 
‘no evidence of harm’ – which again, does not indicate harm was not caused, but rather 
that there was insufficient reporting to infer the type or extent of harm that might have 
occurred. 
This differs from the ICO enforcement actions such as monetary penalties, which were 
reported in a standardised fashion, whether in the press releases or notice forms. Thus, 
the ICO enforcement actions provided more consistency on the amount factual detail 
offered on abuse type, cause and any harm caused.  
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7.B.1.B Frequencies of abuse reported in the hard evidence 
Table 12 represents the entirety of hard evidence categorised according to both abuse 
type and cause. The following discussion considers the frequency of abuses by the 
underlying cause, as ascertained from the evidence. 
As shown in Table 12 below, the most prevalent cause for abuse of health or biomedical 
data that emerged from the hard evidence was due to ‘maladministration’ (ten incidents). 
Maladministration operated as a “catchall” cause for abuse including incidents arising from 
incorrect action or failure to take any action, failure to follow procedures or the law, 
inadequate consultation prior to taking action, broken promises in regards to the data in 
question etc. The incidents involving maladministration resulted most often in unauthorised 
disclosure or access to health or biomedical data (five incidents), or the non-secure 
disposal of data (four incidents) with only one incident involving the unauthorised retention 
of data. These incidents128 included (for example) – in order of severity – of the abuse: 
• Hospital staff disclosing sensitive personal data of patients to the press, including 
HIV status, despite clear procedures regarding patient confidentiality.(EUC6, EUC11) 
• Improper decommissioning of hard drives, containing patient data including those 
that identifies HIV positive patients.(ICOM13) 
• Negligent uploading of sensitive personal data of employees to a publicly 
accessible website, without noticing for over nineteen weeks.(ICOM10) 
• Sending sensitive patient records to the wrong fax number on over forty-five 
occasions, compromising fifty-nine individuals’ data despite clear procedures to 
avoid this.(ICOM14)  
 
                                               
128 For a full breakdown of the incidents uncovered in the hard evidence review please reference 
Table 23 in the Appendix. 
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Table 12: Hard evidence – Abuse by cause 
Abuse 
 
Cause 
Non-secure 
disposal  
Loss Technical 
security failing 
Fabrication/
Falsification 
Unauthorised  
 
Non-use Total by Cause 
    Disclosure or access  Retention    
FOI Request     5 
(IT1 ICOD1 ICOD2 ICOD3 ICOD4) 
  5 (10%) 
To meet organisational targets    1 
(UKC9) 
1 
(UKC1) 
 2 
(EUC3) 
2 (4%) 
Involving third parties    1 
(ICOM1) 
    1 (2%) 
Facilitated by:         
Maladministration 4 
(ICOM3 ICOM5 
ICOM12 
ICOM13) 
   5 
(ICOM10 ICOM14 EUC6 EUC7 
EUC11) 
1 
(EUC7) 
 10 (20%) 
Human error  3 
(ICOM2 
ICOM6 
ICOM7) 
  4 
(ICOM4 ICOM8 ICOM9 ICOM11) 
  7 (14%) 
Misinterpretation of legal obligations       1 
(EUC10) 
1 (2%) 
Access without clinical or legitimate 
justification  
    5 
(ICOP1 ICOP2 ICOP3 ICOP4 EUC8)  
  5 (10%) 
Against objections or without 
consent of the individual 
    9 
(UKC2 UKC4 UKC8 UKC10 UKC12 
UKC13 UKC14 EUC4 EUC13) 
  9 (18%) 
Insufficient safeguards     4 
(UKC3 UKC5 UKC7 EUC9) 
  4 (8%) 
Press/media     6 
(UKC6 UKC11 EUC1 EUC2 EUC5 
EUC12) 
  6 (12%) 
Total by Abuse Type 4 3 1 1 39 1 2 51 
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The second most prevalent cause of abuse was the use of health or biomedical data against 
the specific wishes of the individual or without fair notice to the individual (See Table 12: 
Hard evidence – Abuse by cause). Each of these nine incidents involved potential or actual 
unauthorised access or disclosure of health or biomedical data. In many of the incidents, an 
individual was applying for injunctive relief to prevent the unauthorised disclosure of their 
sensitive personal health or biomedical data. These incidents, along with those involving 
actual disclosure or access, were considered together due to the similarity of issues 
encountered in such cases. Examples, in order of severity, include incidents where 
injunctions were sought in order to prevent unauthorised disclosure to incidents, whereby the 
data were in fact disclosed: 
• An injunction was applied for when an abusive husband asked to see the 
psychiatrist, psychologist and therapist records of his wife and children (despite their 
objections.(UKC12) 
• The disclosure of prescription data to a pharmaceutical company without disclosure 
to patients of this proposed use. (UKC14) 
• Individuals’ next-of-kin were not notified of the use of patient records and tissue in a 
public inquiry.(UKC2) 
• A claimant applied for access to a third party’s confidential medical and personnel 
records (despite the third party’s objections) for his court proceedings against his 
employer.(UKC8) 
• A health authority seeking disclosure of medical records in order to carry out an 
investigation into e.g. the possible over dispensing of medicines, when patient 
consent was refused or not obtained.(UKC13) 
As show in Table 12, the third most prevalent cause was human error (seven incidents). 
Human error resulted in either the loss (three incidents) or the unauthorised disclosure or 
access of data (four incidents). Incidents identified as being caused by human error, in order 
of severity129 include:   
• A social worker left sensitive documents in a plastic shopping bag on a train including 
GP and police reports relating to cases of sexual abuse and neglect, whilst working 
on them during a commute between home and work.(ICOM7) 
                                               
129Here we reference the spectrum of causes of abuse and of harm provided in Section 4.B Causes 
for abuse, Section 4.C Harm types, Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
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• A social worked used a previous case as a template, but sent a copy of the old report 
(instead of the new one) to the wrong person, revealing sensitive personal data 
including details of an alleged criminal offence and physical and mental health to the 
wrong person.(ICOM8) 
• Relating to a nurse’s misconduct hearing, three unencrypted DVDs containing 
sensitive information regarding children were lost in transit.(ICOM6) 
• The loss of an unencrypted USB memory disk on the premises of a local 
authority.(ICOM2) 
The fourth most prevalent cause of abuse130 featuring in five incidents was unauthorised 
access without clinical or otherwise legitimate justification (See Table 12). It is worthwhile 
noting that the three incidents, all occurring in the UK, were criminally prosecuted. These 
incidents were prosecuted by the ICO on the basis of breaching section 55 of the DPA. 
Section 55 makes it an offence if a person knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of 
the data controller, obtains, discloses or sells personal data or the information contained in 
personal data, or procures the disclosure to another person of the information contained in 
personal data. These incidents are distinguished from the other non-intentional or negligent 
cases (e.g. human error or maladministration), given the wilful and intentional nature that 
motivated the guilty party to abuse the data. This more wilful and intentional breach of 
data protection law featured less than other more non-intentional abuses, 
representing only 8% of total incidents identified in the hard evidence.  
These incidents included (for example) in order of severity: 
• A manager of a health service accessed the health data of over 2,000 people in order 
to use the data to set up a new fitness company. (ICOP2) 
• A receptionist at a GP’s practice obtained sensitive medical information relating to 
her ex-husband’s new wife unlawfully. (ICOP3) 
• A health worker obtained the patient data of five members of her ex-husband’s family 
in order to obtain their new phone numbers. (ICOP4) 
7.B.1.C Incidence of abuse involving DNA profiles and tissue 
As stated above, only one incident was identified during the evidence review involving 
‘genetic data’. This incident related to the (potential) harms arising out of the indefinite 
retention of DNA profiles by UK authorities. (EUC7) Given the important implications raised by 
                                               
130 Tied with unauthorised disclosures arising from FoI requests, also five incidents. 
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genetic data, we discuss this incident in further depth in Section 9.A.7. Further we consider a 
focused review on genetic data as an area warranting further and future research (see 
Section 10.D).  
7.B.1.D Frequencies of abuse by harm reported in the hard evidence 
As shown in Table 13 below, a single incident could cause multiple forms of harm. However, 
the single most prevalent ‘harm’ uncovered was not actual harm, but the potential for harm 
as perceived by the adjudicating body (i.e. court, tribunal or ICO). Potential harm was found 
in an overwhelming 53% (or twenty-seven incidents). Within the spectrum of actual harm,131 
emotional or physical, individual distress was most prevalent with 18 incidents (35%). 
However the spectrum of actual harm was wide-ranging and included not only individual 
distress, but also the receipt of suboptimal clinical care, financial loss and harm caused to 
broader public interests (e.g. cases of reputational damage to public organisations such as 
the NHS or damage to the public trust in the confidentiality of the health profession). We also 
recorded incidents if there was no discussion of harm at all,132 or if there was an explicit 
finding of no harm, as these both could reflect the narrowness of harm provided for in the 
legal regime as opposed to broader conceptions of impact revealed in the soft evidence.
                                               
131 Which as discussed previously, was not intended to be exhaustive but reflective of the actual 
evidence uncovered. There are many other types of harm that could befall an individual, an 
organisation or negatively impact broader public interests. The typologies of abuse by harm/impact 
merely reflect the evidence base produced during this exercise. 
132 Reflecting our findings of ‘no evidence of harm’, which does not mean no harm occurred, but rather 
that there was insufficient detail reported to categorise the extent of and/or type of harm that might 
have occurred.  
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Table 13: Hard evidence – Abuse by harm  
     Abuse 
 
Impact 
Non-use Non-secure 
disposal 
Technical 
security 
failing 
Loss Fabrication/Falsification Unauthorised  
 
Total 
     Disclosure or access  Retention   
Individual 
distress 
1 
(EUC3) 
    15 
(UKC1 UKC6 ICOP2 ICOP3 ICOP4 ICOM8 EUC1* EUC2 EUC4 
EUC5* EUC6 EUC8* EUC9 EUC11* EUC12 EUC14) 
1 
(EUC7) 
18 
(35%) 
Suboptimal 
clinical care 
     2 
(EUC8* EUC11*) 
 
2 (4%) 
Financial Loss      2 
(EUC5* EUC14*) 
 
2 (4%) 
No evidence of 
harm 
1 
(EUC10) 
    4 
(UKC2 UKC13 ICOP1 EUC13) 
 
5 (10%) 
Potential for 
harm  
 4 
(ICOM3 
ICOM5 
ICOM12 
ICOM13) 
1 
(ICOM1) 
3 
(ICOM2 
ICOM6 
ICOM7) 
1 
(UKC9*) 
19 
(UKC3 UKC4 UKC7 UKC8 UKC10 UKC11 UKC12 IT1 ICOM4 
ICOM9 ICOM10 ICOM11 ICOM14 ICOD1 ICOD2 ICOD3 
ICOD4 EUC1*) 
 
27 
(53%) 
No harm found      1 
(UKC14) 
 
1 (2%) 
Damage to 
broader public 
interests 
    1 
(UKC9*) 
1 
(UKC5) 
 
2 (4%) 
Total Incidents  
51 
* Indicates an incident resulted in more than one type of harm, thus the percentages versus total incidents (51) do not tally. 
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7.B.1.E Potential harm 
The most prevalent type of harm found in the hard evidence was the potential for harm. 
The adjudicating body inferred harm, whether it was a UK Court, the ICO (and less often 
the ECtHR or CJEU), based on the nature or severity of the type and cause of abuse. In 
incidents categorised with ‘potential harm’, there was not necessarily evidence of actual 
distress, either emotional or physical. Thus, harm was inferred in cases such as: 
• A further monetary penalty notice was issued by the ICO in relation to the improper 
decommissioning of hard drives of NHS Trusts, which contained health data 
regarding HIV-positive patients. Since not all of the hard drives were recovered, 
and because the data was extremely sensitive, it was considered likely that the 
data could be abused in future to discriminate against the individuals implicated or 
otherwise cause harm. (ICOM13) 
• The High Court of Justice in England and Wales found against the disclosure of 
confidential expert testimony and reports from a psychiatrist in a family law case 
(where disclosure was against an abused wife’s wishes) in part, because ‘…the 
disclosure of such personal material would be likely to cause the mother distress 
and upset which would be highly likely to impact adversely upon a child living in the 
same household.' (UKC3) 
• When a USB stick was lost on the premises of North East Lincolnshire Council, the 
ICO considered in its issuance of a monetary penalty the risk assessment taken 
post-breach, which indicated ‘…that the loss of the sensitive personal data is likely 
to lead to the ill health of those affected through the disclosure of the data or due to 
a break in the services, which they were receiving. The likely damage and distress 
to the data subjects is substantial due to the volume of data which has been lost, 
and that the data subjects are children aged 5 - 16, some of whom are deemed 
vulnerable (and their families).’(ICOM2) 
• In the landmark case Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, the House of Lords 
inferred that Ms Campbell would be distressed since ‘…[a] person in her position 
would find disclosure highly offensive, and might also be deterred from continuing 
with the therapy, thereby causing a setback to recovery.’(UKC11) 
• When the ICO issued a monetary penalty notice to the Central London Community 
Healthcare NHS Trust for incorrectly faxing the sensitive personal health data of 
patients on over forty-five occasions, the ICO inferred individual distress of those 
individuals whose data were compromised as it was ‘likely to cause substantial 
distress to the patients'; although no complaints were received from data 
subjects.(ICOM14) 
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7.B.1.F Findings of actual harm 
Notwithstanding, actual harm in the form of individual distress was found in cases where 
complaints were made by the individuals implicated (signalling their distress), or when the 
courts otherwise found sufficient evidence of actual harm133 by individual distress. These 
cases included: 
• In the ICO’s prosecution of a former health service manager based at a council-run 
leisure centre. The council received complaints of distressed patients who were 
approached by the former manager who unlawfully obtained their sensitive medical 
information to use the data for a new fitness company he was setting up.(ICOP2) 
• The ICO’s prosecution of a former receptionist of a GP office who was unlawfully 
obtaining sensitive medical information relating to her ex-husband’s new wife. The 
receptionist had sent a text message to her ex-husband’s wife referring to the 
latter’s highly sensitive medical information taken from her medical record. The ICO 
received evidence of this harassment and the distress caused to the ex-husband’s 
new wife.(ICOP3) 
• The ECtHR found evidence of ‘great personal distress’ caused to both the 
Countess and Earl of Spencer by virtue of the strain caused to their relationship 
and to the medical treatment for Countess Spencer’s mental health and 
bulimia.(EUC2) 
• The ECtHR found ample evidence of individual distress upon the publication of 
information about the applicant’s husband’s HIV-positive status and his extramarital 
affair with a woman living with AIDS, an affair that produced two children. 
Specifically, ‘[t]he newspaper article had humiliated the husband and the 
publication of information about his private life had caused him non-pecuniary 
damage, had an impact on his health, and a negative influence on his family life 
and his reputation as well as restricting his family's opportunities to interact with 
others. He died and his wife brought suit based on such harms.’(EUC5)  
The other types of harms – namely suboptimal clinical care and financial loss – also 
produced evidence of ‘actual’ harm including: 
• In reference to the final case of actual, individual distress above, the deceased had 
to move from their village and lost his job due to the publishing of an article about 
his HIV-positive status and extramarital affair and children with a woman living with 
AIDS.(EUC5) 
                                               
133 Actual harm as defined and legally recognised in the law – see Section 3 above for further 
explanation on the narrow, regulatory notion of harm. 
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• A young woman had become pregnant after being brutally raped, and when 
seeking an abortion the hospital issued a press release regarding her situation 
causing the young woman to be subject to a national news frenzy – she eventually 
was forced to leave that hospital and seek an abortion 500km from home.(EUC11) 
7.B.1.E Findings of ‘no’ harm or where there was ‘no evidence of harm’ 
In contrast, two categories on the spectrum of harm involve findings of no harm or cases 
where harm was not considered at all by the adjudicating body. Only one incident was 
uncovered where the court categorically stated there was no harm.(UKC14) Of the hard 
evidence results, the third most prevalent were cases where harm was simply not 
discussed (five incidents).134 For incidents where harm was simply not discussed by the 
adjudicating body (‘no evidence of harm’), the cases would typically state the facts 
surrounding the breach and/or fines imposed, without discussing harm: 
• That the processing of health or biomedical data was against patient wishes 
(consent not provided) or no response.(UKC2) 
• The amount of fines that were paid.(ICOP1) 
7.B.1.F Harm arising from non-use of data 
As only two cases of non-use of health or biomedical data emerged from the results this 
warrants separate discussion – in one case, harm was also not discussed.(EUC10)  
In Gillberg v Sweden(EUC10) the discussion focused on the interference with the human 
rights of the individuals who wanted access to the research data in question (which 
involved children’s health data). Whereas all other cases where human rights were 
engaged by way of Article 8 (private and family life), the human rights engaged for non-use 
of data included: (1) the claimants’ rights to freedom of expression (Article 10) as it related 
to their perceived right to access the health (research) data in question, and (2) the 
claimants’ Article 6 rights (which protects an individuals rights to a fair trial) to have the 
ECtHR judgment implemented as it ruled in favour of granting access to the health 
(research) data. 
The only other cases that involved an incident of non-use was the ECtHR case, McGinley 
and another v United Kingdom.(EUC3) This case dealt with the non-disclosure of data 
regarding the radiation exposure levels to former members of the armed services who 
were stationed near the site of nuclear tests on or near Christmas Island in 1958. The UK 
would neither confirm nor deny the existence of such documents despite the contentions of 
the applicants. The Court considered the issue of non-disclosure (or thus non-use of the 
data) in terms of its capacity to ease individual distress caused by the fear of potential 
damage caused by being near the nuclear blast – in this regard, the non-disclosure of 
documents was considered sufficiently linked to the applicants’ private lives to engage 
                                               
134 And categorised as ‘no evidence of harm’. 
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Article 8. Whilst Article 8 was engaged, the applicants’ claim ultimately failed because they 
had not exhausted administrative procedures to request the data under Freedom of 
Information legislation in the UK.135  
Importantly, both cases of non-use were considered to engage the human rights of 
individuals. This in part recognises the ‘harm’ that can be caused when data are not used, 
and thus the value in searching for examples of such harm – albeit with meagre returns – 
as it relates to failures to use data. Given the lack of evidence uncovered on non-use of 
data, we dedicate fuller discussion to the implications arising out of non-use in Section 
9.A.8 below. 
7.B.1.G Harm to broader public interests 
Finally and considered separately are incidents not involving individual harm, but harms to 
broader public interests involving damage to a public institution’s reputation or diminished 
confidence in the doctor-patient relationship etc. Despite the fact that the law does not 
explicitly recognise harms to the public interest as they might arise for individuals, the hard 
evidence search did identify five incidents, where the adjudicating body considered harms 
or potential harms to broader public interests. These incidents included, for example: 
• Damage to the confidential nature of police interaction with their Occupational 
Health and Welfare department if information imparted during such interactions 
were disclosed without ‘…any reference or notice to the applicant, without affording 
him reasons for the decision or an opportunity to have made representations before 
or during the decision making process.’(UKC5) 
• In a libel action against the BBC for publishing a story on NHS hospitals falsifying 
waiting times, the Court considered the falsification of waiting times as damaging to 
the public interest. In particular, the case was considered important given that 
‘…institutional corruption within a public body…has gone unpunished136.(UKC9) 
• The ECtHR found potential for harm to broader public interests, including the 
creation of a possible disincentive for other HIV-positive patients to seek 
appropriate treatment but also to the ‘the interests of a patient and the community 
as a whole in protecting the confidentiality of medical data’137.(EUC1) 
                                               
135 McGinley and another v United Kingdom(EUC3) raises interesting questions regarding the linkage 
of occupational health records with mainstream, medical records such as those held by the NHS. 
The armed forces are a special case, as they hold their own records whilst personnel are serving – 
it is unclear on the extent to which such records are shared or linked when a) a civilian joins the 
armed forced and b) when personnel leaves the service. 
136 Further discussion on incidents of falsification and fabrication of data will be provided in Section 
9.A.6 Falsification and fabrication below. 
137 Z v Finland, paras [96]-[97]. 
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It was expected that less evidence would be found on harms caused from 1) non-use of 
data, and 2) harm caused to broader public interests, given the narrow conception of harm 
in the law. There are no legally recognised positive obligations to use health or biomedical 
data, in any particular way, bar a patient’s request for access to their own health 
records.138  
 
  
                                               
138 However, in depth consideration of the role or impact of Freedom of Information legislation in this 
regard is outwith the scope of this report. 
Summary of hard evidence results 
The hard evidence uncovered unauthorised disclosures and access to health or 
biomedical data as the most prevalent abuse type, followed by non-secure disposal of 
data, data loss, non-use of data, unauthorised data retention and technical security 
failures. Maladministration was the greatest cause for abuse, whereas only four 
incidents or 8% of the evidence represented criminally punishable (intentional) abuses 
of health or biomedical data. Although the law will provide compensation only for actual 
harm, the hard evidence did uncover instances of the courts and ICO considering 
potential harm in an overwhelming 53% of the hard evidence. Thus, evidence of actual 
harm featured less prominently in the hard evidence, with incidents of individual distress 
as the most prevalent form of actual harm caused (35% of the evidence). Surprisingly, 
despite the lack of recognition for harms caused to the public interest in legislation, the 
courts did consider and find actual harm to such public interests. And relatedly, 
although no positive obligations exist to use health or biomedical data (bar FOI 
obligations), the ECtHR considered non-use of data as engaging human rights which 
may have implications for wider uses of health or biomedical data, such as in research. 
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7.B.2 Soft evidence typology 
Whereas it was possible to present the same abuse type, cause and impact categories for 
the hard evidence and for Twitter, this was not the case for the soft evidence. Please note 
the following provisos.  
• In contrast to the hard evidence, the newspaper figures presented are based on 
our interpretations of their sometimes-sparse detail, that is, some did not provide 
statements rigorous enough to use more differential categories with good 
conscience. For example, erring on this side of caution, there was a large cluster of 
cases involving ‘maladministration’, whereas some of these could also have been 
‘human error’ or ‘human error’ only.  
• Further, a newspaper article could refer to cases involving multiple causes (e.g. 
‘theft’ and ‘loss’), and such articles appear in the tables more than once.  
• Finally, every attempt was made to ensure that all articles were assigned to one 
incident only, and that each soft incident was unique. Those incidents that might 
not have been unique were discounted.139  
7.B.2.A Abuse by cause typology  
7.B.2.A.1 Incidents involving NHS Staff 
In Table 14 it can be seen that forty-eight incidents involved NHS staff (or, in the case of 
theft, premises). The first most common abuse type was unauthorised data access or 
disclosure; such abuse accounted for one in three (14; 29%) incidents. For example: 
• A constituent requested his Welsh Assembly Member to investigate why third 
parties are in receipt of medical records. Here, records sent to the DWP and ATOS 
were being opened routinely by Royal Mail staff.(news14) In the words of the 
constituent, ‘People are sending very personal information and I have a right to 
know this is happening: I feel like I’ve been misled.’ 
• As investigated by the ICO, Torbay Care Trust made details on a spreadsheet of 
staff available on the Internet in error.(news15) Details included sexual orientation and 
NI numbers. The error was reported by a member of the public, and it was 
estimated that the spreadsheet had been viewed 300 times before being reported.  
 
                                               
139 We exclude newspaper incidents news45, news48, news54-59. 
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Table 14: Soft evidence: Abuse by cause  
Abuse  
 
Cause  
Non-secure 
disposal 
Loss Theft Fabrication/ 
falsification 
S/W failing Unauthorised  
data 
Other 
 
Total 
     disclosure or access  retention    
Involving NHS staff 
(or premises): 
6 (13%) 
(news8,10,11,18,
29,42) 
7 (15%) 
(news6,12,13,1
7,26,31,44) 
5 (10%) 
(news17,31,34,
40,52) 
6 (13%) 
(news2,3,4,5,9,
35) 
3 (6%) 
(news1,13,35) 
14 (29%) 
(news14,15,16,19,23,24,25
,30,32,33,39,43,47,50) 
2 (4%) 
(news7,49) 
4 (10%) 
(news27140,2
8141,51142,53
143news60144) 
48 
To meet NHS 
targets 
   3 
(news2,3,5) 
     
To protect 
professional 
reputation 
   2 
(news4,35) 
1 
(news35) 
    
For self-gain 
(curiosity, financial 
gain) 
     3 
(news23,24,32) 
   
Not involving NHS 
staff  
2 
(news18,38) 
    9 
(news14,20,21,22,30,33,37
,46,50) 
  11 
Facilitated by:          
Maladministration 7 (16%) 
(news8,10,11,18,
29,38,42) 
5 (11%)  
(news6,13,17,2
6,31) 
5 (11%) 
(news17,31,34,4
0,52) 
6 (13%) 
(news2,3,4,5,9,
35) 
3 (7%) 
(news1,13,35) 
15 (33%) 
(news14,15,20,21,23,24,25
,30,32,33,37,39,43,47,50) 
 4 (9%) 
(news27,28,5
1,news60) 
45 
Human error  2 
(news6,12) 
   4 
(news16,19,22,33) 
 1 
(news51) 
 
Misinterpretation 
of legal obligations 
      2 
(news7,49) 
  
 
                                               
140 Data destroyed in error. 
141 Survey data sent to deceased patients. 
142 Incorrect coding. 
143 Sale of data to Actuarial Society. 
144 Extremely poor record keeping at GP surgery. 
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• Three incidents involved the use of social media.(news25,news43,news47) All three reached 
the media through FoI requests (the Guardian Healthcare Network, Scottish 
Conservatives, Big Brother Watch resp.). In response to the Guardian Healthcare 
Network’s request, which uncovered figures across twenty-five Trusts, Andy Jaeger, 
Assistant Director of Public and Professional Communications at the NMC said 
‘[S]taff misuse of social media is largely unintentional, but there are cases that the NMC 
deals with which are "absolutely deliberate" – which is perhaps not surprising given that 
the regulator deals with referrals relating to nurses and midwives that may not be fit to 
practice. Such instances include pursuit of relationships with patients and bullying and 
harassment of colleagues.’ 
The second most common abuse types were loss (7; 15%), followed by non-secure disposal 
and fabrication/falsification (6; 13% each), and then theft (5; 10%). ‘Other’ incidents are 
explained in footnotes to Table 14. Incidents of loss could sometimes be explained by a 
perhaps understandable thoughtlessness against the backdrop of extreme workloads of NHS 
staff, coupled with a lack of staff awareness training. 
• As investigated by the ICO, a consultant psychiatrist lost data, including notes on a 
patient’s mental health tribunal, that was not secured properly to his bicycle.(news6) The 
ICO concluded that insufficient steps had been taken by Cardiff and Vale Health 
Board to make employees aware of the fact that they could indeed access the 
network remotely. 
Other losses had far more serious consequences. For example: 
• At Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust, it was estimated that thousands of patient 
medical records were lost, caused by software problems and staff IT errors.(news13) 
Crucially, these included patients awaiting cancer test results, and of those affected 
by the loss, seventy-four died. The Trust claims that no one died because of waiting 
for results or care. The external reviewer, Terry Hanafin, concluded that this was a 
‘serious management error’.   
Although one would expect to see fewer and fewer reported incidents of loss over time, one 
article showed that this is not necessarily the case. 
• In 2014 a FoI request by the Scottish Liberal Democrats ascertained that there were 
806 incidents of data loss across Scottish Health Boards in the previous five 
years.(news41) Whereas there were eighty-six losses in 2009, the number of loss 
increased to 223 in 2013. 
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Incidents of non-secure disposal were all known to the ICO with the exception of: 
• British Telecom led a 5-country study together with the University of Glamorgan, in 
which three hundred hard drives were bought at auction.(news38) According to The Sun 
newspaper, one third of the drives contained sensitive details including NHS patient 
notes. Investigating this short tabloid report further, we found that three hundred and 
seventeen drives were purchased in the UK, Australia, Germany and the US.145 
However and as noted in Techworld, ‘of the countries surveyed, the UK did relatively 
well by the admittedly low standards of data security uncovered’.146  
Incidents of theft all pre-dated 2012. This is encouraging, in that it suggests that theft of 
hardware is becoming a thing of the past.  
The six Incidents of falsification/fabrication were considered severe. For this reason, all are 
reported below: 
• One incident involved the Bristol Royal Hospital that in 2002 was embroiled in a 
scandal of such proportions that an inquiry ensued. The article here is from 2014, 
demonstrating how long the process can be to see justice (potentially) being 
served.(news2) Bereaved parents noted that the hospital had failed to declare the death 
of their son, possibly to provide better figures for National Institute for Cardiovascular 
Outcomes Research’s league tables. Sir Bruce Keough has now ordered lawyer-lead 
inquiry into the children’s’ Ward 32. 
• Also in 2014, the National Audit Office identified in NHS England (Leeds, Oxford, 
Colchester, North West London Hospitals Trust, Barnet & Chase Farm Hospitals) that 
only 43% of cases were recorded properly.(news3) Twenty-six per cent of cases showed 
falsified waiting times, and thirty-one per cent of incomplete record keeping. 
• In 2013 two paramedics employed by the Welsh Ambulance Trust were struck off, 
after one failed to assess a thirty-year-old patient, resulting in her death.(news4) Both 
paramedics were party to falsifying the data. 
• In 2013 several articles emerged about the Colchester University Hospital 
scandal.(news5) The sources for the articles were inquest and Monitor, the Trust 
Watchdog. Cancer records were being falsified to meet national cancer targets, and 
of sixty-one cases reviewed, twenty-two showed that patients had been placed at risk 
of receiving care that was unsafe or not effective. Management failed to investigate 
allegations and concerns raised by staff; rather, staff were bullied into silence.  
• In 2013 it emerged that the Care Quality Commission reverted possibly to cover-up 
tactics to conceal severe shortcomings at Furness General Hospital.(news9) It 
                                               
145 Andrew Jones et al, ’The 2006 analysis of information remaining on disks offered for sale on the 
second hand market’ (2006) 1:3 Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law. 
146 John Dunn ‘Hard disks still scrapped with data intact: Simple forensics reveal secrets, says study’ 
(2006) <http://news.techworld.com/security/6618/hard-disks-still-scrapped-with-data-intact/> accessed 
29 April 2014. 
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transpired that information on the scandal (where, for example, sixteen babies had 
died) was forwarded but with names of responsible individuals redacted. It took the 
intervention of the ICO and Health Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, to rectify this. 
• It emerged at a Coroner’s inquiry in 2009 that a nurse had falsified a patient’s record 
at Holloway Prison.(news35) She had failed to administer psychopharmaca to the 
prisoner, who went on to complete suicide, and then she altered the patient’s record 
on the EMIS system. An audit revealed that no such medication had been 
administered on the day of the suicide. Note, as well as classifying this article under 
falsification/fabrication, it is also classified under a software failing. However, this is 
not as clear-cut as one would hope. On the one hand, it was the rigor of the audit that 
allowed the falsely amended patient record to come to light. On the other hand, the 
record was amended falsely because EMIS allowed this.  
7.B.2.A.2 The motivations behind the incidents involving NHS Staff 
Overall, we were able to ascertain the motivations behind nine incidents. As shown in Table 
15 three were to meet NHS targets, two to protect professional reputation, and three for self-
gain. The incidents not discussed thus far are the three pertaining to self-gain. 
Table 15: Determinable motivations behind all incidents involving NHS Staff 
 Fabrication/falsification S/W failing Unauthorised data 
disclosure or access 
To meet NHS 
targets 
news2-Bristol Royal Hospital 
news3-NHS England 
news4-Colchester University 
Hospital 
  
To protect 
professional 
reputation 
news4-Colchester University 
Hospital 
news35-Holloway Prison 
news35-Holloway Prison  
For self-gain   news23-Royal Victoria Hospital 
news24-Edinburgh Royal 
Hospital  
news32-Moregate Primary 
Care Centre 
 
• As investigated by NHS Tayside and the NMC, a nurse at the Royal Victoria Hospital 
accessed ten medical records.(news23) She was sacked and struck off. It is unclear 
what her motivations were, but it is reasonable to assume self-gain, because she had 
accessed friends’ records. We cannot judge whether this was done with misplaced 
benevolence, malevolence or idle curiosity. 
• The case at Edinburgh Royal Hospital involved a cleaner who obtained a female 
patient’s details and then contacted her, presumably out of romantic/sexual 
interest.(news24) It could be that the details were from the patient’s records, but the 
hospital maintains that the information was taken from a floor plan of A&E displayed 
on a screen. The patient’s name alone would have been sufficient, because the 
cleaner tracked her down via Facebook. The experience left her feeling vulnerable: ‘I 
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didn’t know who he was, what he was capable of. I didn’t know if he was just going to 
turn up at the house. It’s just wrong.’ 
• Incident 32 (news32) involved a nurse at Moorgate Primary Care Centre who gave 
patients’ details to her boyfriend, employed by company handling personal injury 
claims, Direct Assist, in Bury. We have no knowledge of any impact her actions may 
have had on the subjects. She was sacked, and in the run-up to her court case, she 
stabbed her daughter fatally and made an uncompleted suicide attempt. She is 
currently serving a twelve-year custodial sentence for manslaughter on the grounds 
of diminished responsibility.  
7.B.2.A.3 Incidents involving individuals outside of the NHS 
Also shown in Table 14, eleven breaches involved individuals outside of the NHS (but 
possibly also NHS staff). Two cases involved non-secure disposal. For example, hard-drives 
were handed over to a sub-contractor by Brighton and Sussex University Hospitals NHS 
Trust.(news18) He failed to decommission them before sale on eBay. 
The other nine cases involved unauthorised data disclosure or access, five within the UK and 
four abroad. Examples in the UK include: 
• The hacking incident was reported where James Jeffery stole 10,000 records from 
the British Pregnancy Advisory Service’s website in 2012.(news20) According to The 
Independent, since his conviction there have been a further 2,500 attempts to hack 
into this site, in a third of the cases from North America and from Russia. 
• Based on a FoI request in 2012 by Channel 4’s Dispatches programme, there were 
approximately five cases daily where a staff member at the DWP sought to access or 
to disclose data without authorisation.(news46) The request revealed only eleven 
‘serious cases’. 
Examples abroad include: 
• The NHS technology supplier, GE Healthcare, sent 600,000 records to the US by 
mistake.(news21) The incident was reported only a year later. It was reported in The 
Sun, and no further details were available.  
• In 2009 the ICO started to investigate why data from private hospitals were being sold 
to individuals with access to IT companies in India, allegedly for ‘transcription 
purposes’.(news37) According to the Daily Mail, the purchasers were undercover 
investigators. What seems to be clear is that the private clinics’ records did include 
NHS records, but none had sent material directly for transcription abroad. The first 
service supplier was DGL Information Technologies UK, who sub-contracted to 
Scanning and Data Solutions, who in turn worked with subcontractors, one of whom 
was located in Pune, India. 
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7.B.2.A.4 Breaches facilitated by maladministration or human error – borderline cases 
Forty-five news incidents (Table 14) involved maladministration, and 33% (fifteen) of these 
were due to unauthorised disclosure or access. However and as noted earlier, this figure is 
likely inflated, because it was often not possible to ascertain any element of human error. 
Indeed, only seven incidents were clearly human error. It is also questionable to what degree 
‘maladministration’ identified here would also be deemed to be such in the hard evidence. 
For these reasons, we do not comment on this section of the table.  
7.B.2.B Abuse by Impact typology 
The next question is whether and to what degree has a harm caused by an abuse impacted 
upon the individual, the institution or on broader society?  
• At the individual level, we found only one incident that had the potential to cause 
financial harm. In 2014, it became known that the HSCIC predecessor, NHS IT, had 
sold 47m patient records to the Staple Inn Actuarial Society for £2,200.(news53) 
According to an HSCIC spokeswoman, ‘[t]he HSCIC believes greater scrutiny should 
have been applied by our predecessor body prior to an instance where data was 
shared with an actuarial society’. However, as a result, the premium for critical illness 
cover for those aged under 50 has increased.147 Although this could be seen as an 
increased financial burden on the insured individuals, this premium rise can be 
considered as appropriate and informed. 
• We found no evidence of abuse that impacted upon institutions outside of the NHS, 
and negative impacts on the NHS could only be presumed (e.g. loss of public trust 
and confidence).148  
• In cases where the NHS had (inadvertently) provided data to third parties, our reading 
of the respective articles indicated that no blame was attributed to these third parties.  
• We also found no direct references to societal harm.  
The impact of identified harms reported here, therefore, relate only to the individual (see 
Table 16). In the fifty-seven incidents, thirty-four (60%) had no reference to the impact of a 
harm upon the individual. Of those that did, some indicated multiple impacts. Ten (18%) 
referred to distress, one (2%) to reputational damage, eight (14%) to suboptimal clinical care 
and three (5%) to a potential for an impact of harm.  
                                               
147 Indeed, this was the precursor to the debate surrounding care.data. 
148 However, the recent public outcry over care.data would seem to indicate that tangible harm is not 
needed in order to evidence a compromise in trust between individuals and public institutions such as 
the NHS, which arguably negatively impacts the public interest.  
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Table 16: Soft evidence: Abuse by impact  
 
Abuse 
 
Impact 
Non-secure 
disposal 
Loss Theft Fabrication/ 
falsification 
S/W failing Unauthorised  Other Total 
     disclosure or 
access  
retention    
Individual distress    4 
(news2,3,5,9) 
 3 
(news14,16, 
37) 
1 
(news49) 
2 
(news51+G8,news60) 
(human error) 
10 
(18%) 
Damage to individual 
reputation 
       1 
(news51)(human error) 
1 
(2%) 
Suboptimal clinical care*   1 
(news13*) 
 5 
(news2,3*,4*,
5*,9*) 
2 
(news1,13*) 
   8 
(14%) 
Financial Loss        2 
(news53,Ma05) 
(data sold comm. purposes, 
legal costs) 
1 
(2%) 
No discussion of individual 
harm 
7 
(20%) 
(news8,10,1
1,18,29,38, 
42) 
7 
(24%) 
(news6,12,1
7,26,31,41, 
44) 
6 
(17%) 
(news17,31,
32,34,40, 
52) 
1 
(3%) 
(news35) 
1 
(3%) 
(news35) 
12 
(34%) 
(news15,19,21
,22,23,30,33,3
9,43,46, 
47,50) 
  34 
(60%) 
Potential for harm       2 
(news20,25) 
 1 
(news28) 
(human error?) 
3 
(5%) 
Total 57 
* Suboptimal care that led to or possibly led to death and *News3 and news5 involve Colchester Hospital 
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Identifying incidents of actual harm are central to this report. Therefore we draw here on two 
tables. The Abuse by Impact Table 4 should be regarded as an orientation only, 
simultaneously giving an overview of the findings. Later we present those incidents where we 
can also report subjects’ statements regarding the harm they have experienced (see Table 
26 in the Appendix).  
Of those presented here, ten were made by the subject or their next-of-kin and six by 
citizens’ voice groups. For each incident, we cite in brackets the news-number, followed by 
the newspaper where the citations appeared, for example, (news28/S06).  
7.B.2.B.1 Impact of harm caused through falsification/fabrication 
These were severe instances of abuse, where the NHS organisation(s) suffered reputational 
damage and a great loss of public trust. These are instances of lives at risk, or indeed lives 
lost. In the three following incidents, note that the subjects became socially and politically 
active, and sought justice. 
• Bristol Royal Hospital failed to declare the death of a child, and the parents ‘believe 
Trust chiefs “covered up deaths and blatantly lied”’.(news2/Mi02)  
• In the wake of the CQC cover-up at Furness General Hospital, bereaved father 
James Titcombe had led the campaign for a public inquiry into ‘serious systemic 
failures’ … and called reports of a cover-up at the Care Quality Commission 
‘shocking. … It embodies everything wrong with the culture in the NHS’.(news9/B03)  
• In the wake of the Colchester University Hospital scandal, (news5/Te11) the bereaved 
mother of a four-year-old who died after delays in treatment ‘called for “justice” for her 
son, and said no-one at the NHS trust had been held accountable for the failings, or 
even disciplined’. Going public is pro-active coping strategy, and documents again a 
subject’s need for restorative justice. 
Also in the wake of the Colchester University Hospital scandal, (news5/Te11) we see another type 
of reaction, here one that demonstrates understandable despair and hopelessness at the 
time of the event.  
• A widow ‘said she was left “crying down the phone” to medical staff, pleading for them 
to treat her husband.’ This is admittedly scant evidence, but against the backdrop of 
the Colchester scandal and the number of patients who were misdiagnosed or where 
diagnosis was so late that cancers were now terminal, the impact statement could 
reveal not only what is clearly poor treatment or lack thereof, but also a case resulting 
from the fiddling of waiting lists. The main point here is that the (indirect) impact of 
falsification can leave the subject or loved one so disempowered, that the event can 
lead to long-term trauma. The consequences of such events on the bereaved are 
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well-documented and can have year-long negative implications for mental health (see 
for example Carr, 2003).149 
7.B.2.B.2 Impact of harm caused through human error 
Human error can and will occur. Errors can include miscoding, failure to update records in a 
timely manner and misfiling. Further, the impact of the error can affect one individual only or 
a group of individuals. The incident below had the potential to impact upon the loved ones of 
903 deceased individuals.  
• In 2011, the Scottish Government sent the Inpatient Patient Experience survey to 903 
deceased patients.(news28/S06) As reported in The Sun, Margaret Watt of the Scotland 
Patients Association, ‘branded the blunder “outrageous” and said grieving families 
deserved an apology. She said: “Someone should take a fall for this because it is 
absolutely shocking. It is unforgivable and I hope they extend an unreserved 
apology.”’ 
The next incident was probably due to misfiling of one note in a patient’s record. Although the 
GP surgery admitted to its error, it was not willing to amend the record until it lost its case in 
court.  
• Reported in 2010, a patient was erroneously labelled an alcoholic in her patient 
record at her GP surgery.(news51/Ma22) Helen Wilkinson fought to have her record 
amended, but whilst the surgery was sympathetic, it was not willing to comply with 
her wishes. She took the surgery to court, drawing on the DPA and arguing that the 
NHS had caused her ‘unwarranted and substantial distress’. The surgery then 
amended her record. Reporting later about the incident and its impact in The 
Guardian in 2006,(G26) Ms Wilkinson said ‘I went ballistic. To be labelled an alcoholic – 
who had seen it? Who knows, literally hundreds could have seen it’ and rightly 
wondered how such false information could be used, for example, if the subject were 
someone in the middle of a ‘messy divorce’. The incident was so distressing for Ms 
Wilkinson that she has since withdrawn from the NHS. 
Finally, this distressing incident suggests far more than the mere misfiling of a piece of 
patient information. It documents record keeping standards of the poorest kind.  
• Mary Kerswell, a former biomedical scientist, was asked by her GP surgery, 
Biggleswade Health Centre in 2013, to undergo a urine test for a kidney condition she 
did not have.(news60) Concerned, she requested a copy of her patient notes, but these 
were not available at the surgery at the agreed time. She felt that something was 
amiss, so refused to leave. The police were called and she was arrested. Receiving 
                                               
149 Deborah Carr, ‘A “good death” for whom? Quality of a spouse’s death and psychological distress 
among older widowed persons’ (2003) 44:2 Journal of Health and Social Behavior 215-232. 
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the notes three months later, she found that her notes revealed incorrectly that she 
had chronic kidney disease, was a heavy smoker, lived with Alzheimer’s, had a 
hysterectomy and a double hip replacement. ‘I was utterly shocked … it read like a 
post-mortem, it really did. … It could have been really dangerous. Who knows what 
implications these errors could have had if I’d been taken to hospital in an 
emergency?’ 
7.B.2.B.3 Impact of harm caused by unauthorised/inappropriate disclosure or retention 
Subjects’ statements have been addressed above concerning the female who was contacted 
by a hospital cleaner (news24/S05) and Royal Mail staff opening letters containing medical details 
to ATOS and DWP.(news14/In05) Three other incidents came to light. The first two express the 
subjects’ outrage at the affront on their privacy. The third was distressed because of the 
potential for causing her mother distress. 
• Commenting on the fact that data had been sold illegally to undercover investigators 
in 2009, one patient commented ‘But this is our life – this is your flesh and bones 
you’re talking about. It’s just one step away from grave robbing)’.(news37/Ma6) 
• In 2010, it emerged that Guthrie cards with babies’ blood samples were being 
retained by hospitals in the UK.(news49/ti12) Further, coroners and the police were 
allowed to access these. In the words of Shami Chakrabarti, (also member of 
Liberty): ‘“As someone who gave consent for my own baby to be tested, I’m horrified 
that anyone would breach my trust, keep my child’s sample for years on end and use 
it for all sorts of extraneous purposes.”’ GeneWatch also noted that ‘”Giving mothers 
a leaflet does not amount to informed consent. No one who has just given birth is in a 
state to understand the full implications of how their baby’s genome might be used in 
future.”’ 
• In 2012 it was reported that Caseway Hospital, part of Northern Trust, had sent eight 
patient letters to the incorrect recipient.(news16/B08) This was extremely distressing for 
one affected female, because ‘This is a complete shock, I know nothing about it … I 
did [undergo the test], but nobody knows that. All that I got done, I hid that from my 
mother. She knows nothing about anything.’ 
7.B.3 Twitter evidence typology 
7.B.3.A Frequencies of abuse reported in the Twitter evidence 
As stated in the initial findings, out of the seventy relevant hits, only eleven were related to 
incidents in the UK. The overwhelming majority were of abuse in the US (fifty-seven 
incidents) plus one in Ireland and one in Zambia. Thus, each of the most prevalent causes 
must be viewed with this US-centric standpoint in mind and according to Table 17 below.
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Table 17: Twitter evidence – Abuse by cause 
 
 
 
 
          Abuse  
 
Cause  
Non-secure 
disposal 
Technical 
Security 
Failing 
Loss Theft Unauthorised  
data 
    Disclosure or access  Retention  
For self-gain (financial 
gain) 
   2 
(TW15 TW40) 
2 
(TW47 TW60) 
1 
(TW34) 
Third Parties  8 
(TW5 TW6 
TW10 TW16 
TW22 TW41 
TW69 TW70) 
 
 12 
(TW4 TW7 TW9 TW33 
TW35 TW44 TW45 
TW49 TW58 TW66 
TW67 TW68) 
  
Access without clinical or 
legitimate justification 
    6 
(TW21 TW43 TW46 
TW62 TW63 TW64) 
 
Facilitated by:       
Maladministration 8 
(TW24 TW25 
TW31 TW48 
TW51 TW53 
TW55 TW57) 
7 
(TW1 TW8 
TW12 TW13 
TW14 TW28 
TW50) 
6 
(TW27 TW29 
TW32 TW38  
TW54 TW56) 
6 
(TW17 TW18 TW19 
TW20 TW26 TW37) 
3 
(TW30 TW52 TW61) 
 
Human error   3 
(TW2 TW11 
TW59) 
 
 6 
(TW3 TW23 TW36 
TW39 TW42 TW65) 
 
Total by abuse type 8 (11.5%) 15 (21%) 9 (13%) 20 (29%) 17 (24%) 1 (1.5%) 
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7.B.3.B Theft 
The most prevalent cause for abuse of health or biomedical data that emerged from the 
Twitter evidence was attributed to theft, totalling twenty incidents (or 29% of total incidents). 
Causes attributed to theft included those carried out by third parties (external to an 
organisation, with no explicit motive); for self-gain (where explicit self-gain motives were 
made): or because of maladministration (access to the data was facilitated by lack of 
encryption, password protection etc.). Of the twenty incidents of theft, eighteen occurred in 
the US, whilst only one occurred in the UK(TW45) and one in Zambia.(TW35) 
Thefts carried out by third parties (external to the data controller as opposed to staff), 
represented twelve incidents (ten of which occurred in the US). In these cases, it is possible 
that the organisations and premises were specifically targeted by those with interests in 
selling data on the black market and/or were carried out by sophisticated criminals: 
• In Zambia, the press reported the looting of computers that stored vital data for 
patients at the Cancer Diseases Hospital, which included data storage devices. (TW35) 
• Regarding the only UK case of theft, a system used by the company 
Pharmacyrepublic, to record the medication handed out to around 2000 patients, was 
stolen from one of its premises. (TW45) 
• In the US, fifty-seven hard drives were stolen from an insurance company’s training 
facility. (TW68) 
Insofar as the two incidents of theft with explicit evidence of being motivated by self-gain, 
both occurred in the US and involved former hospital employees selling patient data for 
profit. (TW15, TW40)  
This is in contrast to the final category of thefts – those facilitated by maladministration – all 
of which occurred in the US (six incidents). These cases of theft were differentiated and 
collectively categorised as ‘maladministration’ because the thefts were made possible (or 
easier) due to poor technical security practices on the devices stolen or generally by the poor 
data handling practices of the data controller (potentially reflective of poor staff training). In 
five of the incidents, it was clear that the data were unencrypted, and thus when stolen, more 
easily accessible for abuse. (TW17, TW19, TW20, TW26, TW37) 
A theme emerged in regards to thefts from employee cars – if the devices stolen were in 
plain view (even if in a locked car and regardless of data encryption) this could further 
incentivise theft (TW33, TW49) and be indicative of the need for further training with disincentives 
to handle data/devices carelessly by employees and independent contractors. A final theme 
worth noting is in regards to thefts while employees are travelling on vacation – these 
incidents could indicate the need to have clearer policies on the encryption of portable media 
(USB drives, laptops) and/or to prohibit the transfer or carrying of certain digital files to non-
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work locations (i.e. acceptable for a business trip or home, but not so for annual leave and 
other personal time off)(TW37, TW26) or prohibit download of certain sensitive data to external 
devices at all. 
7.B.3.C Unauthorised disclosure or access 
The second most prevalent abuse type, unauthorised disclosure or access represented 
seventeen incidents (24%). The causes attributed to unauthorised disclosures or access 
related to incidents motivated by self-gain; incidents where access was given without clinical 
or otherwise legitimate justification; those due to more systemic, maladministration problems; 
and finally, inadvertent disclosures due to human error. 
Taking each of these causes in turn, the most prevalent cause for unauthorised access or 
disclosure involved access without clinical or otherwise legitimate justification (6 incidents). 
These incidents all occurred in the US except for one in the UK, and always included access 
by employees who presumably had the technical security credentials to facilitate such 
access. These included situations where: 
• In the single incident occurring in the UK (not reported in the UK hard evidence 
Section 7.A.1 above), a hospital employee accessed her ex-boyfriend’s medical 
records without any legitimate or clinical reasons to do so.(TW46) 
• Medical staff accessed patient records simply because they ‘used to know the 
patient’.(TW62) 
• Again, medical staff accessed patient records simply because they were 
‘curious’.(TW64) 
Tied for the most prevalent type of unauthorised disclosure or access were those cases due 
to human error – which poses problems for its ability to be confused with maladministration. 
Similar to how ‘borderline’ incidents were assigned human error or maladministration in the 
hard evidence, incidents were considered due to human error if they were perceived as 
caused by the isolated mistake of a single individual, as opposed to being indicative of 
widespread administrative issues in data handling. Unlike other evidence, cases of human 
error featured a higher number of UK cases (four UK versus two in the US): 
• In the UK, an Ayshire woman had her medical records mistakenly transferred from 
her GP (without her knowledge) to another practice in Manchester. Due to this 
mistake she was removed from screening programmes for cervical cancer years 
earlier, and found this out when she went in with symptoms consistent with cervical 
cancer).(TW42) 
• In the UK, an NHS trust was fined following the exposure of three patients’ medical 
data because faxes were sent to members of the public that included details on 
physical and mental health. (This was also reported in the hard evidence).(TW23, ICOM4) 
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• In the UK, a FOI request mistakenly revealed unrequested data regarding an 
operation, including sensitive personal data of individuals’ medical issues.(TW36) 
• In the US electronic, patient files with ‘limited patient information’ were sent to the 
wrong insurance company.(TW3) 
 
Systemic problems in the governance over legitimate and authorised access 
(maladministration), were the cause of three incidents of unauthorised access or disclosure, 
including two incidents in the US and one in Ireland:  
• In the US, an employee gained unauthorised access to patients’ personal information 
due to poor security standards.(TW30) 
• In Ireland, a hospital outsourced transcription of medical records and GP letters to the 
Philippines. The identity of patients may have been disclosed (i.e. the records were 
not sufficiently anonymised and some records were never returned).(TW52, Ti9) 
• In the US, a hospital employee allowed their friend into a restricted area where they 
could overhear patients’ consultations describing their health condition.(TW61)  
These instances reveal potential weaknesses in the organisations’ training of staff on 
confidentiality of patient data at various stages of the patient care experience i.e. from the 
point at which the patient is admitted, to consultations with the doctors or nurses, to when 
records are filed and/or transcribed for future access and so forth. Providing accessible 
training on the different ways in which data could be improperly disclosed or accessed is 
important to prevent such abuse. We return to this point in Section 8.A. 
Finally, the two incidents involving unauthorised access due to motivations of self-gain both 
occurred in the US by a medical employee. In the first case, the employee accessed patient 
data of a competing medical practice in order to send those patients marketing materials for 
his practice.(TW47) In the second incident, a radiologist accessed 177 pregnant mothers’ 
patient records because she had lost a baby due to drug addiction and wanted to find out 
how similarly situated mothers received help to combat their drug addiction.(TW60) One can 
differentiate these two incidents on the basis of the pecuniary motivations in the former, and 
the emotional or non-pecuniary motivations in the latter. 
7.B.3.D Technical security failures 
Fifteen incidents were caused by technical security failures (21%). These could be attributed 
to either third party hackers preying on system vulnerabilities or to poor technical security not 
implemented properly (maladministration). It was expected that technical security failures 
would represent a large portion of the evidence – however this abuse type featured strongly 
only in the Twitter evidence as opposed to one incident reported in the hard.(ICOM1) 
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Technical security failed due to the intrusions by third parties – namely hackers – in eight 
incidents (all in the US). These included incidents of scale that could have been targeted for 
re-sale on the black market: 
• A hacker accessed a medical providers’ system, stealing the social security numbers 
and medical information of 9,700 clients. (TW6) 
• A server containing the Medicaid (insurance) patient data of 280,000 Utah citizens 
was hacked and downloaded. (TW41) 
• A computer server storing data for a state mammography registry was subject to a 
"targeted in a computer hack". Importantly, an individual whose data was breached 
was not aware that her mammography records were even sent to a registry in the first 
place (she did not know the registry even existed). (TW69) 
The sheer scale of patient files that were accessed and exposed, presumably in spite of 
strong technical security measures, could indicate sophisticated criminality at work and the 
possible motivation to sell data on the black market.150 Importantly, despite the lack of 
evidence of such hack-attacks in the UK, this does not (in the slightest) indicate that this has 
not occurred. As stated previously, there are mandatory data breach notification laws in the 
US, making such incidents come to light more readily than in the UK where the only 
organisations with mandates to report are within the NHS. This is something the ICO has 
advised to take account of when looking at trends of data breaches in the UK: where the 
NHS and public sector always have higher reported instances of data breaches – but not 
necessarily higher instances overall if private sector organisations are not reporting these 
incidents.151 
Technical security failures could also be attributed to maladministration (seven incidents) – 
due to poor (or lack of) implementation of proper technical security and/or data handling 
protocol. In the seven incidents, organisations posted sensitive information about their staff 
or patients online, under the false assumption that it was not publicly available - when in fact, 
it was generally accessible; (TW1, TW8 TW50) held data on servers that were easily breached by 
hackers; (TW12, TW28) or found sensitive personal data regarding patients online unbeknownst to 
staff as to how the data were stolen.(TW13, TW14) 
                                               
150 Whereas the three evidence strands often consider abuses as they relate to individuals, others 
such as those related to hack-attacks, relate to the abuse of many (sometimes thousands) of people. 
Section 8 will consider individual versus large-scale impacts considering any meaningful distinctions 
between the scale of abuse that occurred. Further, we address cybercrime later in 9.D.1 The black 
market for data. 
151 This is not to undermine the severity or concern caused by the amount of data breaches that are 
occurring within the NHS. However, the presence of a mandatory reporting scheme, applicable only to 
a portion of data controllers in the UK, can and does skew the results on ‘trends’ of data breaches in 
the UK, as reported by the ICO. ICO, ‘Trends’ (2014) <http://ico.org.uk/enforcement/trends> accessed 
26 April 2014. 
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7.B.3.E Other motivations for abuse  
Table 24 in the Appendix reveals further incidents of abuse, including nine incidents where 
health or biomedical data were lost either due to maladministration(TW27, TW29, TW32, TW38, TW54, 
TW56) or human error.(TW2, TW11, TW59) Loss of digital or manual copies of data due to 
maladministration were considered to be indicative of more systemic, organisational 
problems as to the proper handling of data – these incidents seemed to be caused by 
maladministration at least more than equal to any element of human error. Whereas in cases 
of loss involving human error, the incident was considered to represent an isolated, one-off 
mistake, down to individual circumstance. 
Eight incidents involved the non-secure disposal of health or biomedical data (see Table 24 
in the Appendix). Non-secure disposal was to a lesser extent indicative of poor vetting of 
third-party vendors charged with the secure destruction of sensitive data(TW24) rather than a 
more blatant disregard for proper procedure – in seven out of the eight incidents, sensitive 
patient files were literally thrown away in publicly accessible bins or similar.(TW25, TW31, TW48, 
TW51, TW53, TW55, TW57) Despite the overwhelmingly US-centric nature of the Twitter evidence, the 
UK featured more in this category than did the US (four out of the seven incidents occurred 
in the UK). Finally, there was only one incident of unauthorised retention of data.(TW34)   
7.B.3.F Categories of harm in the Twitter evidence 
Similar to the other typologies created, a single incident could be interpreted from the Twitter 
evidence as causing more than one type of harm (indicated with an asterisk in Table 18 
below). Thirty-six incidents, however, featured no discussion of harm at all – in such cases, 
the discussion of abuse of health or biomedical data was completely removed from any 
consideration of harm or potential harm caused to individuals, organisations or broader 
public interests. Therefore, in these cases it was not possible to infer even potential harm 
due to insufficient reporting of the incident, which does not necessarily mean no harm 
occurred.  
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Table 18: Twitter – Abuse by Harm  
        Abuse 
 
Impact 
Non-secure 
disposal 
Technical Security 
Failing 
Loss Theft Unauthorised  
 
 
    Disclosure or access  Retention  Total by 
harm 
Individual distress  3 
(TW5* TW50* 
TW69) 
1 
(TW38*) 
2 
(TW9* TW35*) 
3 
(TW42 TW46* TW47) 
 9  
Suboptimal clinical 
care  
   1 
(TW35*) 
  1  
Financial Loss  1 
(TW5*) 
 1 
(TW15) 
1 
(TW46*) 
 3  
No discussion of 
individual harm 
5 
(TW25 TW31 
TW53 TW55 
TW57) 
6 
(TW1 TW13 TW14 
TW16 TW22) 
2 
(TW2 TW29) 
9 
(TW18 TW19 TW20 TW37 
TW44 TW45 TW49 TW66 
TW67) 
13 
(TW3 TW23 TW30 TW36 
TW39 TW40 TW43 TW52 
TW60 TW61 TW62 TW63 
TW64 TW65) 
1 
(TW34) 
36  
No harm    1 
(TW7) 
  1  
Potential for harm  2 
(TW24 TW48) 
8 
(TW6 TW8 TW10 
TW12 TW28 TW41 
TW50* TW70) 
7 
(TW11 TW27 
TW32 TW54 
TW56 TW59 
TW68) 
7 
(TW4 TW9* TW17 TW26 
TW33 TW58 TW68)  
1 
(TW21) 
 25  
Damage to institution 1 
(TW51) 
 1 
(TW38*) 
   2  
*Indicate multiple types of harm for one incident 
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7.B.3.G Potential harm 
Notwithstanding, in twenty-five incidents (35%), we could infer the potential for harm to occur 
in future, given the more substantial reporting in these incidents. First, as stated above, the 
majority of evidence identified from Twitter was from the US (fifty-seven of seventy incidents). 
In regards to the twenty-five incidents of potential harm, potential for financial harm was 
typically found when a US citizen’s social security number was comprised thus enabling 
identity theft.(TW4, TW6) The potential for either financial harm or emotional/physical distress was 
found more generally in cases where data were left compromised and accessible to the public 
or left in the hands of hackers for an extended period of time.(TW1) 
7.B.3.H Actual harm 
In fewer cases, incidents of actual harm were uncovered – nine cases of individual distress 
ranging from distress caused by identity theft,(TW5) to general feelings of distress after being 
notified of their sensitive data being breached,(TW50) to incidents of harassment causing severe 
distress and impact on the individual’s mental health.(TW46) 
An exceptional case of both individual distress and the provision of hampering clinical care 
occurred in Zambia, whereby the theft of computers from a cancer hospital brought operations 
to a halt for the 350 patients. This caused severe individual distress and negatively affected 
patient care.(TW35) 
Three incidents recorded the financial loss of individuals. This was typically in relation to 
identity theft;(TW5, TW15, TW46) whereby two incidents recorded damage to broader public interests, 
through the diminishment of public trust in the NHS.(TW38, TW51)  
7.B.3.I No harm – but compensation 
Important to note is the single case where a US Court recently found no harm but still awarded 
$3M USD in damages to the individuals whose data were exposed in a data breach. This 
ruling was based on the company’s negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty 
and unjust enrichment. Key to finding in favour of the individuals (despite finding no harm) was 
that the company purported, to its customers, that it would keep their data safe and clearly did 
not do so when laptops stolen from their staff exposed the patient records of tens of thousands 
of its customers.(TW7) 
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7.C Merged evidence  
The merged evidence represents where the hard, soft and Twitter evidence strands produced 
overlapping results. A brief overview is shown in Figure 7 below and these incidents of overlap 
are highlighted in the Appendix.  
Figure 7: Overlapping reporting of incidents 
 
7.C.1 Overlap between hard and soft evidence 
There were only six incidents reported in the hard evidence that were also reported in the soft 
evidence (via newspapers). Five such overlapping incidents were related to ICO monetary 
penalties, which are publicly reported on the ICO website and thus more easily transposed 
and noticed in traditional media outlets. It can be said that where the hard and soft evidence 
merged, that these cases represented the more egregious abuses in the hard evidence 
(though not necessarily so for the soft evidence). The single UK case law incident that 
overlapped with the soft evidence was regarding the highly publicised BBC news feature on 
falsification of hospital waiting times.(UKC9, Te9) Far more egregious cases involving the abuse of 
health or biomedical data, that were tried in either the UK or ECtHR or CJEU, were simply not 
picked up in the traditional media sources searched in the soft evidence strand. 
7.C.2 Overlap between hard, soft and Twitter evidence 
We further show in Figure 7 where the hard, soft (newspaper) and Twitter evidence 
overlapped (also highlighted in the Appendix). Only six incidents reported on Twitter 
overlapped with either the hard or soft newspapers searches.  
Only two incidents reported in the hard evidence overlapped with those reported in Twitter. 
These two incidents similarly involved ICO monetary penalties and would be more easily 
picked up by social media outlets due to the ICO’s publication scheme for issuing such 
penalties.  
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Only four incidents overlapped between Twitter and the soft (newspapers) search. These 
overlaps included two international incidents – one in Ireland(TW52, Ti9) and one in the US.(TW1, 
Ma18) The remaining two incidents related to abuses that were interestingly enough not reported 
in the hard evidence despite the likely involvement of the authorities and/or ICO due to the 
flagrancy of the abuses (i.e. the disposal of confidential medical records in a woman’s garden 
in Londonderry;(TW25, B4) the disposal of eighteen patients’ records in a communal waste bin at 
a residential apartment block and the disposal of a patient’s sensitive medical procedures and 
test results in a bin outside Coventry University Hospital.(TW48, G16) 
7.C.3 Useful comparisons between the evidence strands 
Comparing the evidence types and their usefulness for a review such as this, the results from 
a hard evidence search could be described as ‘what you seek is what you get’. In contrast, it 
would appear that Twitter lends itself well when considering the international, albeit US-
centric, landscape. The lack of overlaps between the hard and soft evidence demonstrates 
that a newspaper search produces a broader picture of public interest and citizens’ concerns. 
It is here that the voice of the public and advocacy groups can be heard (though heard only in 
a modest number of articles). Information gleaned in this fashion does come at a price. The 
reliability of a piece of evidence might not be unquestionable and the interpretation of such 
evidence relies on the academic judgement of the research team. Finally, in order to gather 
evidence from vulnerable groups, we suggest that web-based research is inadequate. Rather 
and quite rightly so, one should seek permission from those groups to access more 
forthcoming sources.  
In summary, the clear lack of merged or overlapping results simultaneously indicates the 
limitations of the hard evidence versus soft evidence versus Twitter search on their own, whilst 
highlighting the value added by combining the three approaches. The three-strand approach 
offers a more complete and holistic view on the types of abuses and harms at stake when 
processing health and biomedical data. 
  
 98 
8. Conclusions 
8.A Conclusions drawn from the hard evidence 
Given the narrow conception of harm provided for in law and even narrower provision for 
compensation, it was not surprising that the hard evidence uncovered a modest amount of 
evidence revealing actual harm.152 However, the level of factual detail provided in court 
judgments and ICO enforcement procedures as to the type of abuse (i.e. reason for the claim), 
the cause (i.e. to establish fault, negligence etc.) and in considering the award of damages 
(i.e. for any pecuniary or non-pecuniary harm caused) contributes greatly to a clearer 
understanding of the types of circumstances that lead to abuse of health or biomedical data. 
The hard evidence thus provides rigorous detail as to abuse type and causes in a way that 
sources in the news or social media cannot provide (with the same degree of certainty).  
As to the most prevalent abuse types and causes of abuse (maladministration; using data 
against the objections or without the consent of individuals; human error; or unauthorised 
disclosures by the press or media) – conclusions drawn feature strong implications for 
governance and thus warrant separate discussion in Section 9.A below. 
8.A.1 Evidence of individual impact lacking 
What was genuinely lacking from the hard evidence was any sense of the voice of the 
individuals implicated – the court or ICO discussed harm far removed from the (likely) broader, 
perceived harm experienced by the affected individuals and typically only inferred harm that 
could arise. This was evidenced in the overwhelming 53% of cases where only a potential for 
harm was found (as opposed to actual harm). Evidence of actual harm featured less 
frequently. Where actual harm was found, it was in cases where the circumstances dealt with 
particularly sensitive data (such as HIV-positive status, rape, abortion) or where criminal 
offences were being tried (as opposed to ‘ordinary’ contraventions of the DPA which come 
under civil law jurisdiction). Thus what the individuals may have subjectively perceived as 
harmful would simply have been left out if not relevant to the particulars of the claim in front of 
the adjudicating body. 
8.A.2 Understanding risks for harm – actual versus potential harm 
The hard evidence uncovered individual distress (either purely emotional or with physical 
manifestations) as the most prevalent form of actual harm associated with abuses of health or 
biomedical data. Importantly, individual distress is provided for under the DPA – individuals 
                                               
152 See Section 3.B above for fuller discussion on the narrow conception of harm under the law. 
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can recover for individual distress – albeit in limited circumstances.153 In light of the fact that 
the law specifically takes into account (arguably insufficiently) individual distress when 
calculating damages, it makes sense that this form of actual harm was well represented.  
Financial loss (damages) is also specifically accounted for in the compensation provided 
under the DPA section 13 but only featured in four incidents. Thus, it would seem that 
individual distress, whether purely emotional and/or physical is the most prevalent risk that 
data controllers should consider when processing health and biomedical data. This is with the 
specific understanding that these harms are specifically recognised by the law (and thus can 
be compensated for).   
However, the potential for harm was taken into account by the ICO when issuing monetary 
penalties for serious breaches of the DPA. Where the prospect for harm remained a grave 
possibility for the individuals implicated by a particular data breach, the ICO took this into 
specific account when issuing the penalty. Thus data controllers might consider the risks for 
harm on a spectrum of harms most likely to least likely to occur, with the understanding that if 
a strong potential for harm is found due to the nature of breach (e.g. if lost or stolen hardware 
is never recovered or the data is so sensitive that the risk for future abuse is high) this can be 
enough to support a hefty monetary fine – actual harm is not a necessary element to the ICO 
imposing fines for breaches of the DPA. The level of fines exacted on organisations that have 
not taken appropriate measures to eliminate risks or reduce possible impact to individuals, is 
warranted where such risks have not been taken into account or blatantly disregarded when 
warned previously by the ICO. 
8.A.3 Harms to the public interest  
As stated before, harms to the public interest are simply not provided for in the same way as 
individual damages are under the DPA, due in large part to the remit of the DPA that is over 
personal data. Thus, instances of harm caused to the reputation of public organisations such 
as the NHS or to broader public interests, such as in the diminished confidence in the doctor-
patient relationship are not provided for. Furthermore, outwith Freedom of Information Act 
requirements, there are no positive obligations to use data and as such, harms caused by 
failure to use data are similarly not recognised in law. Notwithstanding, the courts did consider 
the harm that certain uses (abuses) of health or biomedical data had on broader public 
interests regarding the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship and the disincentives 
that this could cause persons to not seek the treatment they need.(IT1, EUC1) They also 
considered harm caused to other confidential relationships(UKC5, ICOD4) (e.g. interactions with 
Human Resources), as well as the damage to the reputation of a public service such as the 
NHS.(UKC9) 
                                               
153 DPA s 13(a), (b) provide that an individual may only recover for individual distress arising out of 
contravention of the DPA if (a) the distress also causes the individual to suffer damages (financial); or if 
(b) the distress arises out of use of the data for the “special purposes” (i.e. journalism, arts, literature). 
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From this evidence, it would appear that courts will take into account harm to broader public 
interests (such as the confidentiality of certain relationships) and will do much to uphold the 
necessary, confidential quality of these interactions. Whilst damage to the reputation of a 
public service might also be taken into account, it is considered that this would always take a 
backseat to evidence of individual harm, with greater emphasis being put on the presence of 
the latter, which was clearly featured more in the hard evidence section. This is even more 
apparent in the soft evidence, which will be concluded upon below. 
8.A.4 Harms outwith privacy harms 
One of the central conclusions of this report is the need for a holistic approach to 
conceptualising harm in context of processing health and biomedical data outwith the narrow 
scope provided for in law. The implications arising out of the single, legal case where the court 
unequivocally found no harm,(UKC14) because the data were anonymised, raises important 
questions regarding the range of interests that are impacted when individuals’ health and 
biomedical data are used. 
In R v Department of Health, ex parte Source Informatics Ltd154  the High Court’s 
determination that no harm occurred hinged upon the prescription data of patients being 
anonymised. The High Court’s reasoning was that if anonymised data were used – even if for 
a commercial purpose and without the prior notice of this to the patients – no harm could be 
caused. Thus, ‘[i]n the Court’s view, concealment of the confider’s personal identity in any 
further disclosures of the confided information is sufficient to secure the protection of the 
confider’s personal privacy.’155 The approach taken by the High Court raises questions about 
the use of data for research and where they are (a) suitably anonymised and (b) used without 
consent but authorised by a body such as the Confidentiality Advisory Group in England under 
s 251 of the 2006 Act, or the equivalent in Scotland through the working of the Privacy 
Advisory Committee.  
If we accept that the law ‘recognises much more than a right to concealment of one’s identity 
as falling under a right to privacy’156 then the High Court’s judgment fails to account for a host 
of other human interests which are at stake in the processing of health and biomedical data – 
namely autonomy, identity and dignity.157 The implications of this for good governance are 
such that anonymisation alone may not be sufficient to recognise the full range of interests at 
stake when processing biomedical and health data. Whilst anonymisation of data technically 
brings use outwith the remit of the DPA, good governance would require transparent 
                                               
154 [2001] QB 424, [2000] 1 All ER 786. 
155 Beyleveld and Histed, ‘Betrayal of confidence in the Court of Appeal’ 280.  
156 Beyleveld and Histed, ‘Betrayal of confidence in the Court of Appeal’ 295. 
157 However it is understood and exemplified by the evidence produced in this review that ‘[w]hile the 
existence of affront might be real, it is not obvious what the legitimate legal interest is that would be 
compromised’. See: Laurie and Harmon, ‘Through the Thicket and Across the Divide’ 9. 
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consideration of the full range of human interests at stake.158 Thus it is contended that 
anonymisation is not in and of itself enough, in recognition of the vast spectrum of material 
harms and soft impacts that can arise out of processing health and biomedical data. 
8.B Soft evidence 
This strand of the research sought to identify evidence of actual harm to the individual or to 
social groups through the abuse of biomedical or health data. We argued that it is the 
individual subject of an abuse who is best placed decide whether a harm has affected him or 
her and to what degree, because the effect of the harm can only be subjective. We also 
explained why we found the term ‘harm’ inappropriate in this context: the impact of the harm is 
at the forefront. 
We presented one hundred and thirty-nine scrutinised articles that were collapsed into sixty 
separate incidents (Section 7.A.2 Soft Evidence). Some incidents may have had multiple 
impacts (Section 7.B.2 Soft evidence typology). Therefore, the number of incidents and 
impacts do not tally.  
8.B.1 Abuse in the biomedical and healthcare sectors 
The majority of abuses involved NHS staff, or in the case of theft, NHS premises including GP 
surgeries/care homes (total incidents = 48). In contrast, only a quarter of incidents were 
outside of the NHS (total incidents = 11). We found no evidence of abuse in academic 
institutions in the UK that hold biomedical and health data. The high incident rate would 
appear to be in line with official ICO figures regarding data breach figures across all sectors in 
the UK.159  
Taken at face value, this might be taken to suggest that this sector is weaker in its security 
and governance than others. However, the NHS holds a huge amount of data and data 
transactions are immense. The high rate of abuse may, therefore, reflect a rate by volume 
effect. It should further be taken into account that  
(a) in contrast to other sectors, the NHS is obliged to report breaches.  
(b) The NHS is high in public interest, so breaches and other failings are reported widely in the 
press. 
                                               
158 The ICO in its ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ discusses the need for transparency – whilst it might 
not be feasibly possible to notify all individuals of intended anonymisation of their data, governance 
policies should indicate how personal data will be used, including whether anonymisation will be 
performed. ICO, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ 40.  
159 ICO, ‘Enforcement: Trends’ <http://ico.org.uk/enforcement/trends> accessed 20 June 2014. 
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(c) The rise in accident/injury claims lawyers advertising for business and the resulting claim 
culture might have a role in ‘chasing for cases’ of breaches more so from the NHS than in 
other sectors. 
8.B.2 Types of abuse 
In Table 14 it was noted that 48 incidents involved NHS staff, and 11 incidents non-NHS staff. 
The majority of incidents involving non-NHS staff arose in the main because the abusers were 
at the receiving end of intentional and unintentional actions by NHS staff. We conclude 
therefore on the findings involving NHS staff only. The majority of abuses (29%) were due to 
unauthorised data disclosure or access. However, loss and theft together accounted for a 
further 25%, non-secure disposal for 13% and fabrication/falsification a further 13%. As shown 
in Figure 8 below, we see, therefore, a spread of abuse types.  
Figure 8: Soft evidence – Types of abuse 
 
We compare the four most frequent types of abuse identified in this strand to the rates 
identified in the other two strands (see Figure 9 below) and can conclude the following. The 
hard evidence strand clearly was the best source to identify cases of unauthorised data 
disclosure/access, where such abuse was identified in just under a third of the cases (29%) in 
the soft evidence. Non-secure disposal cases were picked up approximately equally in the 
three strands (8-13%). Interestingly, abuse due to data loss accounted for only 6% of incidents 
in the hard evidence, yet 15% and 13% in the soft evidence and Twitter evidence respectively.  
Most importantly, only the soft evidence was able to provide evidence of 
fabrication/falsification (except for the exception of one case in the hard evidence160). Including 
such instances may be a novel approach to some, and it does have the flavour of deliberate 
loss and/or destruction of paper records. This has far-reaching consequences in determining 
the sources to consult when calculating data abuse prevalence rates.  
                                               
160 Henry v British Broadcasting Corporation [2005] All ER (D) 43. (Incident number UKC9) 
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Figure 9: Comparing types of abuse across the three evidence strands
 
8.B.3 Causes of abuse – the motivations to abuse 
In only seven incidents was it possible to identify clearly the motivation behind the abuse. 
Three of these were linked to management failings and scandals, and all resulted from the 
perceived need to meet targets now commonplace in the NHS culture (see Table 14). The 
other five involved individuals acting inappropriately to protect their professional reputations 
after severe failings in the care given or for personal gain. Comparing these figures to the hard 
and the Twitter evidence, only two incidents in the hard evidence were to meet NHS targets, 
and four in Twitter for personal gain.  
These seven incidents may well be just the tip of an iceberg, because internal NHS 
investigations are often subject to confidentiality, and it may require a FoI request for findings 
to come to light. Additionally, even the Health Service Ombudsman is in 2014 facing 
allegations that it disregards the majority of complaints it receives. It conducts investigations in 
private and does not discuss individual complaints.(Te08) Thus, the use of confidentiality 
clauses, we conclude, reinforces the suspected tip of the iceberg.  
8.B.4 Facilitation of abuse – maladministration and human error 
As stated earlier, we attempted to identify the factors that might facilitate the abuse. Due to the 
limitations imposed by interpreting the incidents from the soft evidence, there was a strong 
weighting towards maladministration, and little definitive evidence of human error. Therefore 
any conclusions must be considered with extreme caution.  
According to our very broad categorisation (see Table 14), 45 incidents were due to 
maladministration, 7 to human error and 2 to misinterpretation of legal obligations. The 
incidents categorised as either maladministration or human error should be of particular 
interest, because they would help identify poor practice, and from that point it would be 
possible to work on solutions. It goes beyond the remit of this report to investigate further the 
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why and how that such incidents occurred. Rather than speculating here, we give clear 
recommendations under Section 10 Future Research. 
8.B.5 Impacts of abuse 
It is useful to consider these findings in the comparative setting (see Section 7.C Merged 
evidence), because one aspect of this work was to look for evidence of impact in the grey 
literature. By comparing the three strands, we can gauge how forthcoming the grey literature 
was.  
Impact identified: The rate for identifying impact was lower in the newspaper strand (36%) 
than in the hard evidence (42%), but more frequently than in the Twitter evidence (18%). One 
would have expected newspaper articles to report impact more frequently, given that 
journalists are able to bring in personal interest aspects to their articles (in some newspaper 
types more than others). Nonetheless, the soft evidence strand did offer often very moving 
impact statements from the subjects or the loved ones of data abuse, and we consider this to 
be one of the key strengths of the soft search results. 
Figure 10:Comparing frequencies of impact/harm across the three evidence strands 
 
Potential for harm/impact identified: Only 5% of soft incidents reported the potential for impact. 
This is unusual, when we consider that cases of data breach in the NHS, where thousands or 
indeed millions of patients might be affected by an abuse. However, perhaps the breach itself 
is newsworthy enough. Examples of this can be seen in the following headlines; ‘NHS trust 
fined record £325,000 for auctioning off online computer hard drives filled with HIV patients' 
details’(Ma12) and ‘Records stolen from hospital that held secret DNA database.‘(Ti13) On the 
other hand, how could a journalist then track down any individuals affected by a breach of 
hundreds to millions of patient data? The newspaper articles did sometimes include 
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statements from citizens’ voice groups, and these were particularly forthcoming in addressing 
the potential for harm having an impact.  
No impact identified: Fifty-nine per cent of newspaper articles did not discuss any impact. We 
reiterate here that this does not mean that no harm occurred in these incidents.  
Finally, when comparing hard with soft evidence it becomes clear that it is part of a judge’s 
ruling to identify a potential for harm or ascertain whether harm has occurred in the legal 
sense. It is therefore unsurprising that the soft evidence produced fewer instances of 
harm/impact or harm/impact potential than the hard evidence did, and thus a high rate of 
incidents where no harm was addressed (59%). The rates from the soft evidence raise two 
questions. Is there more harm/impact than acknowledged in the public domain? If so, how can 
this be quantified?  
8.B.6 Quality of findings in newspapers  
There were differences in the way that specific newspaper types reported the incidents. A 
newspaper writes for its readership, and as we presented in Table 6, these can range from 
tabloid to broadsheet, from right-wing to centre-left. These differences can account for the 
level of language used, the balance between information and opinion and, not least, how the 
newspaper ‘feeds’ its message to the reader.161 It would appear that each newspaper has a 
majority audience of one language level or another (see Figure 11:Comparing reading levels 
across three newspapers) and from this it is clear that some articles/incidents can be reported 
in a more sophisticated way than others.162  
Figure 11:Comparing reading levels across three newspapers 
 
                                               
161 There is the debate as to whether the media influence their audiences or merely give their audiences 
what they want. It is possible that these are symbiotic relationships. 
162 ‘Google's reading age tool - comparing UK newspapers’ (Virtualeconomics.co.uk, 2010) 
<http://www.virtualeconomics.co.uk/2010/12/googles-reading-age-tool-comparing-uk-newspapers.html> 
accessed 20 June 2014. 
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Against this complex backdrop, we ascertained that often very little information could be found 
in tabloid articles.163 Although such articles served well to gauge the mood of its readership, it 
is questionable just how useful tabloid articles are for the purposes of research such as this. 
Articles from middle-market newspapers gave enough information overall to consider the 
article for relevance, more so for the Daily Mail.164 As seen above, 66% of the Mail’s 
readership have an intermediate reading age, and this goes some way to account for the 
amount of useable information contained in articles. (Former) broadsheets were very well 
informed written in a sophisticated language, and their articles would provide a good starting 
point for further research.  
On a final note, it was an interesting exercise to read and compare the use of emotive and/or 
suggestive language used by different newspapers. It goes beyond the remit of this report to 
perform any discourse analysis, but here we give brief examples of what messages are 
transmitted and how, and which further implications/undertones can be found. The texts for 
each newspaper are direct quotations. In the first example (see Table 19: Discourse analysis – 
Telegraph and Guardian) the audiences targeted are centre-right (Telegraph) or centre-left 
(Guardian). Neither makes it clear that HES data extracts were supplied, both question the 
correctness of this and both link this to the care.data debate.  
Table 19: Discourse analysis – Telegraph and Guardian 
Incident: News53: Health records sold to Staple Inn Actuarial Society 
 The Telegraph (Te04) The Guardian (G02) 
1. Source The Telegraph disclosed It has emerged that ... according to the 
Daily Telegraph 
2. What was done? Hospital data covering 47 million patients 
was sold by the NHS for insurance 
purposes 
A major insurance body bought more 
than a decade’s worth of hospital data 
covering 47 million patients 
3. Justification, 
mitigation 
[HSCIC] would like to restate that full 
postcodes and dates of birth were not 
supplied 
[HSCIC] insisted that the records were 
not used to analyse individual insurance 
premiums 
4. However, the 
reader should also 
know that ... 
Predecessor body was wrong to sell the 
information 
The details were then reportedly 
combined with information from credit 
ratings agencies 
5. Linking to 
care.data 
Those in charge of the new [care.data] 
scheme have repeatedly insisted that data 
held in the new giant database would 
never be used for insurance purposes. 
The news comes at a time of heightened 
sensitivity ... The [care.data] project ... 
has been put on hold for six months.   
 
                                               
163 The Mirror and Sun. 
164 The Express, Mail, and Western Mail. 
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In the second example (see Table 20) the audiences targeted are right-wing (Daily Mail) or 
centre-left (Independent), with 66% and 76% resp. of its readership having an intermediate 
reading level. There are similarities between the texts, but also crucial differences. The first 
quotation from the Mail (Personal data ... was ... sold on auction site) is in the form of sub-
headings, that is, the ‘take-home message’. It is also misleading in that it could suggest intent. 
Both articles describe the patient groups affected, but only the Independent also reports on 
those NHS staff who are also subjects of the abuse, that is, victims are also close to home, not 
only patients. Finally the Mail notes the record fine of £325,000, but the Independent also 
presents the standpoint of the Trust, where the CEO not only raises the issue of austerity, but 
also translates what £325,000 can buy in patient care delivery.  
Table 20: Discourse analysis – Telegraph and Independent 
Incident: News18: NHS trust fined because hard drives containing patient information sold at auction 
 Daily Mail (Ma12) Independent (In26) 
1. What was done? Personal data ... was ... sold on 
auction site. 
NHS Trust ... sold computer hard 
drives ....without first removing 
confidential details about patients 
with HIV. 
Highly sensitive files of tens of 
thousands of patients, including 
details of HIV treatment, ended up 
being sold on eBay. 
2. Other data 
subjects? 
... included details of patients’ medical 
conditions and treatment, disability 
living allowance forms and children’s 
reports 
Same as Mail, but also: 
... documents containing staff details 
like National Insurance numbers, 
home addresses ... and information 
referring to criminal convictions and 
suspected offences 
3. How discovered? University contacted the [ICO] ... to advise that one of their students had 
purchased hard drives via an Internet auction site. 
4. The size of the 
fine and its 
impact 
Record £325,000 In a time of austerity ... we simply 
cannot afford to pay a £325,000 fine. 
... [The amount would pay for] the 
delivery of 300 babies, 50 hip 
operations, 30 heart bypasses and 
360 chemotherapy treatments. 
 
8.B.7 Quality of findings in charities and citizens’ voice groups 
There was a paucity of incidents identified through charities and citizens’ voice groups. As we 
concluded earlier, charities support individuals with a set of concerns unique to that charity. 
Thus we found no evidence of harm or the impact of harm upon anyone because of their 
minority group membership.  
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We were particularly interested in the Terrence Higgins Trust website, not least because those 
living with HIV are not bound by age, ethnicity, socio-demographic status and so on. A 
substantial part of the site is for members only, all of whom live with HIV. With ethical approval 
(Swansea University’s College of Human and Health and College of Medicine Ethics 
Committee) in place, we contacted the THT media team and found that they would be most 
helpful in gatekeeping/passing on information to their members in the framework of a larger 
future study. This is an interesting point to note, particularly because we found no evidence of 
discrimination or stigmatisation of lower-power/lower-status groups. The lack of evidence does 
not mean that there is no discrimination or stigmatisation.  
In conclusion to the findings from charities and citizens’ voice groups, there is clearly more 
work to be done to find out more. We make suggestions in Section 10 Future Research.  
8.C Conclusions drawn from Twitter evidence 
The incidents reported on Twitter were done so with varying levels of detail as to abuse type, 
cause and instances of harm. As such, the conclusions offered in this section relate to those 
instances of abuse and harm which offer the most detail given the medium of reporting. Since 
Twitter offers less concrete and rigorous evidence than the hard evidence, and given the US 
centric focus of the results, the incidents reported offer more insight into general trends of data 
breaches, whereas the UK results (in both the soft and hard evidence) offer more insight for 
UK governance of health or biomedical data. However and importantly, Twitter featured 
several incidents involving larger-scale data breaches, which may have implications beyond 
those, effectuated from smaller-scale data breaches impacting one or two individuals. The 
data breaches implicating 165,000(TW9) to 729,000(TW17) to 780,000(TW41) individuals arguably 
have greater potential for negative impact and harm on broader public interests. Abuses of 
health or biomedical data of such scale will likely engender more widespread and stronger 
feelings of mistrust regarding the organisations involved and in the confidentiality of the 
services implicated. Whilst there may be no differential in actual individualised harm there 
arguably is such a differential in terms of actual (or at least potential) harm to broader public 
interests.165 Due to the unquantifiable nature of harms to broader public interests, it is 
impossible to speculate further as to any relevant threshold whereby the differential for 
increasing harm to broader public interest occurs. However, episodes implicating hundreds of 
thousands has relevance for determining measures of good governance in handling and 
maintaining large amounts of personal data.  
8.C.1 Prevalent abuse types 
Thefts, unauthorised disclosure or access, technical security failures and non-secure disposal 
of health or biomedical data featured heavily in the Twitter evidence.  
                                               
165 However, in particularly egregious abuses of health and biomedical data involving one or only a few 
individuals, if well publicized, can have a similarly great effect on broader public interests. 
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From the evidence, theft did not appear to be an issue featuring prominently in the UK (with 
only one incident out of twenty occurring in the UK, eighteen in the US, one in Zambia). This 
imbalance in incidents of theft could indicate a more highly developed black market for health 
data in the US as opposed to the UK;166 and/or the increased effectiveness of criminal 
monitoring and/or data breach notifications in the US, where in the UK such notifications are 
not mandatory.  
The second most prevalent abuse type involved unauthorised disclosure or access of 
data – whereby, access to the data in question without legitimate reason to do so, featured as 
prominently as with cases involving human error. We distinguished between the unauthorised 
access of data for reasons involving financial or otherwise personal self-gain, and access 
simply without proper reasons for doing so. The latter cases featured more prominently, a 
possible indication that more robust audit trails and access controls are needed when it comes 
to particularly sensitive data. In these cases, data was for the most part accessed for non-
malicious reasons – to satisfy curiosity, possibly boredom or similar.   
However, curiosity can still lead to harm if new (and especially sensitive medical) information 
is learned about a patient/individual that was not known before, and could be used against 
them in a discriminatory fashion.(EUC9) Thus, even when more malevolent motivations are 
lacking, data controllers should restrict access and thus ensure sufficient safeguards are in 
place that are commensurate with obligations of confidentiality and/or data protection to the 
individual involved. 
Human error also played a significant role in the evidence of unauthorised disclosure or 
access. It emerged during the review that cases caused by human error could be rectified by 
different approaches to the administration of data, involving different staff training and/or 
entirely different data handling protocol. Importantly, the key elements involved in cases of 
human error –the human element and chance - cannot be removed. Thus, abuses caused by 
human error cannot be ruled out entirely - not even the best governance can prevent these 
instances of ‘chance’ or mistake entirely.   
Technical security failures featured less prominently in the results than anticipated – if 
considering a ‘traditional’ or narrow conception of how a data breach involving health or 
biomedical data might occur. However, the even balance between causes for technical 
security failures (eight incidents caused by the technical prowess of a motivated 
intruder/hacker i.e. involving third parties; and seven caused by poor administration of 
technical security standards i.e. maladministration) has important implications for data 
controllers. First, that vigilance and adaptability to constantly changing technology is key to 
eliminating risks involved when storing sensitive health and biomedical data. Second, that data 
controllers must factor into their risk assessments  ‘motivated intruders’ – they should assume 
                                               
166 The black market is discussed more generally in Section 9 below.  
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that ‘…there will be someone who would want to identify the individuals to whom it relates and 
who will use all methods reasonably available to do so.’167  
The incidents involving technical security failures also highlight the permanency of digital 
footprints – even if a file is deleted, there are technologies such as caching, and that will leave 
a footprint. This makes it increasingly important to constantly review internal security 
measures against current, technical best practices. Organisations simply cannot 
underestimate the motivations or technical prowess of hackers – in two cases, the 
organisations did not even know their patient databases were hacked until it was too late and 
the files were exposed (or worse) shared on the black market online. 
The loss of data was more indicative of wider systemic issues regarding organisations’ data 
handling practices (maladministration), instead of human error. Maladministration was 
considered the cause of a particular abuse when not only a hard drive, USB stick or laptop 
was lost, but when that particular device was not encrypted or otherwise protected – thus 
facilitating easier access and abuse of the sensitive data.(TW27, TW29, TW32) These cases 
highlighted, once again, the importance of good technical security standards, implemented 
across an organisation. For instance, if a device cannot be recovered after a staff member 
loses it, but it can be wiped remotely; and furthermore, technical security measures can 
prevent certain, sensitive data from being downloaded at all onto portable devices. Such 
measures can diminish the chances of sensitive data being accessed and abused. 
Finally, despite the US-centric nature of the Twitter evidence, the non-secure disposal of 
data seemed to be a particular problem in the UK where there was clear disregard for patient 
confidentiality and no sense of proper data protocols being understood or implemented by 
staff. When hospital staff are reverting to throwing confidential, patient files, (containing 
extremely sensitive health data) into public bins(TW48, TW53, TW57) or in similarly inappropriate and 
publicly accessible places(TW25, TW51, TW55), it is clear that (1) proper data handling procedures 
were not taught or thus understood sufficiently by staff; and or (2) the particular working 
environment breeds contempt and disregard for standard protocols and procedures in place. 
8.C.1.A Misconceptions on level of harm uncovered 
Fewer cases of actual harm were uncovered than anticipated in the Twitter evidence. Due to 
the less confining parameters (that governed the hard evidence search), it was expected that 
Twitter would uncover more incidents reported from the standpoint of the individual then it did. 
In fact the harm (or lack thereof) uncovered in the Twitter evidence, largely mirrors the 
reporting in the hard evidence – incidents featuring no discussion of harm and potential for 
harm featured most prominently. Also similar to the hard evidence strand was the most 
prevalent finding of actual harm being individual distress.  
                                               
167 The ICO, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ 18. 
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In this regard, it is considered that the Twitter evidence sits squarely neither as hard evidence 
nor soft evidence. The incidents reported on Twitter would often link to secondary news 
reports focused on the factual circumstances of a particular abuse, leaving out the potentially 
more ‘sensational’ impact statements of the individuals involved. Just as in the hard evidence, 
harm was discussed entirely ‘removed’ from the individual perspective and thus did not 
provide the same type of insight gained from the newspaper search in the soft evidence 
strand. This lack of evidence of harm may be due to the very nature of Twitter, which relies 
heavily on links users make to external news sites in order to “create” news on its site.  
The value added by undertaking this non-traditional approach to evidence gathering is 
understood now, as in part, to reveal the overall lack of time and discussion spent on the 
objective and actual individual and public costs associated with abuses of health or biomedical 
data. Even if in thirty-six out of seventy incidents reported on Twitter, no discussion of harm 
was provided – this simply does not indicate harm to individuals or the public interest did not 
occur. The importance of data controllers understanding, from a relatively objective basis, 
what actual and potential harms are at risk of happening when processing sensitive health and 
biomedical data, is key to ensuring proportionate and effective governance that seeks to 
prevent most instances of abuse found in this review. 
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9. Implications of the Evidence  
This section looks at our conclusions, that is, the implications of our findings brought together 
with information reported in the Introduction. We present here and in this order the implications 
for governance, provide our assessment of the effectiveness of sanction, and conclude with a 
discussion of incentives and disincentives. Note that public engagement is a theme that is 
brought in across several of these sub-sections. 
To address the secondary aim of this report – to find evidence of harm arising from non-use of 
data – we consider below the implications of non-use from the perspective of this review, and 
thus the lack of evidence found. Therefore, this section will feature a focused discussion on 
the lack of evidence found of harm arising from non-use of data. This discussion will offer 
insight into why evidence of harm from non-use is difficult to find. Importantly, this discussion 
will conclude with the implications of non-use for governance of health and biomedical data. 
Other implications of non-use are discussed elsewhere in this report (see Figure 14). 
Our overall conclusion is: 
The evidence identified shows a narrow range of sanctions available when health or 
biomedical data have been abused. It is considered that the sanctions applicable to the abuse 
of health or biomedical data in the UK are not entirely ineffective, but also not fully capable of 
offering robust disincentives for further abuse. Because the ‘softer’ or more pre-emptory 
sanctions imposed at the earlier stage of the complaints process are not publicised, it was not 
possible to assess the effectiveness of a potentially wide portion of ‘sanctions’ available. 
However, the effectiveness of sanctions imposed at later stages (usually post-abuse) are 
limited in the UK to the narrow confines of the DPA (for the ICO), and slightly less so for UK 
Courts that may take a broader perspective in line with common law and human rights. In this 
regard, the ECtHR serves an extremely important role as an alternative forum to address 
abuses that could be overlooked within any domestic system. However, all that the ECtHR can 
do is declare a breach of human rights; it always then falls back to the domestic offending 
state to change its laws and practices. In the next section, we consider the effectiveness of the 
remedies offered by these various sanctioning bodies – the ICO, Information Tribunal, UK 
Courts and ECtHR. 
 9.A Implications for governance  
Due to the rigour necessary in justifying court and tribunal judgments as well as in ICO 
enforcement measures, the hard evidence provided more precise detail (than the soft 
evidence strand) as to ‘what went wrong’ in particular situations where use of health or 
biomedical data was considered an abuse. (On the other hand, there were only six single 
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incidents reported in the hard and soft evidence, so direct incident comparisons were limited.) 
As such, the hard evidence in particular will be drawn from to consider the implications for the 
governance of health or biomedical data in the UK.  
However, the value added from approaching the evidence from a ‘soft’ perspective also 
reveals important implications for governance, because it relates to which harms and impact 
are taken into account and brought into the public eye. The soft evidence has revealed that a 
harm can result in an impact, and arguably governance should be as pre-emptive as possible 
(typically via ethics approval processes).  
Thus, we advocate an approach to governance in light of both hard and soft conceptions of 
harm, by not only protecting against hard (actual) harm, but also being sensitive to potential 
impacts. These ill effects can be softened through good preparation and an understanding of 
likely expectations. We can never eliminate harm or impact entirely, but we can better prepare 
for both. Incidence of actual harm might seem the most severe, but impact is nonetheless 
significant and should be accounted for in good governance.  
In this vein, we consider the most prevalent causes of abuse and the implications for 
governance. Given the focus of the report on finding evidence of actual harm, governance will 
be considered specifically from the vantage point of the evidence reviewed. In consideration of 
the most prevalent causes for abuse and the implications this has for governance, we address 
the relative effectiveness of the sanctions and remedies perceived in the evidence, in light of 
the prevalence of harm.  
9.A.1 Maladministration (most prevalent cause for abuse) 
The most prevalent cause for abuse across both hard and soft evidence was 
maladministration. Maladministration offers the most implications for governance as it is 
considered the epitome of poor governance. It was accepted that incidents involving alleged 
maladministration would be hard to ‘call’. For example if patient records were stored in a public 
area before being taken to a safe storage area,(Inc39-E18) was this human error or 
maladministration or both? Similarly, if an unencrypted portable media drive was lost, how 
much of the data breach and any resultant harm is due to human error and/or due to the poor 
implementation of policies on proper technical security and data handling?(ICOM2) 
In borderline cases and where incidents were perceived as more indicative of systemic 
organisational problems as to the proper handling of data, rather than human error, 
maladministration was considered the cause. Maladministration poses greater implications 
(and value) for understanding the causes of harm. Whereas the human factor (chance, 
mistake, etc.) can never be eliminated entirely, poor implementation of data handling 
procedures (here poor governance) can be improved and made fit for purpose, that is, made 
more robust to prevent instances of harm from occurring. 
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Due to the broad categorisation processes described above, maladministration operated as a 
catchall cause referring to incidents including those arising from: 
• Failure to take any action when necessary to prevent an abuse;  
• Failure to follow correct procedures or the law despite the provision of guidance and 
existence of standard procedures and protocols;  
• Inadequate consultation prior to taking action;  
• Lack of clear mandates on proper standard procedures and protocol; or 
• The adherence to out-dated standards and procedures that put data at risk.  
The maladministration of health and biomedical data most often resulted in the unauthorised 
disclosure of or access to health or biomedical data. The multiple level failings of the proper 
administration and handling of data, as it relates to the most prevalent related abuse 
(unauthorised disclosure or access) is indicative of two issues that could be addressed by 
more robust governance: 1) that all levels of staff that come into contact with or have specific 
roles handling health and biomedical data, do not have the proper training and/or incentive to 
handle data properly in keeping with the standards and procedures provided (or disincentives 
if they breach such standards or fail to follow procedures); or 2) the complete absence of 
coherent standards and procedures that guide staff clearly towards safe data handling and 
that address the specific situations encountered by staff at different levels of the organisation. 
However, there is a further and relevant difference between staff (training) failures and 
systemic failures. This distinction finds parallels between arguments and theories advanced in 
information governance literature that attempt to make sense of negligent practices within the 
NHS.  
The absence of coherent standards and procedures was further apparent with regard to staff 
use of social media. As noted earlier,(news25) in 2011 there was a known lack of guidance for 
staff in this respect. In the interim, most Health Boards and Trusts have guidelines in place,168 
and the NMC 169 a guidance document.  
Another case in point is the NHS, which featured especially prominently in the soft evidence 
strand (in forty-eight incidents out of sixty). Despite the arguably robust data handling 
protocols that for example NHS England operates under,170 incidents of repeated and 
advertent abuse still occur. This could be explained by the ineffectiveness of training and/or 
                                               
168 For instance see: NHS England: http://www.rdash.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Social-
Networking-approved-HROD-02.02.2012-V1.pdf; NHS Scotland: 
http://www.nhsaaa.net/media/132550/socmedpol.pdf; NHS Wales: 
http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sitesplus/documents/862/316socialnetworkpolicy.pdf.  
169 Nursing and Midwifrey Council, ‘Social Networking Sites’ (2012) http://www.nmc-uk.org/Nurses-and-
midwives/Advice-by-topic/A/Advice/Social-networking-sites/ accessed 29 April 2014. 
170 NHS England, ‘Information Governance Policy’ (2014) <http://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/ig-policy-1.1.pdf> accessed 28 April 2014. 
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dissemination of standards and procedures when it comes to handing health or biomedical 
data.  
An example of this is seen in the ICO’s monetary penalty notice issued to North Staffordshire 
Combined Healthcare NHS Trust where several faxes containing sensitive health details of 
three individuals regarding their physical and mental health, special needs/mental health 
services provided and whether the individuals were at risk for self-harm, serious neglect or 
exploitation by others were sent mistakenly to a member of the public.(ICOM4) The mistakenly 
sent faxes were intended for the Wellbeing Centre (the “Centre”) with remit to improving 
access to psychological therapies. Importantly in this case and to the assignment of 
maladministration as the cause for abuse, the ICO uncovered that: 
• The Centre’s new fax number was not pre-programmed into the NHS fax machine 
even thought that NHS office regularly sent faxes to the Centre. The Centre’s fax 
number was input manually each time by staff, whereby in this incident, the fax number 
of the unintended recipient differed by one digit only.  
• The NHS staff did not “call ahead” to the number, which could have flagged to them 
that the faxes were not received by the Centre.  
• At the time of the abuse, this NHS office operated a safe haven policy and best 
practice guidelines that were available to staff via the NHS intranet. These guidelines 
provided that staff should pre-program the most frequently-used numbers into safe 
haven fax machines and operate a “call ahead” system.  
• Importantly, the ICO found that the staff in question were not aware of the safe haven 
policy or best practice guidelines and did not receive any specific training relating to fax 
use. The ICO considered these shortcomings were exacerbated by a lack of effective 
management control.(ICOM4)  
The implications that can be drawn from this example and instances of maladministration 
more broadly indicate a new approach to employee training - one that is contextualised not 
only to the role of the staff member (and thus appropriate to their level), but also one tailored 
to particular data handling practices such as email, fax, internet usage, patient intake, record 
keeping etc. (We discuss this further under 9.D.3.C Data protection awareness (re-)training – 
bringing home the real-life message) It is understood that many organisations operate 
information governance based on a one-size-fits-all training approach – the extremely high 
prevalence of abuse of data due to maladministration would seem to indicate that this 
approach should be re-visited.  
In support of more contextualised training and guidance for safe data handling, specific 
incentives and/or disincentives for handling data according to proper protocol could further 
promote best practices. More robust methods for ‘spot checking’ data handling compliance 
could be considered as a means to combat complacency, laziness or outright disregard for 
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proper protocol. Furthermore, the disciplinary actions that result from abuses of data should be 
made clear in staff training, to disincentivise abuse (although and as we argue in 9.D.3 
Disincentives, a soft approach can be crucial to the success of staff training – a dual approach 
can work very well in parallel). Finally, vigilance is required to ensure that best practices are in 
line with the current state of the art for technical security. Even if the loss of manual paper files 
was less prominent in the evidence, when digital copies of files are carried by staff off 
premises, high risks remain unless robust technical security measures are used and clear 
procedures are in place for what kind and how much sensitive health or biomedical data can 
be carried off premises (if at all).  
How exactly robust technical security measures are maintained goes beyond the remit of this 
report. As an indication only, we list here: procurement should ensure that all devices 
purchased reach ISO/IEC 27001 standards,171 the NHS IG Toolkit Administrator should 
ensure that he or she is up to date with latest developments,172 and the Information Asset 
Owner must be able to provide assurance that ‘the IG a) security risks have been considered 
and assessed on a regular basis, b) security measures have been implemented correctly and 
cannot be bypassed and c) security risks arising from use of the information asset are 
acceptable to their provider and other stakeholders.’173 
9.A.2 Processing against individual objections or without their consent  
Turning to a further prominent cause for abuse, we consider what form of consent (if any) is 
required when using the sensitive health or biomedical data of an individual for this has 
obvious implications for how data are governed within an organisation.  
The use of personal or sensitive personal data, as defined in the DPA, must be justified on the 
basis of certain legitimising conditions under Schedule 2 of the DPA (if ordinary personal data) 
and under Schedule 3 if sensitive personal data – including health and biomedical data in the 
latter category. Despite the higher threshold for justifying the use of sensitive data, obtaining 
the consent of a data subject is not a strict requirement if other Schedule 2 and 3 conditions 
are met. Indeed, consent is neither necessary nor sufficient to comply with the provisions of 
the DPA. This is a legal reality that escapes many, and it can lead to certain 
expectations about how data are appropriately handled. Without speculating too far, such 
expectations can, in turn, lead to future feelings of affront or harm when consent has not been 
sought or obtained, and yet even when – notwithstanding – uses of data are perfectly legal 
and legitimate. It does not follow therefore that consent should always be sought. Rather these 
                                               
171 Information Standards Board for Health and Social Care, ‘Information Governance’ 
<http://www.isb.nhs.uk/use/baselines/ig> accessed 26 June 2014.  
172 Department of Health. ‘BS ISO 27000 Series of Information Security Standards’ 
<https://www.igt.hscic.gov.uk/isoiecsummary.aspx> accessed 26 June 2014. 
173 Note: Guidelines for NHS England. NHS Connecting for Health, ‘NHS Risk Management’ (2009) 
Appendix 4 
<http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/infogov/security/risk/inforiskmgtgpg.pdf> 
accessed 24 June 2014. 
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potential impacts should be appreciated and full(er) explanations or engagement put in place 
to address them and disabuse people of false assumptions and unjustifiable and untenable 
expectations. 
In the hard evidence, incidents within this category were characterised as the use or proposed 
use of health or biomedical data against the stated objections of the individual(s); without fair 
notice; without obtaining consent; or, in cases where consent was refused. This cause of 
‘abuse’ highlights the importance for data controllers to be able to distinguish between conduct 
that represents an actual breach of the law, and that, which may cause upset to some 
individuals but was technically lawful or permissible. If other conditions under the DPA justify a 
use of health or biomedical data simply because the individual did not consent to the 
processing, said use might still be lawful technically.  
9.A.2.A Legal obligations and good governance 
At this juncture, it is important to distinguish in context of the statements preceding this, the 
difference between the lawful use of health or biomedical data and the good governance of 
data, which will call for best practices that exceed technical obligations under the law.  
In the hard evidence where health or biomedical data was/would be used against the wishes 
of individuals, this presents a strong case for better public engagement in the first instance, as 
opposed to indicating the need to obtain informed individual consent for each proposed data 
use. Good public engagement clarifies the boundaries for what could be done with an 
individual’s data from the time of collection, boundaries that are maintained unless notice is 
given otherwise. Even when consent is obtained at a fixed point in time, a given use of health 
or biomedical data can still cause harm in future if new uses arise that change significant 
aspects of the transaction. A more reflexive, interactive relationship with individuals can help 
reassure that they will be given notice if anything changes significantly the way and purposes 
to which their data are used. Even when consent is infeasible to obtain or inappropriate under 
the circumstances (e.g. disciplinary proceedings or a disproportionately large number of 
individuals to contact), data controllers can promote robust public engagement, and give clear 
notice to what can be expected as to the data collected. It must be remembered that, due to 
advancements in medical knowledge and medical technologies, no-one can anticipate today 
how data might be used at a future date – another reason to have governance of the highest 
standards. 
A full discussion on the nuances of operating on the basis of obtaining fully informed, 
individual consent for each proposed use of health or biomedical data, versus an opt-out 
clause, combined with fair processing notice(s) and good public engagement is outwith the 
scope of this report. However, it is important to highlight the distinctions made between what is 
legally required and that which is considered good governance or best practices. Importantly, 
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it is not the case that best practice would demand the need to obtain individual consent in all 
circumstances.  
9.A.3 Unauthorised disclosure by the press 
The incidence of press or media disclosing patient details without authorisation revealed a 
clear need for NHS staff and other organisations that handle sensitive health or biomedical 
data to have clear standards and guidelines governing interactions with the press. Such 
guidelines would need to be accessible and tailored appropriately for all levels of staff. There 
should be strong disincentives for breaching these rules. The liabilities of staff should be made 
clear when breaches of patient confidentiality occur, regardless of their position. Unauthorised 
disclosure by the press or media, facilitated by the lack of guidelines and/or implementation of 
proper protocol for hospital/medical staff speaking to the press, resulted in grave instances of 
harm to not only the individuals but also to their family and loved ones.  
In Armoniene v Lithuania, decided by the ECtHR, a widow sought damages for financial harm 
and distress caused by the unauthorised disclosure of her husband’s HIV-positive status by 
the press, as well as his affair with an HIV-positive woman that resulted in the birth of two 
extramarital children.(EUC5) The ECtHR detailed the grievous harm – both financial and 
emotional – caused to the entire family. The family were forced to move from their village after 
the information was published. The distress caused by the publication had a detrimental effect 
on the now deceased husband’s health. The stigma associated with his HIV-positive status 
had a negative influence on his family life and restricted his family’s ability to interact with the 
public.  
In P and another v Poland a young woman was raped brutally and became pregnant.(EUC11) 
She made an early decision to have an abortion, but when seeking the procedure, the hospital 
issued a press release regarding her situation. The young woman became the centre of 
national news frenzy. She was harassed from unknown third parties, which forced her to be 
discharged from the hospital and seek treatment 500km from home. 
Finally, in Z v Finland, the unauthorised disclosure by the press was in fact perpetuated by a 
Court of Appeals in Finland. It faxed a judgment to Finland’s largest newspaper (Helsingin 
Sanomat) that confirmed a woman’s HIV-positive status and disclosed her full identity.(EUC1) 
The ECtHR considered the damaging effect caused to Z’s professional and personal life by 
this unnecessary disclosure by the Court of Appeal – with consideration of potential damage to 
wider public interests including the discouragement of ‘…persons from seeking diagnosis or 
treatment and thus undermin[ing] any preventive efforts by the community to contain the 
pandemic’; as well as damage to ‘the interests of a patient and the community as a whole in 
protecting the confidentiality of medical data’.174 Ultimately the ECtHR found the disclosure of 
the Court of Appeal’s judgment to the press as unnecessary and awarded Z non-pecuniary 
                                               
174 Z v Finland, paras [96]-[97]. 
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damages. Z v Finland highlights both the sensitivity of HIV-positive data, but also the care with 
which other professionals (lawyers, Courts, police) must and should treat such data. 
Overall, the severity of harm caused by unauthorised disclosures by the press/media is 
indicative of the unstoppable trajectory that disclosed information disclosed takes in today’s 
society. One need look no further than the recent Leveson Inquiry to confirm this.175 
 Once sensitive information regarding an individual’s health is publicised and reported in the 
general media, the damage is no longer localised but capable of reaching even further 
audiences given today’s digital society. Thus whilst doctors have a special relationship and 
thus obligation to maintain the confidentiality of their patients, it should be made clear to other 
staff within the health service, as well as other professionals including lawyers, police, courts, 
etc.) that they play a significant and important role in maintaining confidentiality (even if the 
direct line of legal liability does not necessarily fall with them). 
This underscores again the need for on-going staff awareness training. Additionally, there is 
an increasing need for health care staff to be aware of blaggers, that is, those who knowingly 
or recklessly obtain or disclose personal data or information without the consent of the data 
controller. Such individuals are not only investigative journalists seeking to ‘out’ a public figure 
in some way. Indeed, the first blagging conspiracy came before the court in 2013.(Ti03) ICU 
Investigations Ltd with its three hundred and thirty strong client base of three hundred and 
thirty blagged personal patient details from (not only) GP surgeries. These details were then 
sold to clients (such as Brighton and Hove Council and Allianz Insurance) wanting to trace 
their debtors.  
9.A.4 Unauthorised access due to insufficient safeguards 
A case worthy of mention is that of I v Finland,(EUC9) which featured the unauthorised access of 
a woman’s HIV-positive status due to insufficient safeguards being in place. In this case, a 
woman living with HIV and working as a nurse in Finland had paid regular visits to the same 
hospital’s Infectious Diseases Clinic from 1987.176 In 1992, the woman became suspicious that 
her colleagues were aware of her illness – at the time, hospital staff could access freely the 
patient register containing information on patients' diagnoses and treating doctors. Whilst, she 
did not claim that there had been any deliberate, unauthorised disclosure of her health data (it 
was not clear who may have accessed her health records), she did claim that the hospital 
failed to meet its obligation to keep her data secure against unauthorised access.  
                                               
175 ‘Leveson Inquiry: Culture, practice and ethics of the press’ 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140122145147/http:/www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/> 
accessed 29 June 2014. 
176 I v. Finland [2008] ECHR 20511/03 (17 July 2008); Big Brother Watch‚ ‘Broken records: The worrying 
lack of security around your medical history, and how it is changing for the worse’ (2012) 
<http://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/brokenrecords.pdf> accessed 19 June 2014.  
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The ECtHR found in her favour, and awarded her compensation for the distress caused by the 
need to change her employment and the effect of the rumours on her son’s life.177 It is worth 
noting that the woman also claimed for financial damages relating to her contract not being 
renewed and her needing to move homes because of the rumours surrounding her health. 
Although her financial loss was not recognised legally (due to insufficiency of causal 
evidence), it nevertheless highlights the serious and wide-ranging impacts that abuse of health 
data can have. Importantly, the ECtHR found that: 
Although the object of art 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against 
arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to 
abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there 
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life.178 
This indicates the important positive obligations data controllers have, to ensure proactively 
technical and organisational safeguards are in place, to secure the personal health data they 
hold. 
9.A.5 Human error 
Human error was also a key issue uncovered in the evidence and is well recognised by the 
ICO: in the first quarter of 2013, more than half of the data breach incidents reviewed by ICO 
were caused by human error (down to the carelessness of individuals handling the data).179 
Incidents caused by human error such as misplacing an unencrypted USB stick somewhere at 
work(ICOM2) or leaving behind sensitive documents on a train(ICOM7) could at least be partially 
resolved by better employee training and technical barriers to staff downloading especially 
sensitive data to portable devices. The evidence would suggest a relationship between cases 
of human error and maladministration, or in some cases an interaction between the two. 
Additionally, these two causes were often ‘borderline’, whereby a judgment was made to 
assign a single cause. In cases where the abuse was a one-off occurrence and, on the face of 
the evidence, not indicative of a systemic issue of poor data handling, human error was 
assigned. Ultimately, this category represents the unknown and unchangeable element in the 
risks of handling sensitive data, that is, the human element – one that the ICO acknowledges 
as a key cause for data breach incidents.180  
It is also useful to consider at this point unintentional human error in the context of the 
healthcare workplace and working conditions. The NHS across the UK is in dire financial 
                                               
177 I v Finland, para [53]. 
178 I v Finland, para [36]. 
179 Sally-Anne Poole, ‘ICO blog: The cost of carelessness - how stats help inform the action we take’ 
(ICO, August 2013) <http://ico.org.uk/news/blog/2013/the-cost-of-carelessness-how-data-informs-the-
action-we-take> accessed 29 April 2014. 
180 Sally-Anne Poole, ‘ICO blog: The cost of carelessness - how stats help inform the action we take’. 
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straits, and staff workloads are increasing exponentially.(BBC01,H03,Te20) In times of stress, the risk 
of carelessness increases.  
In addition, we see the first steps towards integrated care in the UK, where health and social 
services data will be linked. As Goodwin, Smith and colleagues note, ‘governance needs to be 
aligned across the various health and social care providers to drive shared interests and 
accountability in care delivery for people’.181 The workforce accessing health and social care 
data will increase, an array of IT systems and platforms will be communicating, and each 
linked organisation will come with its own culture, priorities and IT knowledge-base. It is 
therefore vital that information governance is developed appropriately and rigorously alongside 
other pathways to integration.  
Overall, despite the existence of robust data handling procedures, there always remains the 
possibility for human error to intervene. Human error represents one of the causes identified 
that should be distinguished from more intentional and flagrant abuses of health or biomedical 
data, given the inadvertent nature of these abuses. 
9.A.6 Falsification and fabrication 
It could be argued that falsification and fabrication, such as the cases identified in the 
newspaper search (and single case in the hard evidence(UKC9)), are less a question of good 
governance and more a question of criminal intent. It goes beyond the remit of this review to 
discuss this in full. However, if cases of falsification and fabrication of health or biomedical 
data fall within the remit of the ICO, then custodial sentences are not, we argue, too harsh. 
Indeed, Christopher Graham, the Information Commissioner, has been pressing government 
for tougher penalties.(Te12) 
We differentiated earlier between the individual perpetrator and serious management failings 
that have led to falsification and fabrication, and discussed these in depth in Section 7.B.2.B.1 
Impact of harm caused through falsification/fabrication. Whereas the individual (presumably) 
acts alone or with a few other individuals, falsification and fabrication on a larger scale 
involves perpetrators and those who may be considered ‘guilty by association’ – or at least 
witnesses to such abuse. The question remains as to why it is difficult to combat falsification 
and fabrication in the NHS despite the clear existence of proper data handling protocols. One 
possible answer lies in the fears that staff might harbour after whistle blowing or where the 
work environment is that of harassment and bullying. Another possible answer lies in the 
perceived need for some middle and senior NHS management to meet organisational targets.  
 
                                               
181 Nick Goodwin et al, ‘Integrated care for patients and populations: Improving outcomes by working 
together’ (The King’s Fund and Nuffield Trust 2012) 
<http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/sites/files/nuffield/publication/integrated_care_for_patients_and_populati
ons_-_improving_outcomes_by_working_together_jan12_0.pdf> accessed 18 June 2014. 
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We differentiated earlier between the individual perpetrator and serious management failings 
that have led to falsification and fabrication. Whereas the individual (presumably) acts alone or 
with a few other individuals, falsification and fabrication, on a larger scale, involves 
perpetrators and those who may be considered ‘guilty by association’ or at least witnesses to 
such abuse. The question remains as to why it is difficult to combat falsification and fabrication 
in the NHS despite the clear existence of proper data handling protocols? A possible answer 
lies in the fears that staff might harbour after whistle blowing or pressures to meet 
organisational targets.  
9.A.7 Genetic data  
The only case uncovered in the search for genetic data was S and Marper v United 
Kingdom,(EUC7) which focused on an alleged interference with the applicants’ Article 8 rights to 
respect of private life under the European Convention on Human Rights.182 The implications 
arising from the abuse of genetic data warrants discussion along with the important issues 
raised by this case. Furthermore, Section 10 Future Research will highlight abuse of genetic 
data as an area warranting further research. 
9.A.7.A S and Marper v United Kingdom  
This case featured a long history of trial domestically, before escalating to its review by the 
ECtHR.183 The two applicants, “S” and Michael Marper, were both previously arrested, 
whereby S was eventually acquitted at trial and the charges against Marper were dropped. 
Despite this, and in keeping with (then current) police policy in the UK,184 their DNA profiles, 
“cellular samples”185 and fingerprints were to be retained without any stipulated time for 
disposal. The applicants applied to the ECtHR to seek destruction of their DNA profiles, 
cellular and fingerprint samples as they contested it was a violation of their Article 8 rights to 
respect of private and family life.  
In considering the case, the ECtHR considered the nature of DNA profiles, cellular samples 
and fingerprints, and specifically, each of the data/material’s propensities to reveal sensitive 
information about S and Marper. The Court distinguished between cellular samples on the one 
hand and DNA profiles on the other:  
                                               
182 S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 31. 
183 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39 [7], [2004] 4 All ER 19 on appeal from 
[2002] EWCA Civ 1275 and [2002] 1 WLR 3223. 
184 Section 64(1A) of Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (as modified by Section 82 of the Criminal 
Justice and Police Act 2001) authorised police in England and Wales to retain collected fingerprints or 
DNA samples so long as they were only used in relation to preventing or detecting crime, investigations 
of an offence or in prosecutions. The provisions governing retention of samples in Northern Ireland were 
identical to those in England and Wales, whereas in Scotland samples must be destroyed if the 
individual is either not convicted or fully acquitted (bar certain crimes, and then a three-year retention 
period applies). 1995 Criminal Procedure Act of Scotland, s 18(a). 
185 The ECtHR refers to cellular samples (rather than DNA samples) to mean what we presume are the 
blood, semen, saliva or hair samples taken from S and Marper at the time of their arrest. 
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DNA samples are cellular samples and any sub-samples or part samples retained from 
these after analysis. DNA profiles are digitised information, which is stored 
electronically on the National DNA Database together with details of the person to 
whom it relates.186 
Of relevance to this report are the DNA profiles, as representative of the digitised information 
(or data) stored after analysis of the samples. Whilst cellular samples are technically outwith 
the scope of this evidence review (as the remit of this report is related to health and 
biomedical data) the implications arising from the Court’s discussion over DNA samples is 
nonetheless important to our understanding of the implications arising out of abuses of genetic 
data. The Court considered DNA profiles and cellular samples together, although reaching 
different conclusions as to the relative sensitivity of each.  
As to cellular samples, the Court found the applicants’ concerns legitimate – specifically as to 
potential future abuses: 
An individual's concern about the possible future use of private information retained by 
the authorities is legitimate and relevant to a determination of the issue of whether 
there has been an interference. Indeed, bearing in mind the rapid pace of 
developments in the field of genetics and information technology, the Court cannot 
discount the possibility that in the future the private-life interests bound up with genetic 
information may be adversely affected in novel ways or in a manner which cannot be 
anticipated with precision today.187 
The Court acknowledged the pace of technological advancement was such that S and Marper 
held legitimate fears as to future, intrusive surveillance to which they could be subjected. 
However, this was not the only consideration – the Court found particularly sensitive, the data 
cellular samples could reveal about both an individual’s health as well for their relatives.188 
This is in agreement with the NCOB report on bioinformation that was cited to in this 
judgment189 whereby cellular (DNA) samples (containing entire genetic sequences of 
individuals) are recognised as holding serious potential for revealing ever more sensitive 
personal data regarding an individual’s health, family relationships, and potentially even 
behaviour.190  
                                               
186 S and Marper v United Kingdom [footnote 1]. 
187 S and Marper para [71]. 
188 Thus the data, which could be produced from analysing the samples, was what was most sensitive. 
S and Marper para [72]. 
189 The ECtHR noted the NCOB’s concerns regarding indefinite retention of bioinformation such as to 
the “lack of satisfactory empirical evidence to justify the present practice of retaining indefinitely 
fingerprints, samples and DNA profiles from all those arrested for a recordable offence, irrespective of 
whether they were subsequently charged or convicted.” See S and Marper paras 38-40. 
190 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘The forensic use of bioinformation: ethical issues’, September 
2007 para 1.12.  
 124 
The Court then considered DNA profiles. Despite the fact that DNA profiles contained ‘a more 
limited amount of personal information extracted from cellular samples in a coded form’, the 
Court found that nonetheless ‘the profiles contain substantial amounts of unique personal 
data’.191 This is in accordance with the NCOB report on Bioinformation that provides that DNA 
profiles do not in themselves reveal a substantial amount of personal data bar (potential) 
identification and gender.192 Nonetheless, the ability for the police and authorities to use DNA 
profiles to conduct a) familial searching to identify genetic relationships between individuals 
and b) make inferences regarding an individual’s ethnic origin was considered extremely 
sensitive and impactful on private life.193 
As such, the ECtHR found that a) the retention of DNA profiles, cellular samples and 
fingerprints194 sufficiently related to the applicants’ private lives under Article 8 and b) that the 
indefinite retention was a ‘disproportionate interference with the applicants' right to respect for 
private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society’.195 This was despite 
the Court’s acknowledgement that the United Kingdom was serving a public interest, in the 
prevention crime.  
This ruling holds great implications for widening the legal notion of harm (at least in relation to 
Article 8 considerations196). The potential for the DNA samples to be used in a discriminatory 
fashion in future (and cause harm), with special consideration of the potential impact on the 
younger “S” (who at the time of arrest was eleven years old), skewed the evidence in favour of 
the applicants. The weight given to the potential to cause harm, in light of future 
advancements in DNA analysis, highlights the broad implications that arise with the use, or 
mere storage of genetic data. However, the public interest in protecting the privacy in genetic 
data, data which may reveal information about an individual’s health, or even information that 
he or she might not have been aware of (e.g. familial relationships) will often be balanced 
against other public interests, such as those served through its utility in crime detection and 
prevention.  
In the now successfully appealed House of Lords judgment R (on the application of S) v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire R (on the application of Marper) v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire in 2004, the Court considered that ‘[t]he value of retained fingerprints and samples 
                                               
191 S and Marper para [74]-[75]. 
192 This is explicitly recognised by the ECtHR in S and Marper as well as by the NCOB in The Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, ‘The forensic use of bioinformation’ paras 1.12 and 4.53. 
193 S and Marper paras [75]-[76]. 
194 The ECtHR held that fingerprints were sufficiently related to S and Marper’s Article 8 rights to private 
life, albeit that DNA profiles and cellular samples had a more important impact on their rights. 
Specifically, the Court held that the retention of their fingerprints ‘on a nationwide database with the aim 
of being permanently kept and regularly processed by automated means for criminal-identification 
purposes’ was sufficient to be deemed an interference with said rights. S and Marper para [86]. 
195 S and Marper para [125]. 
196 Which are arguably broader than those permitted under UK data protection law or even common 
law. 
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taken from suspects who were subsequently acquitted is considerable’.197 The major role DNA 
evidence played in the detection and prosecution of serious crime was the proper context in 
which the indefinite retention of S and Marper’s DNA samples, profiles and fingerprints would 
be assessed under human rights law.198 Opposite to the judgment of the ECtHR, the House of 
Lords considered:  
[F]ears of what may happen in the future in the light of the expanding frontiers of 
science [are] not relevant in respect of contemporary use of retained samples in 
connection with the detection and prosecution of crime. If future scientific 
developments require it, judicial decisions can be made, when the need occurs, to 
ensure compatibility with the convention.199 
The House of Lord’s finding that the indefinite retention of DNA samples, profiles and 
fingerprints as only modestly interfered with S and Marper’s private lives,200 lies in stark 
contrast to the broad perspective taken by the ECtHR; a perspective which would eventually 
cause a change to such laws in the UK.201 The House of Lord’s treatment of the issues around 
retention of genetic data emphasise the narrowness taken to considerations of ‘harm’ in the 
UK context, even when operating within the remit of human rights law and in particular Article 
8.  
This divergence of judgments also importantly accentuates the variable quality of public 
interest judicial determinations – in the House of Lords case, the public interest factors 
weighed against S and Marper in finding indefinite retention both legitimate and proportional to 
any modest interference with their Article 8 rights. This is the precise opposite to the ECtHR 
case where the balance was skewed in favour of S and Marper as the indefinite retention of 
their DNA profiles, samples and fingerprints were found to substantially interfere with their 
Article 8 rights to private life and the interference was disproportionate to the legitimate aim 
sought (prevention and detection of crime). Thus, there is likely to be no legal certainty when 
public interests are balanced – it will be on the facts of each case to determine where the 
balance lies. Even though the search for ‘genetic data’ uncovered only one case, it is a case of 
                                               
197 R v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39 [7], [2004] 4 All ER 19. 
198 [2004] UKHL 39 [8]. 
199 [2004] UKHL 39 [28]. 
200 [2004] UKHL 39 [32]. 
201 In response to the ECtHR’s ruling in S and Marper, the UK amended its legislation (via the the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012) to require the destruction of obtained DNA samples, profiles and 
fingerprints after a specified period of time and subject to relevant conditions based on the status of the 
conviction, previous convictions, age, etc. The changes regarding destruction of data are found under 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ss 64ZA–64ZJ, with changes regarding retention and use of 
material, in ss 64ZK–64ZN of the Act. Scotland already had provision for destruction of samples within 
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in fact in late 2013 the Justice Minister launched a new DNA database system whereby a ‘DNA profile 
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before.’ ‘Justice Minister Launches Improved DNA Profiling Service’ (Northern Ireland Executive 2013) 
<http://www.northernireland.gov.uk/news-doj-121213-justice-minister-launches> accessed 23 June 
2014. 
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importance – one that broadened the legal landscape to recognise and provide for new 
notions of harm as they relate to genetic data and samples. For S and Marper, the public 
interest balance did lie in favour of protecting the privacy in their genetic data and DNA 
samples. As such, this perpetuated an important change to the law in England and Wales 
where samples must be destructed under certain conditions and timescales. 
Overall, the ECtHR case of S and Marper serves as a reflection on the range of potential 
harms that can arise from mere storage of genetic data, whereby it is the informational value 
of analysed DNA samples that can impact upon individuals’ right to respect of private life. The 
case crucially serves as a reaffirmation of the importance of considering harm outwith the 
narrow scope of actual harm (as understood in legal terms) both when planning and 
implementing good governance of health and biomedical data. The unique capability of 
genetic data to identify, characterise and speak to physical, physiological, familial qualities and 
relationships ensures that its use or mere storage will give rise to a host of ethical and legal 
considerations.  
9.A.8 Non-use of data 
9.A.8.A Focus of this section 
As well as harms resulting from the abuse of biomedical and health data, there are the effects 
due to non-use of such data to consider. However, it is acknowledged that little/no actual 
evidence of harm due to the non-use of data was found by the searches used in this review, 
and that it would be challenging at best to determine with a high degree of confidence whether 
an instance of harm was truly due to the non-use of data, or whether its causes were 
otherwise in the presence or absence of adequate data. It is also important to retain the 
distinction between harm due to the non-use of data and the benefits due to the use of data, 
and not to simply invert the latter and effectively equate the two. It could be misleading and 
inaccurate to postulate that benefits resulting from the use of data in a study would not have 
been realised, and that the opposite outcomes would have occurred, if those data had not 
been used. Therefore, this section will identify and discuss some important reasons for the 
non-use of data, with examples of consequences or lost opportunities where available, to help 
clarify why problems due to the non-use of data are not more evident. 
9.A.8.B Context  
It is universally accepted that data collected in the course of healthcare delivery hold great 
potential for research and the improvement of clinical practice and patient care if they can be 
made available as needed. The traditional position within the UK is of data in silos, such that 
GP data is held within the practice and not systematically shared with hospitals, and even 
within a given hospital, data are held on administrative or departmental systems that may 
communicate with each other to varying extents. Valuable data collected for research might 
not be put to any further use after the end of the study. The question arises as to why the 
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wealth of routinely-collected and bespoke study data are not being used to best advantage. 
Whilst the complexities and constraints of the various legislative and regulatory governance 
frameworks are undoubtedly relevant here, it is worth reviewing other, some rather 
fundamental, factors at play in the non-use of data. To do this, we need to take a step back. 
9.A.8.C Clinical records 
In 1996, the National Audit Office (NAO) published a report entitled ‘Setting the Records 
Straight’202 and this noted numerous problems with paper case note keeping.  Among the 
hospitals studied, 12 of the 16 kept multiple sets of casenotes for some patients, which could 
lead to confusion in administering care. Among 121 clinics, only two-thirds of casenotes were 
at hand for immediate use, and although most were located in adequate time, on some 
occasions (up to 3%) the search was fruitless and the patient was unable to receive their 
consultation. This has serious implications for the continuity of patient care, and may force a 
delay in surgical procedures because patient history cannot be verified. It carries professional 
risks to the duty of care of the clinical team in not being able to make informed decisions. It 
also imposes an unnecessary financial burden due to wasted time for staff and patients. 
Missing casenotes can bias clinical audit, thus skewing the information used to monitor and 
advance clinical practice. For example, an audit of antenatal risk factors found that 6.4% of the 
casenotes were missing. Although this sounds like a relatively small proportion, the suggestion 
was that this was non-random as clinicians tended to hold onto interesting cases for research 
or further discussion.203 As well as entire case notes going missing, individual test and 
procedure results, and sometimes episodes of care can be missing from the file. This again 
may delay timely care leading to poorer outcomes and subject the patient to duplicate risky 
invasive processes. It also wastes public money and staff time.204 
Since this particular NAO report was published 18 years ago, there have been considerable 
advances in the use of electronic clinical systems in healthcare. Nevertheless, we are still a 
long way from having a comprehensive electronic patient record, let alone being able to use 
and share it effectively. Swansea University hosts the UK Multiple Sclerosis (MS) Register.205 
When the Register was being established in 2009, we carried out a survey of clinical 
record-keeping methods in NHS Neurology clinics across the UK. Of the 47 respondent 
clinics, 5 still used only paper records, 8 stated that they used a word processor package, and 
only 10 said they used an MS-specific clinical system.206 We had to take purposive action in 
                                               
202 National Audit Office, ‘Setting the record straight’ (1995) <http://archive.audit-
commission.gov.uk/auditcommission/subwebs/publications/studies/studyPDF/1134.pdf> accessed 18 
June 2014. 
203 A F E Yoong, C Hudson and T Chard, ‘Medical audit: the problem of missing case-notes’ (1993) 25:3 
Health Trends. 
204 National Audit Office, ‘Setting the record straight’. 
205 David Ford et al, ‘The feasibility of collecting information from people with Multiple Sclerosis for the 
UK MS Register via a web portal: characterising a cohort of people with MS’ (2012) 12:1 BMC Medical 
Informatics and Decision Making, 2012,12(1):73 (18 July 2012). 
206 Rodden M Middleton et al, ‘Clinical system usage in NHS Specialist Neurology sites’ (RIMS 
conference, Brighton, June 2014). 
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order to facilitate data collection for the MS Register, and we adapted an open-source clinical 
system and made it available to our participating sites. There doesn’t seem to be any reason 
to assume that Neurology is different to other disciplines and so the significance of this is that 
the pace of change towards electronic systems is slow, and that without the use such 
systems, the effective use of medical and health data is hampered. The primary task of NHS 
staff is to deliver patient care, and with the high service demand that exists, even with the best 
will in the world, staff are limited in the effort they can dedicate to other pursuits without 
sufficient funding, training and time. 
Even when a clinical system is in place, there are issues that impact on data availability for 
use. A team of healthcare professionals may be involved in an episode of care, some of whom 
may enter data into the system, and some of whom may record data on paper to be 
transcribed later by an administrator. Although it may never be intended that every piece of 
information should reside in the electronic system, this does introduce the possibilities of error 
and non-entry of important data. It is also the case that when an electronic system is 
implemented, a judgement call has to be made on the bases of relevance and resources as to 
how much back data is entered into the system. Thus there are issues of data quality and 
completeness within individual systems to contend with before we consider system 
interoperability so that information from different systems can be combined. Without this, the 
data are still in silos, albeit now electronic ones. 
Among the classic difficulties in data compatibility are differing formats and data structures, 
which may inhibit data integration, and different coding systems that limit semantic 
interoperability. For example, primary care services often use Read codes to record 
diagnoses,207 whereas hospital settings often use the International Classification of Disease 
(ICD) nomenclature.208 This means there would have to be a form of translation in order to 
interpret information from one system to another in seeking to provide the best patient care. 
There is a move to standardise coding systems to promote interoperability by means of the 
Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine Clinical Terms (SNOMED CT), which provides a 
comprehensive clinical terminology. It has been adopted in over 50 countries, and is the 
approved system for NHS England.209 It will undoubtedly take considerable financial resource, 
time and effort to introduce a more standard coding system, but it essential that information is 
consistent and transferable if data are to be used optimally for individual patient care and, 
beyond that, to maximise their usefulness in studies for wider benefits. 
                                               
207 Health and Social Care Information Centre, ‘Read Codes’ 
<http://systems.hscic.gov.uk/data/uktc/readcodes> accessed 18 June 2014. 
208 World Health Organisation, ‘International Classification of Diseases (ICD)’ 
<http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/>accessed 18 June 2014. 
209 Health and Social Care Information Centre, ‘SNOMED CT’ 
<http://systems.hscic.gov.uk/data/uktc/snomed> accessed 18 June 2014. 
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9.A.8.D Research data 
The concept of wider benefits leads us to consider factors that influence the non-use of data in 
research studies. Though the impacts of research are not immediate, in that it takes time for 
findings to be translated into policy and practice, the non-use of data in research can have far 
reaching effects on patient care, the healthcare profession and the economics of the NHS. 
Again, the issue of data absence within clinical systems is an obvious cause of data non-use 
through non-availability. A study of 10,000 electronic health records in New York found that 
the selection process whereby researchers naturally aim for data completeness can result in 
systematic bias. This is because sicker patients tend to have a higher degree of data 
sufficiency within their records. It is a problem characteristic of studies relying on the 
secondary use of data, since data items resulting from tests and procedures are just not 
present for healthy individuals. Unless this is taken into account, the findings will not represent 
the population from which the sample was drawn as they will over-estimate the problem and 
limit external validity.210 This is the converse of the problem identified in the antenatal clinical 
audit (above),211 where some of the problematic cases were excluded, thus underestimating 
the extent of issues to be addressed. Either way, the findings could be misleading and lead to 
sub-optimal recommendations, but unless individual cases could be obtained, examined and 
followed through, it would not be meaningful to discuss harm due to the non-use of data. Even 
then, it would be challenging to show cause and effect if a case was brought to litigation. 
Before considering the governance landscape and its influence on data use, it is worth 
exploring some of the other reasons researchers and organisations may or may not choose to 
share their data. Within the non-commercial sector, the majority of substantial research takes 
place in academia. Researchers may invest extensive time, energy and intellectual input into 
gathering, collating and analysing datasets, and there are still little in the way of incentives for 
sharing data.212 They may also be under immense pressure to produce high impact outputs for 
the Research Evaluation Framework (REF). It is arguable whether this is an ethical practice, 
since it influences the research that is carried out and what is ultimately published. Publication 
bias is a well-known phenomenon with weaker or negative findings less likely to make it to the 
journals. Biomed Central has established the Journal of Negative Results in Biomedicine to 
publish ‘unexpected, controversial, provocative and/or negative results in the context of 
current tenets’.213 But an impact factor of 1.15 offers little kudos, and so as long as the 
expectation of the REF persists, it’s likely that many researchers will have to concentrate their 
efforts on hitting their targets. As a result, publication bias will remain a source of data non-use 
                                               
210 Alexander Rusanov et al, ‘Hidden in plain sight: bias towards sick patients when sampling patients 
with sufficient electronic health record data for research’ (2014) 14:51 BMC Medical Informatics and 
Decision Making. 
211 A F E Yoong, C Hudson and T Chard, ‘Medical audit: the problem of missing case-notes’. 
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and studies with undesirable findings may be repeated. The resulting waste of time and effort 
represents an opportunity cost as public money could be better utilised and needless 
duplicative intrusion into patients’ lives could be avoided. 
The commercial sector invests billions in drug development and clinical trials. Taking into 
account the high failure rate in drug creation, it is estimated that it costs approximately $5 
billion to bring a new drug to market.214 As well as seeking the best treatments for patients, 
pharmaceutical companies are obviously concerned with generating income and protecting 
their intellectual property. As a result, the information they release about drugs may be biased 
as it is selected to maintain and extend their market share. In his book ‘Bad Pharma: how 
medicine is broken and how we can fix it’, Ben Goldacre states that is it beyond doubt that 
‘industry-funded trials are more likely to produce positive, flattering results than independently-
funded trials’.215 For example, it is cited in a 2010 review of trials that 85% of industry-funded 
were positive, but this was the case in only 50% of government-funded trials. A variety of 
reasons are proposed for this higher rate of apparent success including: not publishing 
unflattering results; comparing a new drug against a placebo, or against an inadequate drug at 
too low a dose; selecting patients without proper randomisation; or using small, specific 
sample groups.216  
There have been some devastating examples where non-use of data due to non-publication of 
research findings has been linked to harm to individuals. There was a particularly high-profile 
example in 2006, in a first-in-man trial of an immune-modulatory drug referred to as TGN1412. 
Six healthy volunteers were administered with the drug and within an hour they began 
suffering horrendous side-effects. The Department of Health convened an Expert Advisory 
Group to investigate the situation and develop recommendations to try and prevent similar 
occurrences. The final report concluded that new experimental treatments should not in future 
be given to all the volunteers at the same time, but in response to the question of whether the 
situation could have been avoided, it transpired that there had been some experience with a 
similar intervention ten years previously. A researcher presented the inquiry with unpublished 
data relating to the use of an antibody molecule with parallel effects in a single human subject. 
No one could have foreseen the significance of this unpublished piece of information, but the 
final report recommended that the results of every first-in-man trial should be made available 
to avoid a repeat of the terrifying ordeal to which the six volunteers were subjected. However, 
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a review conducted in 2009 showed that the majority of these Phase 1 trials were still not 
being published, allowing this form of data non-use to continue.217  
Another example of harm to patients through non-publication of data can be seen in the use of 
an anti-arrhythmic drug administered in the 1980s to patients who had suffered a heart attack. 
It is estimated that over 100,000 patients died of a heart attack after taking the drug before it 
was realised that it was not appropriate for people who did not have arrhythmia. As to whether 
this disastrous situation was avoidable, it transpired that a small study had been carried out in 
1980 in which 9 of 48 men who took the anti-arrhythmic drug (lorcainide) died, compared to 1 
of 47 taking the placebo. As a result, the drug was dropped for commercial reasons and the 
findings were not published. Over a decade later the researchers did publish and stated that 
their results might have provided an early warning.218 
Sometimes there are direct accusations that data have been withheld to the detriment of 
patients. One such example concerns a private company, by the name of Myriad Genetics, 
which specialises in testing for genetic variants linked to breast cancer. When a mutation is 
found, counselling is offered to the patient and family members concerning their risk status. 
Although Myriad has access to public databases, it has refused to share its data on the 
grounds of it being proprietary information. Thus Myriad retains its market advantage but vital 
information is being withheld. It is also reported that this occurs with other genetic testing 
companies and the practice, though immoral is not actually illegal. This is an example of 
where the legislative and regulatory frameworks are lagging behind scientific developments 
and action needs to be taken to address these scenarios.219 
9.A.8.E Governance frameworks 
This brings us to consider the impact of governance frameworks on the non-use of data. 
These have long been blamed for hampering the use of data and hindering research. 
Criticisms have been levelled at particular pieces of legislation or regulations, but also at 
subjective interpretations resulting in over-cautious implementation and unnecessary 
bureaucracy. This may include lengthy forms and approval processes, unnecessary steps and 
parties involved in approval procedures, over-stringent rules on data access, and the lack of 
clear responsibilities delaying permissions, amongst other obstacles. In the past ten years, 
vast amounts of effort have been put into streamlining the regulatory and governance 
landscape and in providing better information to researchers. Even so, the current and 
proposed frameworks can present huge challenges to the use of data, not only for research, 
but also for service and care planning. It is a commonly held belief among the public that 
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healthcare and government administrative data are already linked and shared across 
services.220 However, of course, this is not the case, as data cannot even be passed from one 
sector of the health service to another without justification and permission.221 This means 
there is great potential for medical error through lack of joined-up information. For example, 
hospital patients are usually asked if they are taking any medication before they are treated, 
whereas their primary care record could be reviewed if it were accessible. A similar process 
occurs with other practitioners such as dentists before they prescribe. Medication errors are 
the single most common preventable cause of adverse event in medication practice,222 and it 
is easy to argue that more joined-up information could circumvent at least some of these 
occurrences. 
But individuals may not find combining and sharing identifiable data with other practitioners 
acceptable without their agreement, and the governance frameworks that exist serve to 
safeguard individual rights to privacy. In order to make use of personal data, it is necessary to 
obtain regulatory approvals, which often require informed consent of the individuals 
concerned. This is an established part of research ethics and governance frameworks.223 
However, it can be argued that, in some cases, the pursuit of informed consent can 
disadvantage certain groups, particularly those who are hard to reach or on the edges of 
society. It has been proposed that this is the case in seeking to solve ‘wicked’ problems often 
associated with the youth, such as psychosocial issues, school failures and drop-outs, risk-
taking behaviours, substance misuse and juvenile crime. A powerful argument can be made 
that, as such problems require the best data, insisting on consent is a failure of duty.224 A 
similar argument in relation to bias due to consent was evidenced by comparing baseline and 
follow-up data from GP and hospital records on patients who did, with those who did not, 
consent to an intracranial malformation study. The results showed that consenters were 
systematically different in ways that could not have been estimated in advance. The authors 
concluded that those who oversee medical research are harming public health by imposing 
greater constraints on patient data than those required by the law.225  
This problem of not being able to use non-consented data is not limited to research but also 
impacts upon patient care, and it is proposed that sharing data across the health and care 
system could save lives. A case in point was that of a vulnerable little boy who died in 2011 
following systematic abuse. There were interactions with, and reports to, various health and 
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social care providers, but the data were isolated and the problems were not identified in time. 
Furthermore, the article states that too much emphasis is placed on the risks of implementing 
data sharing initiatives, rather than on the potentially enormous risks of not making data 
available.226 This perspective is not limited to the UK, but it accords with opinion from 
elsewhere. For example, a report from the US states that the non-use of patient clinical data is 
a greater risk than abuse, such that:  
[T]he greatest threat, the biggest risk to people with diabetes, or heart disease, or cancer, or 
HIV/AIDs or any other chronic disease or disability seems not to be from un-authorized 
sharing or use of their personal health information, rather it is from the failure to share or the 
inadequate use of that information, and sometimes even valuing protecting privacy over 
protecting an individual's life, their health, and the health of their families, friends and 
neighbours.227 
Within the UK there are specific, regulatory mechanisms that permit the use of identifiable, 
patient data, without consent in certain circumstances. There is provision for the common law 
duty of confidentiality to be over-ridden for important medical and research purposes was 
made possible via section 251 of the NHS Act 2006.228 Applications are administered by the 
Confidentiality Advisory Group of the Health Research Authority,229 but at least anecdotally, 
the success rate is low and applicants are strongly encouraged to pursue the consent route or 
to use anonymous data where at all possible. In some cases, this does not compromise the 
purpose, but in others, it does. But there are many success stories; for example, the author of 
this section is engaged in a study of vulnerable young mothers and their children that has 
successfully obtained s251 support. Without this, the study would have been biased since the 
participants could not be followed-up reliably. Even so, the waiver was only granted for 
matching purposes, that is, so that the study data could be linked to hospital and education 
data, and it was a condition of the approval that the resulting de-identified data had to be 
accessed via a Safe Haven. 
The Information Governance Review published in 2013, commonly referred to as Caldicott 2, 
includes an additional recommendation compared to the first Caldicott report. This is that the 
duty to share information can be as important as the duty to protect patient confidentiality.230 It 
also includes considerable discussion on Safe Havens as ‘specialist, well governed, 
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independently scrutinised accredited environments’ as the sole location where the linkage of 
personal confidential data from more than one organisation for any purpose other than direct 
care, should only take place. This helps to highlight the innovative work that has been 
underway for some years on the development of Safe Havens for access to de-identified 
linked data for research. The SAIL system is one such example where approved researchers 
can access data for research within a secure environment.231 However, although Safe Havens 
hold great promise for using the wealth of valuable, extensive health-related datasets, they are 
still subject to limitations. Not least among these is the constraint of using only de-identified 
data. Many types of study don’t require identifiable data to produce benefits, as proven by the 
rich array of important research outputs produced via anonymous data linkage research; a 
good example being work conducted via the long-established Western Australia data linkage 
unit.232 But de-identified data are not exempt from privacy protection measures and these may 
affect the granularity of the data researchers can access and so impact on research findings. 
This is relevant in the context of this report because it is a form of data non-use. 
The DPA defines personal data as ‘data which relate to a living individual who can be 
identified from those data, or from those data and other information which is in the possession 
of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller.’233 The alternative is to use 
anonymised data, and there are various viewpoints on what actually constitutes anonymous 
data. It has been established that individuals can sometimes be re-identified from data 
purported to have been anonymised.234 Because of this, it is good governance practice that 
de-identified data are curtailed before being made available for research. This may take the 
form of aggregation or suppression of records, or in some cases perturbative methods may be 
employed.235 But this can create another form of data non-use and produce bias in research 
findings, because individual records or items within the those records, where they occur in 
unique or low-copy numbers, may be amended or omitted to mitigate perceived risks of re-
identification. Often, the more unusual records and extreme data items are the most 
interesting for research, since they may underlie pressing health problems. So this well-
intentioned practice can limit external validity, as the application of results will gravitate to 
treating the mean characteristics and phenotypes in the population. Furthermore, the 
conditions for the use of anonymised data often preclude reversal of the process to lead back 
to individuals to highlight a worrying indicator in their data, since this would require permission 
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to hold identifiable information. So although the use of de-identified data is proving to be 
invaluable in data linkage research, it is still subject to forms of data non-use. 
Governance frameworks are not static, and new legislation and regulations being introduced 
can have consequences for data use. At the same time as great efforts are being made to 
streamline and simplify governance procedures and to encourage greater data accessibility, 
other moves pose a serious threat to current research practice. This is most evident in the 
spectre of the proposed Data Protection Regulation (pDPR). Concerns have been widely 
expressed that this legislation could prohibit much medical and other epidemiological research 
due to amendments proposed by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE committee).236 Among the most significant of these 
amendments is the removal of the research exemption, which (under section 33 of the current 
UK DPA17) provides certain exemptions for data processing activities for research and 
statistics, including in medicine and health.237 In future, such processing would only be 
permitted with explicit consent of the data subject unless an exemption was sought for 
research of exceptionally high public interest. Another is the tightening of the definition of 
personal data and the regulation of pseudonymised data, defined as ‘personal data that 
cannot be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, as long 
as such additional information is kept separately and subject to technical and organisational 
measures to ensure non-attribution’ (Article 4(2a)).238 This could impose disproportionate 
regulatory burden and undermine sophisticated data linkage and sharing infrastructures, such 
as Safe Havens. The European Parliament’s position includes the amendments, but at the 
time of writing there is still a way to go before the final text is agreed. Numerous parties are 
contributing to sterling work co-ordinated by the Wellcome Trust to publicise and lobby for the 
interests of research for public benefit.239 If the pDPR is passed as it currently stands, it will 
herald a new era of data non-use by creating insurmountable obstacles to research to the 
detriment of health and well-being.240 
9.A.8.F Conclusions on non-use 
The systematic searches used in this review uncovered little/no proven instances of harm due 
to the non-use of data, wherever they were conducted. By exploring some of the reasons for 
the non-use of data, with examples to demonstrate the principles, this section points towards a 
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better understanding of why the non-use of data is poorly recorded. One of the major issues is 
missing or non-available data, so that data are not present to be used or not in a format that 
can be used. Negligence rather than data non-use is likely to be cited in any legal case or 
report arising from harm, since non-use of data may be insubstantial, and it may be even more 
tenuous to attempt to prove it being the cause of an ill effect. Another issue is publication bias 
whereby undesirable results are not put forward and/or not accepted by journals. This is an 
important form of data non-use, but by definition it will be difficult to find. Governance 
frameworks, and their over-zealous administration, are often perceived as the greatest 
hindrance to research and data use in general. There is, of course, a duty to protect privacy, 
but there also needs to be a balance so that data are used safely for public benefit. Definitive 
instances of harm due to the non-use of data because of excess governance are unlikely to be 
found in searches, as they would be difficult to prove outright. More likely are delays in data 
use, or the preclusion of some studies altogether, so that the consequences are lost 
opportunities, and as such, are very real but more nebulous. The use of de-identified data is 
often a good solution to barriers posed by governance, but even so, it can also result in forms 
of data non-use, which are not easily uncovered. Thus, the problem of data non-use is much 
greater than it appears, and is arguably more dangerous to individuals and society than any 
privacy risks in sharing clinical data.23 But its very nature, and the complex reasons why it 
occurs, make it difficult to ascertain and quantify with accuracy.  
9.A.9 Conclusions on the implications for governance 
Note: We consider now the implications for governance addressed thus far. We believe we 
have identified very important other considerations when we later examine disincentivisation.  
The evidence raised important issues for the governance of health and biomedical data. The 
number one cause contributing to abuse of health and biomedical data was maladministration, 
which can also be understood as the epitome of poor governance practices. Thus the key 
implications for governance of health and biomedical data include the apparent need for 
improvement over the effective monitoring of standards and procedures that are already in 
place in the NHS and other healthcare organisations. This includes a need for random spot 
checks for compliance; robust auditing procedures for how data are accessed, transferred and 
generally used on and off premises; and specific guidance as to particular uses of data and 
especially for more sensitive data (e.g. faxes, emails, use of portable media etc.). Finally, the 
cases involving DNA profiles, raised important implications for the governance of health and 
biomedical data – namely, that harm must be considered from outwith the narrow scope of 
actual harm when planning and implementing good governance of health and biomedical data. 
Finally, in S and Marper,(EUC7) involving DNA profiles, important implications were raised for the 
governance of health and biomedical data – namely, that harm must be considered from 
outwith the narrow scope of actual harm when planning and implementing good governance.   
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9.B Assessing the effectiveness of sanctions and remedies in light the 
prevalence of abuse uncovered 
In light of the incidence of abuse uncovered, we now consider the relative effectiveness of 
sanctions and then remedies featured in the evidence. However, it is important to note, that 
the evidence may be limited by virtue of the potential use of gagging clauses, private 
investigations and confidentiality of proceedings. Sanctions will be considered on a scale from 
those serving the purpose of pre-empting greater abuses and those imposed after the fact, 
that is, after the abuse has occurred. Remedies will also be considered on a scale – from early 
interventions in a robust complaints procedure process to post-abuse remedies and 
compensation including awards of damage, but also forced cessation of processing data. 
9.B.1 Sanctions  
Several types of sanctions were found in the hard and soft evidence strands. Sanctions could 
be assessed from interventions at the pre-emptory stage where abuse has not occurred but 
where data handling has failed to meet legal standards or best practices. However, the 
evidence gathered brought forth only those sanctions imposed post-breach, when the abuse 
has already occurred (potentially, repeatedly). This is considered a logical result given that the 
evidence produced by this review would likely only focus on incidents of abuse, already 
subjected to sanctions, if publicly reported in the press or otherwise.   
 
Figure 12 features the spectrum of sanctions specifically uncovered in the evidence, with an 
overview of those sanctions which no doubt were imposed but were not identified in the 
review. 
 
Figure 12: Spectrum of sanctions uncovered in the evidence review  
 
 
 
 
ICO decision 
notices 
ICO 
monetary 
penalties 
ICO 
prosecutions 
Information 
tribunal 
judgments 
UK Court 
judgments 
ECtHR 
judgments 
 138 
The sanctions not identified in the evidence review specifically include those that would be 
imposed at a pre-emptory stage, for example, as a response to an organisation’s internal or 
ICO complaints procedures process, and thus would not be publicised (or thus uncovered in 
the evidence search). The role of these pre-emptory sanctions will be considered below whilst 
focusing simultaneously on the specific sanctions identified in order of the spectrum above. 
9.B.1.A ICO Sanctions 
The ICO plays an important role in auditing and ensuring the compliance of data controllers. 
Given its role in pre-empting further legal action in the courts, the ICO features first in the 
spectrum of sanctions. Although its enforcement remit includes the power to issue numerous 
sanctions prior the occurrence of serious abuse and thus more escalated actions including 
monetary penalties and prosecutions, none of the more pre-emptory enforcement actions 
detailed below involved health or biomedical data and/or were simply not published by the 
ICO. The ICO’s pre-emptory sanctions that were not identified in the evidence included: 
• Information notices requiring data controllers to provide the ICO with specified 
information regarding their processing of personal and sensitive personal data by a 
certain time; 
• Undertakings that reflect a data controller’s commitment to start a specific course of 
action to improve their compliance with the DPA; 
• Enforcement notices and ‘stop now’ orders where a breach of the DPA occurred 
and whereby the ICO requires data controllers to take or refrain from taking specific 
action, in order to bring themselves into compliance with the law; 
• Voluntary audits by the ICO in consenting organisations, in order to spot-check 
compliance; and 
• The service of assessment notices which notify a data controller that the ICO will 
conduct a compulsory audit to assess whether their processing of personal data 
follows good practice.241  
The three ICO sanctions, which were identified in the evidence included: 
• Decision notices, which represent ‘the Information Commissioner's view on whether 
or not a public authority has complied with the Freedom of Information Act or the 
Environmental Information Regulations, following [an] investigation of a complaint. It 
can include legally binding steps for the public authority to follow.’242 
• Monetary penalties, which are issued on the basis of serious contraventions of the 
DPA and if (a) the contravention was likely to cause substantial damage or substantial 
distress; and (b) was deliberate or (c) the data controller or person must or should have 
                                               
241 ICO, ‘Taking action: data protection and privacy and electronic communications’ 
<http://ico.org.uk/what_we_cover/taking_action/dp_pecr> accessed 29 April 2014. 
242 ICO, ‘Enforcement Notices’ <http://ico.org.uk/enforcement/decision_notices> accessed 29 April 
2014. 
 139 
known about the nature of the risk for such harm and failed to take reasonable steps to 
prevent it.243 
• Prosecutions, where the ICO takes to court data controllers and individuals who have 
committed criminal offences under the DPA. 
Decision notices issued by the ICO have the least implications for governance. Unlike the 
other sanctions featured, decision notices in the UK are specific to violations of the Freedom 
of Information Act and thus specific to public authorities only. More relevant to the scope and 
purpose of this report are the imposition of monetary penalties and the publication of these 
penalties by the ICO.  
Importantly, ‘[u]ntil 2010, one of the biggest flaws of the [DPA] was arguably the limited range 
of offences under it, and a corresponding lack of power granted to the Crown (and, in England 
and Wales, to the Information Commissioner and Director of Public Prosecution) to enforce 
the Act.’244 With the power to introduce monetary penalties for serious contraventions of the 
DPA, the ICO gained an important sanction that would promote compliance with DPA, serving 
as a disincentive to non-compliance with the Act – for both financial and reputational 
reasons. 245 The power to impose fines of up to £500,000 is significant enough to 
disincentivise serious breaches of the DPA, especially given the publication of these penalties 
that ensures bad press for offending data controllers. It is considered that monetary penalties 
serve an extremely important deterrent role in combatting the abuse of health and biomedical 
data, especially given the large proportion of monetary penalties served to NHS and other 
health care service bodies.  
It is considered that monetary penalties serve an extremely important deterrent role in 
combating the abuse of health and biomedical data, especially given the large proportion of 
monetary penalties served to NHS and other health care service bodies. However, considering 
the purpose of the NHS, that is, to provide patient care, one should also be aware of the 
implications of harsh monetary penalties. For example, when Brighton and Sussex University 
Hospitals NHS Trust failed to decommission hard drives and these were placed for auction on 
eBay by a sub-contractor, the ICO imposed a record fine of £325,000.(News18) As the Trust’s 
CEO commented, ‘In a time of austerity ... we simply cannot afford to pay a £325,000 fine. ... 
[The amount would pay for] the delivery of 300 babies, 50 hip operations, 30 heart bypasses 
and 360 chemotherapy treatments’.(In26) 
Finally, it is considered that the criminal prosecutions undertaken by the ICO serve a similar 
deterrent role in disincentivising criminal breaches of the DPA and thus promoting compliance. 
Furthermore and as related to social (rather than legal) conceptions of harm discussed in 
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Section 3.C Harm in other contexts, the ability for the ICO to undertake criminal prosecutions 
for criminal offences under the Act is particularly important to protect vulnerable segments of 
society. This ability helps to ensure that individuals who suffer harm as a result of such abuses 
but are without the wherewithal to pursue the case formally, are protected and/or 
compensated for the crimes committed against them. 
9.B.1.B First-tier Tribunal (Information Rights) Judgments 
Very much related to ICO sanctions are the judgments of the First-tier Tribunal (Information 
Rights). The Tribunal deals specifically with appeals from the ICO’s issuance of enforcement 
notices, decision notices and information notices.246 Given the single incident identified in the 
evidence reviewed of Tribunal proceedings, it suffices to state that the Tribunal’s role in 
sanctioning contraventions of the DPA serves as an endorsement or rejection of the ICO’s 
more pre-emptory sanctions and enforcement powers. Thus the role of the Tribunal, whilst 
‘higher’ up in the spectrum of sanctions, is relatively less important to disincentivising the 
abuse of health and biomedical data. However, this is not to underestimate the importance of 
a ‘final stamp of approval’ from the judicial system, for ‘softer’ or more pre-emptory sanctions 
undertaken by the ICO. A stamp of approval can send important signals to data controllers 
that breaches of the DPA will be taken seriously. 
9.B.1.C UK Court Judgments 
Given that the spectrum of sanctions in Figure 12 generally follows a given abuse from the 
early complaints stage to the more escalated judicial pursuit of the incident, the role for UK 
Courts in sanctioning abuse of health and biomedical data is important in providing a further 
disincentive for poor data handling practices and harmful behaviour. The lack of case law 
dealing specifically with abuses of health or biomedical data as the abuse relates to either a 
breach of the DPA or other common law, first reflects the small percentage of claims that 
actually do go to trial. (See Section 1.D.2.) Secondly, this reflects the fact that many claims will 
be resolved long before reaching the more escalated stage of trial. The way complaints are 
resolved either by a particular organisation or the ICO is not available publicly or thus 
accounted for in the evidence. However, given the ICO’s statement that they deal with tens of 
thousands of complaints every year and that only a fraction of that are reported as being 
subject to the sanctions identified above, would indicate the small fraction of abuse that ends 
up in front of UK Courts.  
With these caveats in mind, the UK Court plays an important role in ensuring that the use of 
health or biomedical data complies not only with the specific (and narrow) provisions in the 
DPA, but also with more general principles at common law (i.e. breach of confidence or 
misuse of private information). This is in keeping with individuals’ human rights (per the 
European Convention on Human Rights and in particular Article 8, which guarantees an 
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individual’s right to private and family life, his or her home and his or her correspondence, 
against the interference by public authorities/governments). This serves an important 
sanctions role, and it overlaps with the ECtHR judgments considered immediately below. 
9.B.1.D European Court Judgments 
The European aspect of this review uncovered evidence of abuse adjudicated by the ECtHR. 
ECtHR judgments are situated as the final step on the sanctions spectrum (see Figure 12) and 
directly reflect the role the ECtHR within the judicial system of EU member states. The ECtHR 
intervenes only if it is alleged that a member state has failed to meet their obligations under 
the European Convention of Human Rights. The subject of this evidence review implicates the 
Article 8 rights of individuals (right to private and family life). Thus within the context of this 
report, the evidence features the ECtHR as a final venue for recourse to individuals where the 
ICO and/or UK Courts may have failed to uphold their rights in regards to their health or 
biomedical data. The evidence identified from the ECtHR offered insight into the more 
egregious cases of abuse of health or biomedical data, and largely from a European 
perspective – only four out of the fourteen cases identified were against the UK.(EUC2, EUC3, EUC7, 
EUC8) Most importantly, the ECtHR is considered to play an important role in the sanctioning of 
abuses that may go overlooked in any member state, and in making important contributions to 
understanding the (broader) scope of protection offered by Article 8 of the ECHR for health 
and biomedical data.247  
9.B.2 Overall effectiveness of sanctions for abuse of health or biomedical 
data 
The evidence identified shows a narrow range of sanctions available when health or 
biomedical data have been abused. It is considered that the sanctions applicable to the abuse 
of health or biomedical data in the UK are not entirely ineffective, but also not fully capable of 
offering robust disincentives for further abuse. Because the ‘softer’ or more pre-emptory 
sanctions imposed at the earlier stage of the complaints process are not publicised, it was not 
possible to assess the effectiveness of a potentially wide portion of ‘sanctions’ available. 
However, the effectiveness of sanctions imposed at later stages (usually post-abuse) are 
limited in the UK to the narrow confines of the DPA (for the ICO), and slightly less so for UK 
Courts that may take a broader perspective in line with common law and human rights. In this 
regard, the ECtHR serves an extremely important role in providing sanctions for abuses that 
would otherwise be overlooked within the UK. In the next section, we consider the 
effectiveness of the remedies offered by these various sanctioning bodies – the ICO, 
Information Tribunal, UK Courts and ECtHR. 
                                               
247 For example consider the case of S and Marper (considered in depth in Section 9.A.7) the ECtHR 
was able to consider the issue of indefinite retention of DNA profiles and samples outwith the narrow 
confines provided for under UK law. This judgment made an important contribution to the understanding 
of privacy issues surrounding genetic data, and the capacity for human rights law to protect against 
disproportionate interferences with such rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.  
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9.C Remedies 
As shown in Figure 13, the remedies identified in the evidence review were limited to two main 
types. 
Figure 13: Remedies identified in the evidence review   
 
 
This is considered as a direct consequence from the way compensation and non-
compensatory remedies are framed in the DPA (detailed in Section 3.B). The DPA also 
provides a limited number of rights of actions for individuals for particular breaches of the Act. 
These are not considered remedies in the legal sense, given that remedies affect how rights 
are enforced and satisfied rather than the right in and of itself: 
• The right of an individual to request access to the personal data held on them.248 
• The right of an individual to request a notice from the data controller (in writing) that no 
decision taken was based solely on evaluation produced by automatic processing.249 
Our assessment of the limited scope of remedies available under the law are affected by our 
broader understanding and more holistic conception of harm (detailed in Section 3.C) as 
encompassing not only legal conceptions but the social realities of harm. Given that the abuse 
of data can result in multiple types of harm (financial, legal, physical, social and 
psychological), the prevention/cessation of harmful processing and/or award of damages can 
only address a small aspect of harm caused to individuals. To further consider are “invisible 
harms” which arguably are neither addressed by current or proposed regulation of data.250  
One notion of invisible harm was taken from the legal perspective, whereby invisible harms 
refer to a cause and effect from current trajectories in the era of big data. Here personal data 
                                               
248 DPA, s 7. 
249 DPA, s 12(1). 
250 Judith Rauhofer, ‘Round and Round the Garden? Big Data, Small Government and the Balance of 
Power in the Information Age’ (2014) 2014 University of Edinburgh, School of Law Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper Series 1-12. 
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are disclosed and inevitably shared with further public or private entities, often without 
individual consent or conscious knowledge.251 The effect (and harm) is perpetuated by the 
improbability ‘for individuals to appreciate, at the time of collection, how long their data will be 
stored, how it will be used in the future, for what purposes and by whom.’252 Thus individuals’ 
ability to make informed decisions or thus take relevant precautions against potential abuses 
of their data is extremely restricted.253 Such invisible harms are not quantifiable in a way that 
would be recognised under current laws, and the single case where a court specifically found 
no harm(UKC14) underscores this notion of invisibility. Even cases of more ‘visible’ harms, 
especially those impacting broader public interests, are similarly unaccounted for under the 
law, whilst at the same time providing for protection of broader public interests as a means of 
justifying use of data254 – there is little to be done where such uses impact or harm those 
interests negatively. 
The prevention or cessation of harmful processing255 can partially address the social and 
psychological impact, depending on how pervasive and widespread the data use was. 
However, restorative justice, which seeks to recuperate the psychological damage caused in 
events of harm, cannot be effectuated with eventual prevention of processing that will 
necessarily be subject to the delays associated with court procedure. This is even more 
apparent with the award of financial compensation for damages or distress arising out 
contravention of the DPA. The financial and psychosocial costs associated with pursuing a 
case to the point where compensation may or may not be awarded simply are not provided for 
in the often-nominal damages awarded.256  
The evidence suggests that cases escalated to the level of the ECtHR will generally be 
awarded more ‘generous’ damages. However, this is limited to the particularly egregious and 
wilful breaches of human rights law (not the DPA). Furthermore, these cases are subject to an 
even longer procedure such that any award of damages will be unable to fully compensate for 
the loss of time spent on pursuing the case and/or address the psychosocial harms caused 
long before the ECtHR reviews the case. 
                                               
251 Rauhofer, ‘Round and Round the Garden? Big Data, Small Government and the Balance of Power in 
the Information Age’ 9. 
252 Rauhofer, ‘Round and Round the Garden? Big Data, Small Government and the Balance of Power in 
the Information Age’ 9. 
253 Rauhofer, ‘Round and Round the Garden? Big Data, Small Government and the Balance of Power in 
the Information Age’ 9. 
254 For instance, Sch 2 para 5(d) of the DPA provides that the processing of personal data will be lawful 
if necessary ‘for the exercise of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by 
any person.’ Here broader public interests are protected where using personal data will do so.  
255 Such as provided under s 10 (prevention) and s 14  (cessation) of the DPA.  
256 For example, Douglas v Hello!, the Court only awarded nominal damages (£50 each). [2003] EWHC 
786 (Ch) para [289]. 
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9.C.1 Overall effectiveness of remedies for abuse of health or biomedical data 
In sum, the overall effectiveness of remedies for harm, caused by abuses of health or 
biomedical data, are considered ineffective given the broader understanding of harm provided 
for in this report. Remedies are limited to those that can be sufficiently supported by the 
required criteria under the law and do not reflect the totality of harmful effects that can be 
caused either to individuals or to indeed broader public interests. 
9.D Addressing incentives and disincentives to abuse  
Whilst the good governance of health and biomedical data, supported by effective sanctions 
and remedies for individuals harmed, can do much to address the prevalence of abuse 
uncovered in this review, there remains strong incentives to abuse data. Aside from the 
causes for abuse identified within the evidence (e.g. maladministration, human error) we 
consider briefly the further incentive perpetuated by the black market for data. Within this 
context, the prevalence of sophisticated re-identification attacks will also be considered.  
9.D.1 The black market for data 
Alongside the issues raised by poor governance, the existence and growth of the black market 
for data further incentivizes and facilitates abuse of health and biomedical data. A wealth of 
independent research on the black market for data has been undertaken predominantly in the 
US and may be indicative of the increased scale and sophistication of the black market there. 
This may be supported by the difference in reported incidents of theft of health or biomedical 
data report in the Twitter evidence – featuring only one case in the UK (TW45) out of twenty 
identified incidents (eighteen in the US, one in Zambia).  Thus, the research discussed below 
may be representative only of the black market in the US, particularly where identity theft can 
bring real income against the backdrop of medical insurance. Although citizens in the UK 
enjoy free medical care, the US trends could have potential implications for the UK in future.257 
As indicated in the RAND Corporation’s exhaustive report on cybercrime, it is apparent that 
the growth of black markets where unlawfully obtained sensitive data are sold is without doubt 
growing in scale and sophistication.258 What once comprised scattered individuals seeking 
monetary gain and/or notoriety are now ‘financially driven, highly organised and sophisticated’, 
representing groups that tend their unlawfully obtained wares in virtual marketplace using 
digital currencies such as Bitcoin, Pecunix, AlertPay, PPcoin, Litecoin and Feathercoin.259 The 
black market for data takes place on difficult to track darknets, virtual private networks and on 
                                               
257 Or presently; the lack of evidence of theft of data in the UK does not (in the slightest) mean this is not 
occurring. 
258 Lillian Ablon, Martin Libicki and Andrea Golay ‘Markets for cybercrime tools and stolen data: 
Hackers’ Bazaar’ (Rand Corporation 2014) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html> 
accessed 29 April 2014. 
259 Lillian Ablon, Martin Libicki and Andrea Golay ‘Markets for cybercrime tools and stolen data: 
Hackers’ Bazaar’.  
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the deepweb.260 In the black market of data, the ‘goods’ and services can include Enabling 
Services that help identify targets (the data and organisations holding the data), Initial Access 
Tools to infiltrate the target’s system and thus bring the perpetrator to the target’s Digital 
Assets (assets in this context include personal and sensitive personal data). Thus, the cycle of 
obtaining data illegally is complete.261  
Services offered on the black market can operate as a one-stop-shop to service the full 
lifecycle of a data breach. Increasingly, disparate sets of data on an individual are being 
combined to form ‘kitz’.262 Also available are ‘fullz’, which are electronic packages containing 
personal data including, for example, health insurance numbers.263 Kitz range from 
USD$1,200 – 1,300, whilst fullz containing verified health insurance credentials, may cost up 
to an additional USD$500. However, others estimate the approximate cost of a medical record 
at USD$20.264 
Also from the US, the Ponemon Institute estimated that, in 2013, 94% of medical institutions 
were been attacked.265 More recently, a US-based study that gathered data on malicious 
traffic by using the honeypot technique reported 72% of malicious traffic recorded as targeting 
health care providers.266 Further taken from the US experience, 90% of healthcare 
organizations believe that breaches are harmful to patients, and resolving medical identity 
theft causes victims a financial loss.267 Indeed, the main motivation for attacks on the 
healthcare industry is financial.268 Outside of financial gain, personal health information can 
                                               
260 Darknets are ‘anonymising private networks using encryption and proxies to mask identities e.g. Tor, 
I2P’, whereas the deepweb refers to ‘web content that is not indexed by search engines such as Google 
but that is accessible through conventional means’. Lillian Ablon, Martin Libicki and Andrea Golay 
‘Markets for cybercrime tools and stolen data: Hackers’ Bazaar’ 66. 
261 Lillian Ablon, Martin Libicki and Andrea Golay ‘Markets for cybercrime tools and stolen data: 
Hackers’ Bazaar’ 10. 
262  Robert Lemos ‘Cyber-criminals selling fraudulent identity ‘kitz’ on the web black market’ (Eweek, 17 
July 2013) <http://www.eweek.com/security/cyber-criminals-selling-fraudulent-identity-kitz-on-web-
black-market/> accessed 29 April 2014.  
263 Elizabeth Clarke, ‘Hackers sell health insurance credentials, bank accounts, SSNs and counterfeit 
documents, for over $1,000 per dossier’ (Dell Secureworks blog, 15 July 2013) 
<http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/general-hackers-sell-health-insurance-credentials-bank-
accounts-ssns-and-counterfeit-documents/> accessed 29 April 2014.  
264 Jenny Mangelsdorf, ‘New healthcare'. New risks: Intermountain’s healthcare cybersecurity challenge’ 
(CSC World Magazine, 2013) <http://www.csc.com/health_services/publications/91654/99357-
intermountain_healthcare_s_cybersecurity_challenge> accessed 28 April 2014.  
265 Ponemon Institute, ‘2013 Survey on medical identity theft’ (Ponemon Institute, 2013) 
<http://medidfraud.org/2013-survey-on-medical-identity-theft/> accessed 29 April 2014.  
266 Barbara Filkins, ‘Health care cyberthreat report: Widespread compromises detected, compliance 
nightmare on horizon’ (SANS Institute/Norse Corp, 2014) <http://norse-
corp.com/HealthcareReport2014.html> accessed 29 April 2014.  
267 Bob Krenek, ‘Five differentiating factors of a healthcare breach’ (Experian 10 April 2012) 
<http://www.experian.com/blogs/data-breach/2012/04/10/5-differentiating-factors-of-a-healthcare-
breach/> accessed 29 April 2014.  
268 Gal Landesman, ‘Cyber threats to the healthcare industry’ (SenseCy, 17 February 2014) 
<http://blog.sensecy.com/2014/02/17/cyber-threats-to-the-healthcare-industry/> accessed 29 April 2014.  
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also be sold on the black market so that others may access health care or bill insurance 
companies for alleged health care. 269  
This begs the question, to what degree can US-based incidence rates be extrapolated to the 
UK? Due to the NHS ethos of free care for all, non-financial motivations for medical identity 
theft are probably less likely in the UK, reflecting the low incidence of theft uncovered in the 
hard evidence; versus high incidence of theft uncovered in the Twitter evidence and in the 
Twitter evidence only. However, the value of health data in and of itself on the black market 
likely remains on par with the value attributed to such data in the US – given its potential for 
targeted marketing, scams etc. 
It is useful to consider at this point another trajectory of cyber attacks in the healthcare setting: 
the targeted attacks of medical devices for which the incentives can only be assumed – a 
desire to cause physical harm to the subject. This concern was acknowledged by the US Food 
and Drug Administration that has issued guidelines for the technical security of medical 
devices.270 In such attacks, medical devices can be ‘infected’ with malware, causing the 
equipment to be slowed down and thus not work properly. This has been the case regarding 
foetal monitors in intensive care wards,271 with further vulnerabilities exposed in wireless 
implanted defibrillators.272  
There is no consensus as to whether we will see an increase in cyber attacks in the UK, nor at 
which rate the black market will grow. However the key projections and predictions for the 
black market,273 its targets and actors are:  
1 Darknet activities will increase Actors likely to be better vetted and enjoy greater anonymity; 
increasing payments in cryptocurrencies poses fewer risks (e.g. those 
associated with money laundering). 
2 ‘Ability to attack will likely 
outpace the ability to defend’ 
(p.31) 
Attacker needs to know only one method of attack; defender needs to 
know all methods of attack. 
3 Attackers methods and tools will 
become more innovative 
As security and law enforcement develops, so will attackers’ 
encryption, vetting and operational security. 
4 Targets will increase Alongside the increase in digital data, hyperconnectivity, social media 
and mobile devices. 
5 Crime, vulnerability and human 
error 
Cybercrime will increase; vulnerability will continue; human error will 
remain a point of weakness. 
                                               
269 Dan Tynan, ‘The next data theft target: Your medical records’  (Yahoo! Tech., 18 February 2014) 
<https://www.yahoo.com/tech/the-next-data-theft-target-your-medical-records-77113382628.html> 
accessed 29 April 2014.  
270 ‘Medical device security alert notice’ (US Food and Drug Administration, 13 June 2013) 
<http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm356423.htm> accessed 28 April 2014. 
271 Gal Landesman, ‘Cyber threats to the healthcare industry’. 
272 GAO (US Government Accountability Office), ‘Medical devices: FDA should expand its consideration 
of information security for certain types of devices: Report to congressional requesters’ (31 August 
2012) <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-816> accessed 29 April 2014.  
273 Lillian Ablon, Martin Libicki and Andrea Golay ‘Markets for cybercrime tools and stolen data: 
Hackers’ Bazaar’.  
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6 Attacker profile Outsourcing (operators for hire, brokers) will increase; digital-savvy 
generation will take over the market; best skilled hackers likely to 
move to grey market; lower skilled hackers will take over the black 
market. 
9.D.2 Re-identification attacks 
Relatedly, the phenomenon of re-identification attacks warrants discussion in the context of 
potential motivations to abuse health and biomedical data. Although evidence of re-
identification attacks did not feature in the UK evidence, the thefts and technical security 
breaches that were identified were indicative of a growing sophistication of targeted attacks of 
databases with large amounts of sensitive health or biomedical data. Furthermore, the 
motivations behind re-identification attacks vary significantly from the other abuses identified in 
this evidence review and require distinction. 
For instance, the theft of health or biomedical data may be motivated by financial gain. 
Motivations for abuse can also take more benign forms, where health data are accessed 
purely to satisfy the curiosity of an individual. In the case of re-identification attacks, the 
motivation may be the adversary’s identification of a particular individual’s record when they 
know that individual is included in a particular database,274 or the goal may simply be to re-
identify as many records as possible275 in order to expose the weaknesses of an 
organisation’s technical security and/or to broadcast the adversary’s technical prowess. 
Of the evidence reviewed, we found nothing to indicate that re-identification attacks, however, 
recent work on the re-identification of genomic data, perceived to be ‘anonymous’, has raised 
concerns.276 Gymrek’s et al 2013 work on re-identification of genomic data demonstrated that 
‘full identities of personal genomes can be exposed via surname inference from recreational 
genetic genealogy databases followed by Internet searches.’277 Specifically, the study showed 
that the combination of a surname with other types of metadata, including age and state, can 
be used re-identify an individual’s personal genome.278 In response to this, key research 
funders in the UK have issued guidance and importantly recommended sanctions for 
researchers that attempt to re-identify anonymised data sets.279 Given the different motivations 
for re-identification attacks, it is important that stakeholders involved in facilitating access to 
                                               
274 El Emam, Guide to the De-Identification of Personal Health Information 169. 
275 El Emam, Guide to the De-Identification of Personal Health Information 169. 
276 Here we reference El Emam’s work on de-identification which lists eight of the most well known re-
identifications attack, most of which occurred in the US (one in Canada).  
277 Melissa Gymrek et al, ‘Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference’ (2013) 339 Science 
321–324, 321. 
278 Melissa Gymrek et al, ‘Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference’. 
279 Cancer Research UK, the Economic and Social Research Council, the Medical Research Council 
and the Wellcome Trust issued a joint statement in response to guidelines issued by the Expert 
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deliberate attempts to re-identify individuals in anonymised data sets – that such action should be 
considered ‘malpractice’ and met with appropriate sanctions. The Wellcome Trust, ‘Research funders 
outline steps to prevent re-identification of anonymised study participants’, (24 March 2014) 
<http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/News/Media-office/Press-releases/2014/WTP055974.htm> accessed 29 
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data, ensure appropriate – and the harshest of – sanctions are in place for deliberate attempts 
to re-identify otherwise anonymous health or biomedical data. This will at least serve as a 
disincentive to those within the health and biomedical sector (but not third party adversaries). 
9.D.3 Disincentives 
The Sections 9.D.1 and 9.D.2 address malicious attacks motivated by, in Kilger et al’s words, 
MEECES: money, entertainment, ego, cause (that is, ideology, aka hacktivism), entrance to 
social groups and status.280 The focus in this sub-section shifts to possibilities for 
disincentivisation to abuse. Normally understood as a financial disadvantage, we explore here 
an alternative – raising awareness of the data handler, appealing to and/or modifying 
personal/professional values and standards and bringing about behavioural change.  
Before doing so, it should be acknowledged that doctors and other health-care professional 
are often faced with data protection decisions that involve data protection and record-keeping 
during patient treatment, or may have to answer for their decisions post-treatment. The 
members only Medical Defence Union (MDU) has a medico-legal team available to give 
advice on specific cases. However, its Annual Reports provide useful case studies of, 
amongst other things, correct data handling and the importance of correct record keeping, 
listed in the Reports’ sections ‘Cautionary Tales’. These reports (covering also the MDU’s 
specialist dental division, the DDU) are in the public domain and available to download.281  
As we noted under 9.B.2 (page 140), applicable sanctions in the UK are not entirely 
ineffective, but also not capable of offering rigorous disincentives to rule out further abuse. In 
addition, some sanctions in place serve to act as a deterrent for the data controller and his or 
her organisation. For the data handler, disciplinary hearings, dismissals, being struck off and 
potential prosecution are formal paths to disincentivisation. Against the backdrop of the 
MEECES motives, successful abuse can promote feelings of self-worth. For data handlers in 
this category, getting caught is likely a known potential risk. In other words, the deterrent is 
ineffective. 
9.D.3.A The repeat offender  
Some individuals are repeat offenders, and we can only speculate why this might be. We offer 
here just two of the many sound propositions offered by psychology.282 Firstly and looking at 
                                               
280 Max Kilger, Ofir Arkin and Jeff Stutzman, ‘Profiling’ in The honeynet project. Know your enemy: 
learning about security threats (2nd edn, Addison Wesley 2004) 509-510  
<http://old.honeynet.org/book/Chp16.pdf> accessed 24 June 2014. 
281 Medical Defence Union Limited, ‘Report and Accounts 2011 including cautionary tales’ (2012) 14-33 
<http://www.themdu.com/~/media/Files/MDU/Publications/Annual%20reports/2011%20annual%20repor
t%20and%20accounts.pdf> accessed 29 June 2014; Medical Defence Union Limited, ‘Guide. Support. 
Defend. Including cautionary tales’ (2013) 15-33 
<http://www.themdu.com/~/media/Files/MDU/Publications/Annual reports/2012 annual report and 
accounts.pdf> accessed 20 June 2014.  
282 There is, for example, a wealth of research on risk-taking behaviour. It goes beyond the remit of this 
report to discuss antecedents of such behaviour.   
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personality traits, an individual who scores low on the agreeableness scale is motivated more 
by self-interest than by wanting to get along with others, is less kind and generally has little 
concern for the well-being of others.283 Secondly we turn to Kohlenberg’s Theory of Moral 
Development. 284 According to Kohlenberg, there are six stages of moral development over 
the life-course, whereby only 10-15% of adults reach stages 5 and 6. Only those who reach 
stage 6 (post-conventional morality) are likely to uphold universal principles in the knowledge 
that these apply to all individuals. Those who do not may not have internalised the wider rules 
of society: upholding the law is not seen as a necessity. The chances of a re-education 
programme being successful are very low. 
9.D.3.B Other ‘offenders’  
Before discussing those offenders who can modify their behaviour, it is essential to consider 
the following hypothetical questions. 
Which abuse is more severe? An act where thousands of encrypted patient 
records are lost and no harm/impact known? An act where a few named 
patients’ details are lost and one patient has been harmed/felt a negative 
impact?  
We will return to these questions later.  
Coming back to other offenders, it is important to distinguish between those who have acted 
with intent (but who have the ability to learn from the experience) and those whose actions are 
unintentional. We consider firstly those who have acted with intent. 
9.D.3.B.1 Staff who have acted with intent but who have the ability to learn from the 
experience  
For some, getting caught after abusing or misusing data can bring feelings of shame at the 
psychological level, and lead to ostracism and exclusion on the social level. We argue that, 
where the offender acts with intent, legal and regulatory sanctions are in place that may be 
effective or – based too on psychological variables – ineffective. We need to turn to the actual 
incident(s) of abuse and, crucially, the motivation behind it or them.  
Where the action was intentional, we propose that re-education is possible, but certainly not in 
all cases. Taking MEECES (see Section 9.D.3 Disinenctives) as starting point, there can be a 
unique set of personal and psychological circumstances specific to the offender. Two 
examples were given above in Sections 7.B.2.A.2 and 7.B3.C. In the first case, a nurse gave 
                                               
283 Robert R McCrae and Paul T Costa, Personality in adulthood (The Guildford Press 1990); The NEO 
PI-R Professional Manual (Guildford Press 1992); Personality trait structure as a human universal 
(1997) 52 American Psychologist 509-516. 
284 Lawrence Kohlberg, ‘The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment’ (1973) 
70:18 Journal of Philosophy 630–646; ‘The Philosophy of Moral Development’ in Essays on Moral 
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patients’ details to her boyfriend working for a company handling personal injury claims.(news32) 
This was undisputedly the wrong thing to do. However, she was so distraught at her 
wrongdoing that she murdered her daughter and attempted to then go on to commit suicide. 
We can only speculate on why she offended to start, but the reaction of a planned extended 
suicide suggests that an unhealthy relationship to her partner and/or mental ill health was 
involved. In the second case, a radiologist accessed pregnant patients’ records.(TW60) Her 
reason for this was that she had a drug addiction, had lost her baby because of it, and wanted 
to gather information from patients with a drug addiction, to see which services they had 
accessed. This too was undisputedly the wrong thing to do. However, it would seem like a 
case of desperation (distraught over death of baby? lack of trust in the ‘relationship of 
confidentiality’?) when a health-care professional does not access formal services. 
These are two quite exceptional cases. Nonetheless, it would be unrealistic to assume that the 
methods we suggest below would work equally well for all. For those who would continue to or 
be allowed to work in their area, there is an array of possibilities that could assist the offender 
in realising the (potential) impact of his or her action.  
Non-confrontational discussions should be held at the workplace, in order to gauge as clearly 
as possible the real motives behind the abuse. Indeed, it is known that the culture of blame (or 
looking for a scapegoat) is cowardly at best, and importantly it not only fails to resolve a status 
quo, but also provides the seed for further development of an oppressive culture. The NHS 
across the UK is notorious for this.285 
Whatever the underlying motivations, not protecting patients’ (or fellow colleagues’) privacy 
and upholding their dignity speaks against the values and moral standards of health-care 
professionals. It is these values that need to be re-addressed. In the process of seeking to 
modify behaviour, it is important to distinguish between compliance and conformity, two 
terms that are very similar but also very different.286 Compliance is the more active form, 
where the individual can modify their behaviour based on explicit or implicit requests made by 
others, usually those in authority. This means that we would see behavioural change, but the 
values and moral standards mentioned above are not necessarily internalised, that is, the 
individual ‘does the right thing because they have been told to’. Conformity on the other hand 
is a more passive phenomenon. Individuals who conform will adjust not only their (external) 
                                               
285 Matthew Limb, ‘Need for accountability should not result in “toxic” blame culture in NHS, conference 
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behaviour, but also their (internal) attitudes and beliefs, that is, the individual ‘does the right 
thing because they want to’.  
One way of getting the message across, about the implications for the subject of data abuse, 
is through inducing empathy (facilitating emotional capacity), that is, engage the offender in a 
perspective-taking exercise (utilising the offender’s cognitive skill).287 A workshop with a 
qualified facilitator/tutor could assist the offender to understand the consequences of his or her 
actions (i.e. know how the subject might feel) and the real impact of his or her actions (i.e. feel 
with or for the subject). Such techniques are being employed increasingly, for example by 
bringing offenders fact to face with their victims.288 In the context of data abuse, even if the 
subject were known to the offender, it would be logistically naïve and morally questionable to 
bring together them together.289 However, consideration could be given to finding a method of 
communicating real-life messages about the impact to the subject, remembering that the goal 
is to bring about attitudinal change (and thus behavioural change). 
9.D.3.B.2 Staff where abuse was unintentional  
The reasons behind an unintentional abuse of data can vary. Hypothetically and for example, 
it could be due to an oversight or carelessness because of extreme workload pressures (e.g. 
front-line staff), or due to the member of staff not realising that the act did constitute abuse 
(e.g. inadequate staff training), or a host of other reasons. What differentiates this member of 
staff from the offender described above is that we can assume a willingness to conform to the 
values of protecting patients (and other colleagues) from breaches. 
Different reasons for the abuse require different actions. As with the offender, a non-
confrontational discussion should be held at the workplace, in order to gauge as clearly as 
possible why the abuse occurred. Crucially and particularly in cases such as these, blame is 
futile. Let us consider here another extreme case, that of Jacinta Saldanha, the nurse who 
completed suicide after disclosing information on the well being of the Duchess of Cambridge 
to two Australian radio DJs posing as the Queen and the Prince of Wales. Her employer, King 
Edward VII’s hospital, described her as ‘an excellent nurse and well-respected and popular 
with all of her colleagues’, and the CEO of the Royal College of Nurses found it ‘deeply 
saddening that a simple human error due to a cruel hoax could lead to the death of a 
                                               
287C Daniel Baston, Shannon Early and Giovanni Salvarini, ‘Perspective Taking: Imagining How Another 
Feels Versus Imaging How You Would Feel’ (1997) 23:7 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 
751-758; C Daniel Batson et al, ‘Empathy, attitudes and action: Can feeling for a member of a 
stigmatized group motivate one to help the group’ (2002) 28:12 Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 1656-1666. 
288 An example is the Offender Behaviour Programme, accredited by the Ministry of Justice. See 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/offenders/before-after-release/obp> accessed 29 June 2014.  
289 When considering the act itself, the fine distinction between front-line staff with patient contact and 
other staff (e.g. back-office staff) should be kept in mind. There are psychological differences between 
the offender-subject relationship. Is the subject known (with all the dynamics that that entails) or is the 
subject anonymous (with all the dynamics that that entails)? 
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dedicated and caring member of the nursing profession.’290 In the same article, the hospital 
claimed it had ‘been supporting [Jacinta] throughout this difficult time.’  
This case perhaps demonstrates the need to keep the goal of the discussion at the forefront. It 
should look to seek ways to support the member of staff in ensuring that such abuse does not 
occur again. Equally importantly, it should establish how much responsibility lies with the staff 
member, and how much with the employer. Both parties may need to take remedial action. 
Taking the two examples given at the start of this section, in the first (extreme workload 
pressures), simply reminding the member of staff of the need to ensure that data (particularly 
paper records) are kept safely and securely is probably unhelpful. Rather, the working 
environment and conditions291,292 might be the underlying cause of the abuse. In the second 
case, a refresher course on data security would be useful, but in a novel form. 
9.D.3.C Data protection awareness (re-)training – bringing home the real-life message  
Many would acknowledge that traditional staff courses on data protection issues are a) 
somewhat dry and b) very theoretical. They provide a sound knowledge base that data 
handlers need to have. At the same time, errors in procedures that result in harm/impact may 
have real-life consequences for the data subject. We believe that – as an alternative or 
together with formal ‘teaching’ – providing workshops and similar that highlight patients’ stories 
can serve very well to bring the message home about just how devastating the impact of the 
abuse can be. In the context of improving the patient experience (that is, in the realm of 
clinical care) this approach comes highly recommended by the King’s Fund as a response to 
the Francis Report,293 and is regarded by the NHS as very effective.294 Indeed, patient stories 
are already available in film form in the public domain.295 Finally, a number of cases have 
been identified and discussed in the soft evidence of this report. 
We also suggest that this real-life approach in delivering education on data protection 
issues in the health care setting should form part of the material delivered to medical 
                                               
290 ‘Statement from the King Edward VII's Hospital on the death of nurse Jacintha Saldanha’ (The 
Telegraph, 7 December 2012) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9730305/Statement-from-the-King-
Edward-VIIs-Hospital-on-the-death-of-nurse-Jacintha-Saldanha.html> accessed 19 June 2014. 
291 A 2012 survey reported that children’s social workers are working on average 9.5 extra hours per 
week. Johnathan Coxon, ’Social worker and overtime: what to do if you’re heading towards burnout’ 
(Community Care, 12 December 2012) <http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2012/12/12/social-workers-
and-overtime-what-to-do-if-youre-heading-towards-burnout/> accessed 24 June 2014. 
292 In its 2013 survey, the Royal College of Nursing found that 56% of nurses work extra hours on every 
shift or several shifts a week. Royal College of Nursing, ‘RCN employment survey 2013’ (2013) 
<http://www.rcn.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/541292/Employment_Survey_2013_004_503_FINA
L_100214.pdf> accessed 20 June 2014. 
293 The King’s Fund ‘Patient-centred leadership: Rediscovering our purpose’ (The King’s Fund, 2013) 
<http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/patient-centred-leadership> accessed 26 June 2014.  
294 NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, ‘Transforming patient experience: The essential 
guide’<http://www.institute.nhs.uk/patient_experience/guide/home_page.html> accessed 27 June 2014. 
295 Patientstories, ‘Films’ <http://www.patientstories.org.uk/films/> accessed 27 June 2014. 
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and nursing students, and to others training in this sector. Lectures are not enough. 
Tutorials/workshops with high student participation are key. 
9.D.3.D Our cautionary tale 
Earlier in this section we posed hypothetical questions, namely 
Which abuse is more severe? An act where thousands of encrypted patient 
records are lost and no harm/impact known? An act where a few named 
patients’ details are lost and one patient has been harmed/felt a negative 
impact?  
As we discussed under Sections 4.A, 4.B. and 4.C, ranking the severity of abuse is not as 
straightforward as one might presume. Based on the hypothetical questions above, to what 
degree does the number of those affected play a role? Has the abuse had an impact on any 
specific individual(s), and if so, to what degree? Was the abuse intentional or unintentional? If 
intentional, was the motivation wilful/malicious or benign (e.g. idle curiosity, accessing medical 
records of a significant other at their request) or somewhere in between (e.g. the newly 
qualified doctor accessing the case notes of patients’ with particular illnesses/conditions of 
special interest to him or her)?  
We consider three aspects here. 
• The cost of non-use of data. 
• The severity of penalty for a misdeed or wrongdoing should be reasonable and 
proportionate to the severity of the infraction (‘let the punishment fitting the crime’). 296  
The degree to which we should consider the impact of severe penalties. 
When considering these, we draw on the data protection landscape in the UK, and depict this 
in Figure 14 in a highly simplistic way. Essentially, the UK legal system dictates the landscape. 
Alongside European Union law with its directives, UK law serves to inform regulations. These 
in turn in part inform information governance. Data controllers are obliged to translate all of 
these into their policies and practices.  
  
                                               
296 Robert Nozick ‘Philosophical explanations’ (Harvard University Press 1981) 366–368. 
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Figure 14: The data protection landscape in the UK (simplified) 
 
Thus far we have discussed in depth in this section the implications of our findings for 
governance and given a detailed account of the implications of the non-use of data. We return 
here to the implications of non-use of data, and suggest a balanced approach when under 
consideration by the regulators and by Governance Boards. 
In the clinical research setting the GMC in its Good Practice Research Guide states that the 
researcher ‘must make sure that foreseeable risks to participants are kept as low as possible 
… [and in addition … be satisfied] that the anticipated benefits to participants out weigh the 
foreseeable risks’.297  For medics, treating patients at their most vulnerable, namely at end of 
life, the GMC in its Good Medical Practice: End of life care stresses that all decisions must be 
in the patient’s best interests. ‘This means weighing the benefits, burdens and risks of 
treatment for the [here child]’.298 Further, ‘[t]he benefits, burdens and risks associated with a 
treatment are not always limited to clinical considerations, and [the physician] should be 
careful to take account of the other factors relevant to the circumstances of each patient’.299  
                                               
297 General Medical Council, ‘Good practice in research: Good research design and practice’ 
<http://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/6003.asp> accessed 23 June 2014. 
298 General Medical Council, ‘Neonates, children and young people’ <http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/end_of_life_benefits_burdens_and_treatment_risks.asp> accessed 
23 June 2014. 
299 General Medical Council, ‘End of life care’ <http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/end_of_life_benefits_burdens_and_risks.asp> accessed 23 June 
2014. 
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Therefore the treating physician and the clinical researcher alike are empowered to make the 
ethically correct decisions regarding the weighing up of benefits against foreseeable risks, and 
in the case of the treating physician, to consider his or her decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
We do indeed put our lives in their hands. We suggest here that, when the benefits and risks 
of data linkage are not balanced, overly cautious decisions can result. When these decisions 
are imbalanced and against data linkage, a highly likely result is that medical advancements 
will be impeded, and the repercussions can affect whole patient groups and their significant 
others, placing a large financial and resources burden on both the NHS and Social Services in 
the future.  
Secondly we turn to ‘the punishment fitting the crime’ and the impact of the punishment. As 
also depicted in Figure 14, the data controller oversees data handlers within an organisation. 
The data handlers can be front-line clinical staff, administrative staff, technical staff etc. who 
come with specific areas of expertise and varying levels of access to patient data. We have 
noted that, when data abuse occurs, there are clearly cases where disciplinary action through 
to dismissal is the only option (depicted in Figure 14 as “hard”). However, the goal should be 
to modify the behaviour (and hopefully also the attitude) of the offender, or in the case of 
unintentional abuse, raise awareness through seminars, workshops etc. Here we suggest a 
“soft” approach. The costs and implications of too harsh a punishment can be: 
• The culture of blame and bullying in the NHS will continue to thrive. 
• This brings with it fear, and the offender may be too traumatised to process any further 
training and thus be unable to modify his or her behaviour. 
• Where a highly qualified member of staff is dismissed, those skills are then no longer 
available to serve the patient. Current patients may be let down, the expertise on the 
ward is lost, and already direly long waiting lists may grow even more. 
If we do not consider this soft approach as a viable addition to disincentives and sanctions, 
there is a legitimate fear that the laws, rules and regulations governing the NHS will continue 
to grow, and most worryingly this to little effect. The NHS is overburdened to the point that 
patient care is suffering. And we must do all we can to prevent this situation deteriorating even 
more. 
Not least, we end this section with ‘the public’, depicted centrally in Figure 14. The public are 
the beneficiaries of good medical research and healthcare. Simultaneously it is their data that 
are at risk of harm. Fortunately for us, we live in a democracy where terms such as citizenship, 
participation and empowerment are becoming increasingly higher on social and political 
agendas. The public can and should be involved in all aspects of civil life. We urge that we – 
‘the experts’ – consult with them on such important aspects of our lives. In this respect, it is 
they who are ‘the experts’. And as a final word of caution, consulting with the public should not 
be a tick-box exercise. We must listen to these very important stakeholders.   
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9.D.4 Conclusions on motivations  
In considering selected motivations to abuse health or biomedical data, as informed by the 
evidence gathered, incentives ranged widely from financial motivations, to other forms of self-
gain including a hacker demonstrating their technical prowess. In light of the range of 
incentives to abuse health or biomedical data, the importance and role for good governance in 
the first instance and effective sanctions when abuses do occur, become apparent. In the next 
section, we consider areas warranting further and future research, in light of the scope and 
limitations of this evidence review and in specific consideration of what evidence was not 
uncovered. We then conclude the report by reviewing the scope of the evidence review, the 
important distinctions made between the three stranded approach (hard, soft and Twitter), and 
finally the key conclusions that emerged from the evidence. 
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10. Future Research 
The evidence review highlighted several areas where further and future research would be 
warranted outwith the scope and limitations of this report. We strongly recommend reducing 
the scope of any piece of future work, giving opportunity to explore in-depth and exhaustively. 
Here we provide indications of the topic and nature of potential areas of interest for both 
NCOB and EAGDA in future. 
10.A Widening the sources searched and reducing the scope 
As much as the evidence review uncovered, it was limited due to its scoping nature and time 
schedule. Particularly, it resulted in the need for a methodology that was able to produce very 
well identified categories, but sometimes-sparse sub-categories (e.g. maladministration, 
human error). The value that different types of sources bring was also apparent. Indeed and 
as shown in Figure 7: Overlapping reporting of incidents, the highest overlap of incidents 
reported was six (found in the hard and soft evidence strands). Future research should shift its 
focus to other sources (or, of course, remain with just one of the three sources here with 
search terms specific to the topic under investigation), particularly to peer-reviewed journals, 
trade magazines and blogs. We have pursued this notion further and provide a sample of such 
sources, as well as giving initial search findings that could be indicative of what these could 
bring. 
We conducted initial searches on four peer-reviewed sites, three trade magazines and eleven 
blogs. Four of the blogs were disregarded.300 The search terms were: 
"data AND protection AND health" 
"harm AND health AND data" 
"health AND data" 
"biomedical AND data" 
"genetic AND data" 
"patient AND record" 
"patient AND data" 
"patient AND abuse" 
As can be seen in Table 21, the number of hits generated by the search terms for all sites was 
66057. Of these, 49038 emerged from the BMJ website and were not read for relevance. 
                                               
300 The blogs University of Denver Privacy Foundation Medical Patient Security, Harvard University Bill 
of Health and Hawktawk had no search functions. The Center for Law and the Biosciences (Stanford) 
archives produced zero hits. 
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Therefore 17019 were evaluated, and 155 were relevant. In the Appendix (see Table 28) we 
include a breakdown of source by each search term. For example we see potential in BMJ 
News, SC Magazine and the blogs Hogan Lovells Chronicle of Data Protection and 
Pogowasright. 
Table 21: Alternative websites – Overview of hits and relevance  
Websites searched  Hits Relevant Comment 
Journals    
BMJ Website  49038 - Not read for relevance 
Journal of Health Organisation and 
Management  
509 0  
BMJ News 6526 11 Some truncated after x 
number of articles read 
BMJ Comment 7175 2 Some truncated after x 
number of articles read 
Trade Magazines    
Computer weekly 673 3  
SC Magazine 216 66  
Professional Security 1129 23 Some truncated after x 
number of articles read 
Blogs    
Privacy international 44 0  
Science and Society (DUKE) 20 0  
Datonomy 52 2  
BTO Solicitors 22 0  
Field Fischer Privacy and Information 
Law 
19 0  
Hogan Lovells Chronicle of Data 
Protection 
208 15  
Pogowasright 426 33  
Total 66057 155  
 
The remit of this work was extremely broad. The benefit of this is that the findings produce a 
sound basis to identify areas that are worthy of further, more in-depth exploration. We would 
therefore additionally strongly recommend that any future work have a sharper and narrower 
focus. Furthermore, evidence emerged from all three strands that were based on FoI requests 
to government departments and public authorities. Because FoI responses generally detail 
information not necessarily in the public domain, searching for such information alone could 
produce very interesting results.   
10.B Future research on social constructionism  
As indicated in Section 8.B.6 Quality of findings in newspapers, the research investment on 
the soft search was extensive. At the same time, the use to which this was put was broad. We 
suggest that, based on these extensive findings perhaps as a starting point only, future 
research examining the social construction of issues around health data misuse and abuse, 
and the symbiotic relationship between the media and the public would contribute to an 
understanding of the wider, social context of data protection. 
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10.C Future Research on Non-Use 
A better understanding of the impact of various factors on data non-use, could be gained by 
conducting a prospective study on researcher views and experiences, including following 
through on studies from initiation. Governance challenges may differ with types of data. For 
example, the privacy issues in the use of free-text, omic, image, and spatial data will differ 
from those involved in the use of structured micro-data. It would be worth exploring these 
issues to understand what needs to be done to avoid non-use and to enable safe data access 
for research. 
10.D Future research on genetic data 
Given the focus of this review on health and biomedical data, and the strong implications 
arising from the single case involving genetic data, highlights yet another area warranting 
future research – and would thus fill a gap in the evidence base. As discussed in Table 22: 
Full details of hard evidence search, the variability with which technical terminology such as 
“genetic” was used in the hard evidence sources demonstrated the difficulty in locating 
incidents of harm with precision. Even in the more objective and arguably ‘sophisticated’ 
setting of the courts, terms such as biomedical, genetic or bioinformation were swapped for 
DNA and cellular samples.  
As such, a narrow study focusing on genetic data would be warranted and involve expanding 
searches to alternative resources including peer-reviewed journals, blogs, trade magazines 
etc. – sources that might lend to more sophisticated (and accurate) use of technical terms 
such as DNA, genetic and bioinformation. Second, a broader approach to the search terms 
employed could yield more hits, and potentially more relevant hits. In broadening the scope of 
search terms used, one could look to known cases such as S and Marper identified in this 
review, and employ the terms adopted by the Court in substitution for e.g. genetic data. This 
method would begin to address the variability in how technical terms are used by the courts. 
The search could also be broadened if the cases cited to by the presiding court were then 
read and considered for relevancy. Applying this ‘snowball’ effect to the search, as opposed to 
sticking to the rigorous systematic approach adopted for this scoping review, would certainly 
offer more breadth of (more relevant) cases to consider. A similar approach on broadening 
both resources searched and terms employed could also be considered for a “soft” evidence 
review. 
Finally, future research could focus on particular uses of genetic data and the propensity for 
such uses to cause harm. Particular areas of interest might lie in new and unregulated uses 
e.g. commercial, genetic testing for predisposition to certain diseases. By narrowing the 
search to a particular use the search would narrow the types of harms that could arise and 
thus identify more context-specific search terms that could then yield more relevant results.  
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10.E Future research on the risks, threats and vulnerabilities in 
processing health and biomedical data 
The work undertaken in this evidence review, as well as the NCOB’s previous research into 
the forensic use of bioinformation, has done much to identify uses of health and biomedical 
data that present risks to individuals, organisations and broader public interests. Whereas this 
evidence review focused on identifying actual instances of abuse and harm caused, future 
research could focus on the risks, threats and vulnerabilities that lead to such incidents. Also, 
whilst this report was able to comment on the implications of the evidence uncovered as to 
specific motivations that may have caused data to be abused, a narrow piece of research is 
warranted into preventive considerations, in order to be able to propose mitigations and 
practical solutions to such risks. In light of a key conclusion of this report - that current legal 
remedies are ineffective in compensating for abuse – carrying forward more focused research 
into the risks perpetuating such abuse is warranted. 
10.F Future research and the necessity of public debate  
We hope that we have demonstrated the value of public engagement throughout this report. 
Opening the debate to the wider public is in the spirit of citizenship. Further, we have seen the 
mismatch of expectations of what the protection of health and biomedical data actually is in 
legal terms. Not only should the public be engaged more in data security concerns regarding 
their own personal sensitive data, we believe that a qualitative piece of research, perhaps in 
the form of consultation workshops, would allow for a better understanding of these 
mismatches. Additionally and in focus groups, the public discuss how best the correct 
messages should come into the public domain.  
In addition and as raised under Section 8.B.7, we found no evidence of discrimination against 
minority groups. Conversely, however, we found no evidence of discrimination against minority 
groups. In order to establish if and how minority groups might be discriminated against, it is 
essential to reach out to such groups via gatekeepers and gather experiential data. We 
believe this could produce fruitful findings.  
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11. Concluding thoughts 
This review provides a unique legal and psychosocial framework of analysis to answer the 
question of whether there is any actual harm that arises from the use of health and biomedical 
data. This framework provides a multidisciplinary basis for conceptualising the very notion of 
harm as it relates to use and (perceived) abuse of data. The novel approach has provided a 
triangulated evidence base to answer the question and the findings indicate strongly that a 
more holistic understanding is required. 
The holistic perspective offered in this review suggests that there are at least two types of 
evidence that must be considered, each with a corresponding understanding of harm. Thus, 
from the point of view of law and legal sanctions, and in considering the most influential legal 
instrument – the Data Protection Act 1998 – a hard evidence base has been generated that 
draws on rulings of the domestic and European courts, the First-tier Tribunal (Information 
Rights), and the Information Commissioner’s Office. In these terms, the hard evidence frames 
“harm” as ‘…that which causes unjustifiably substantial damage or distress to the individual, 
which is beyond mere discomfort – physical, emotional or otherwise.’301 This sets a high 
hurdle. In doing so, it fails to capture the complete picture of how individuals and social groups 
experience or perceive harm arising from data use and abuse.  
To capture this, our soft evidence base conceptualised the notion of ‘impact’ arising from data 
use. Thus, for example, an individual might experience an impact if her/his data are used 
without permission, even if this is perfectly legal. Equally, organisations handling data might 
suffer an impact in trust and allegiance if individuals or groups whose data are held and used 
perceive an adverse impact through uses of which they disapprove. This is not to suggest that 
groundless concerns or abstract fears should drive information governance practices. Rather – 
as our soft evidence base suggests – the range of considerations about what might be 
construed as harmful is far wider than the law alone recognises. As such, the lesson is that 
due attention should be paid to possible impacts when using health and biomedical data, and 
to ensuring that governance mechanisms and actors within them have the ability to assess 
and, where appropriate, respond to data subjects’ expectations.      
Our further reliance on the social medium of Twitter has allowed us to triangulate the findings. 
Twitter has brought insight to the international landscape of data breaches involving health 
and biomedical data allowing for contrast with the UK-based evidence. Somewhat 
interestingly, there is less overlap between the three evidence sources than one might expect. 
The evidence uncovered of actual harm is modest in comparison to potential harm or to a 
psychosocial understanding of impacts. As stated above, the clear lack of merged or 
                                               
301 ICO, ‘Preventing processing likely to cause damage or distress’. 
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overlapping results simultaneously indicates the limitations of the hard evidence versus, soft 
evidence and social media search on their own, whilst highlighting the value added by 
combining the three approaches. This allows us to derive more complete and holistic view on 
the types of abuses and harms at stake when processing health and biomedical data. 
In all areas, the top-level message is that careless or negligence conduct – through 
maladministration or human error – rather than intentional and wilful abuse of data, is 
overwhelmingly the cause of harm/impact.   
The key implication for governance is that a wider perspective on harms arising out of the use 
or non-use of health or biomedical data is required. This must be one that is outwith the 
narrow confines of the law and takes specific account of the full spectrum of harms (hard) and 
potential impacts (soft). In something of a closed circle of analysis, it is important to point out 
that the courts are already taking these considerations into account. Actual harm might be the 
requisite standard under the Data Protection Act, but general common law principles in breach 
of confidence actions and those involving human rights will account for potential harms and 
impacts, as well as harms to broader public interests.  
Equally, this analysis of both harm and (potential) impact suggests that it is insufficient merely 
to ask if data controllers and other users of data have complied with the law. The human 
practices involved need to demonstrate sensitivity to the wider potential impacts – individual 
and social – that handling of health and biomedical data can bring. 
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Table 22: Full details of hard evidence search 
 
UK case law 
For UK case law, the legal database LexisNexis was chosen to provide comprehensive 
access to all relevant judicial rulings. Courts across the whole of the UK were considered, from 
England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (with a detailed list of the Courts listed in 
Footnote 113 above). The only decisions not available in LexisNexis were those from the First-
tier Tribunal (Information Rights) of the General Regulatory Chamber (formerly the Information 
Tribunal) which were searched for separately on the Tribunal’s website. 
The search conducted on LexisNexis permitted full use of Boolean search connectors. For 
biomedical data, broader search parameters were employed, given the lack of results 
following the formula used for health data – thus the search terms used were simply 
‘biomedical and data’.  
Given the lack of results in this aspect of the search, a search for ‘genetic data and breach’ 
was undertaken. ‘Genetic’ data was searched for given the potential (and actual) overlap and 
conflation between biomedical and genetic terminology. Given the non-technical expertise and 
precision with which scientific terms might be used by the Courts it was desirable to expand 
the search for biomedical data on this basis.  
First-Tier Tribunal of the General Regulatory Chamber (former 
Information Tribunal) 
As LexisNexis did not include the decisions of the First-Tier Tribunal in its database, this 
search was undertaken on the Tribunal’s website. The Tribunal’s website did not permit 
Boolean search connectors, however it did allow for searches according to: 
• Jurisdictional area 
• Subject 
• Sub-subject 
• Appeal number 
• Party 
• Date 
To give the widest yet most relevant results the only two variables chosen were jurisdictional 
area, and a nominated subject. Both variables were changed in order to achieve relevant 
results.  
ICO Enforcement Actions 
To complement the findings in UK case law, the ICO’s enforcement of the DPA was 
considered. The ICO has a variety of enforcement measures at its disposal, including: 
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• The issuance of monetary penalty notices of up to £500,000 for serious breaches of 
the DPA on or after 6 April 2010 
• Decision notices, which are published opinions on a public authorities’ compliance with 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or Environmental Information Regulation (only 
applicable to England and Wales) 
• Enforcement notices and ‘stop now’ orders to both public and private sector 
organisations that are in breach of the DPA, setting forth specific steps to bring 
themselves into compliance  
• Criminal prosecutions under the DPA 
Each of these enforcement measures was publicly available on the ICO’s website and was 
considered either through an advanced search mechanism on the website, or by reading each 
individual case (when filtering or search options were not available). 
European Court Judgments 
European Court Judgments were considered due to the European basis of the UK’s data 
protection legislation and especially in light of the relevance of European jurisprudence 
considering privacy implications under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The LexisNexis database was used for this search given its comprehensive resource of all 
decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), General Court of the EU and European Union Civil Service Tribunal (First Chamber). 
For the same reasoning proposed within the UK case law search, the search for biomedical 
data evidence was expanded to search for ‘genetic or biomedical and data and breach’. 
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Table 23: Hard evidence incidents  
(Total of 51 incidents according to criteria in hard evidence search (overlaps with soft evidence highlighted in blue) 
Incident 
No. 
Case Name 
and Date 
Source Abuse Type Abuse Cause Harm 
UKC1 Re JR60 [2013] 
NIQB 93 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised access:  To meet organisational objectives: The potential 
for unauthorised access to health and social care 
records of an adult who was previously a ‘Looked 
After Child’ in Northern Ireland. 
Individual distress: ‘[The applicant] does not want to be 
reminded of her days in care. She does not need to know in 
detail how her mother had let her and her sister down. In 
effect, she says that her time in care was a period of her life 
that, quite understandably, she now wants to put behind 
her. She wants no reminders. She is especially determined 
that all records of this unhappy time should not be accessed 
by any third parties including members of her immediate 
family.’ 
UKC2 GDC v Savery 
and Others 
[2011] EWHC 
3011 (Admin) 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
Disclosure 
Against wishes of individual: Use of patient 
medical records against and/or without patient 
consent 
No discussion of harm: Except that it was against patient 
wishes (consent not provided) or no response. 
UKC3 N (A Child) 
[2009] EWHC 
1663 (Fam) 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
Disclosure 
Without safeguards: Disclosure of confidential 
expert testimony/reports from psychiatrist in 
family law case against wishes of wife. 
Potential distress: '...for the disclosure of such personal 
material would be likely to cause the mother distress and 
upset which would be highly likely to impact adversely upon 
a child living in the same household.' 
UKC4 Lewis v 
Secretary of 
State for 
Health and 
another [2008] 
EWHC 2196 
(QB) 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Against wishes of individual/without consent: 
Court authorised disclosure of documents and 
medical records of individuals who had died 
between November 1962 and August 1991 and 
who had, had tissues removed for analysis for the 
'The Redfern Inquiry into human tissue analysis in 
UK nuclear facilities'. 
Potential distress: 'It is possible that there are those who 
might be indirectly affected by The Inquiry's processes who 
do not know about it and who do not understand its 
implications for their deceased family member.' 
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Incident 
No. 
Case Name 
and Date 
Source Abuse Type Abuse Cause Harm 
UKC5 Re Officer O's 
Application for 
Judicial 
Review [2008] 
NIQB 52 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Without safeguards: Police Ombudsman requiring 
disclosure of medical and health records of 
applicant police officer under investigation 
following his fatal shooting of member of public 
with personal protection weapon. Applicant 
complaining that disclosures breached his right to 
private life. Data requested included: information 
in respect of the applicant's history relating to 
health, conduct and complaints in view of the 
information he received in the investigation and 
the applicant's assertion that his ability to recollect 
the events of the incident was hampered by post 
incident treatment from OHW. 
Damage to institution: Of confidential relationship btw 
Police Officers and OHW. Mention of the officer 
experiencing significant emotional problems and sleep 
deprivation for which he was taking medication, however 
this was not specific to this disclosure. Thus harm was 
procedural harm, because 'the information had been taken 
without any reference or notice to the applicant, without 
affording him reasons for the decision or an opportunity to 
have made representations before or during the decision 
making process.' 
UKC6 Mersey Care 
NHS Trust v 
Ackroyd 
[2007] EWCA 
Civ 101 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
By media/press: Mr Ackroyd, is a freelance 
investigative journalist was passed the medical 
records of Mr Ian Brady (apparently from hospital 
staff, but never confirmed), who was incarcerated 
in a mental hospital for murder.  On 2 December 
1999, some information from these records, 
including verbatim extracts, was published in the 
Mirror in an article attributed to Gary Jones. 
Individual distress: To patient, whose medical records 
disclosed in newspaper article.  
UKC7 Stone v South 
East Coast 
Strategic 
Health 
Authority and 
others [2006] 
EWHC 1668 
(Admin) 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Without safeguards: Independent inquiry into the 
care, treatment and supervision of Stone prior to 
his murder of the victims. Report would be 
published to world at large. 
Potential distress: Stone was worried the public would turn 
more against him (that the media would sensationalise the 
report). 
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UKC8 Bradshaw v 
Chief 
Constable of 
Cambridgeshir
e Constabulary 
[2006] All ER 
(D) 217 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Against wishes of individual: Claimant wanted 
third party's confidential medical and personnel 
records disclosed in court for his proceedings 
against his employer - the 3rd party medical 
records in question were to help show stress-
related sick leave and to establish foreseeability for 
negligence of the ER. 
Potential distress: Harm to the 3rd party not clearly 
mentioned - except that he clearly opposed to his medical 
records being used - possibility of further distress - 
comments such as the third party had 'a lot of problems' and 
already had to take leave off work for stress etc. 
UKC9 
(Also in 
Te09) 
Henry v British 
Broadcasting 
Corporation - 
[2005] All ER 
(D) 43 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Falsification/fabricat
ion of data 
To meet NHS targets: Libel action re: BBC news 
feature on falsification of hospital waiting times - 
did BBC have a qualified privilege to publish. 
Harm to broader public interests and potential distress: The 
NHS suffered a loss of public trust due to the falsifying of 
waiting times. Further, ‘[a]lthough there was no evidence 
that the health of any particular patient had suffered by 
reason of the waiting list fraud, that was likely to have been 
the result in the cases of some of those whose treatment 
had been delayed.’ 
UKC10 R (on the 
application of 
E) v Bristol City 
Council [2005] 
EWHC 74 
(Admin), 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Against wishes of individual: Notifying claimant's 
sister, as nearest relative, against claimant's 
wishes, re: her mental health problems, history etc. 
Potential distress: 'The claimant does not want her sister 
involved with her or her mental health problems, and/or her 
care at all. I accept that there is credible evidence that if Mrs 
S is involved in decisions relating to the claimant's admission 
for an assessment or treatment, and/or if Mrs S were to take 
any action under the Mental Health Act 1983 in respect of 
the claimant, that that would cause the claimant significant 
distress.' 
UKC11 Campbell v 
MGN Ltd. 
[2004] UKHL 
22 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
By media/press: The publication re Naomi 
Campbell's drug addiction and treatment in NA 
went beyond disclosure which was necessary to 
add credibility to the legitimate story that the 
claimant had deceived the public and went beyond 
the journalistic margin of appreciation allowed to a 
free press; that although the photographs of the 
claimant were taken in a public place, the context 
in which they were used and linked to the articles 
added to the overall intrusion into the claimant's 
private life. 
Potential distress: 'A person in her position would find 
disclosure highly offensive, and might also be deterred from 
continuing with the therapy, thereby causing a setback to 
recovery'. 
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UKC12 Re B 
(Disclosure to 
other parties) 
[2001] All ER 
(D) 22 (Aug) 
FCR 32 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Against wishes of individual: Husband asked to see 
psychiatrist, psychologist and therapist records of 
wife and two children in violation of their Art 8 
right to privacy. 
Potential distress: 'Knowledge of R (abusive husband) 
having access to that material would be deeply distressing 
for the mother and the children, and would be wholly 
disproportionate to any legitimate forensic purpose that 
would be served by allowing R to see it.' 
UKC13 A Health 
Authority v X 
and others 
[2001] 2 FCR 
634, All ER (D) 
132 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Against wishes of individual: Health authority 
seeking disclosure of medical records in order to 
carry out investigation against objections of 
patients. 
No discussion of harm 
UKC14 R v 
Department of 
Health, ex 
parte Source 
Informatics 
Ltd  [2001] QB 
424, [2000] 1 
All ER 786 
LexisNexis, UK 
Case Law 
Database 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Against wishes of individual: S Ltd wished to 
collect data on the prescribing habits of general 
practitioners (GPs), which it planned to sell to 
pharmaceutical companies so that they could 
market their products more effectively. It therefore 
asked pharmacists, for a small fee, to provide it 
with certain information contained on prescription 
forms, namely the names of GPs and the identity 
and quantity of drugs that they prescribed, but not 
the names of patients. 
No harm: If anonymised data was used – even if used for a 
commercial purpose and without the prior notice of this use 
– no harm could be caused to the patients. 
IT1 Pauline Bluck v 
IC 
EA/2006/0090 
 
UK Information 
Tribunal Cases 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
 
FOI claim: The NHS would breach the duty of 
confidence owed to Karen Davies if it disclosed the 
Medical Records to the deceased's Mother, other 
than under the terms of the FOIA (with consent of 
her widower/next of kin) and that the breach 
would be actionable by the personal 
representatives of Karen Davies. 
Harm to institution: Trust in the confidential nature of the 
doctor/patient relationship will be diminished and thus 
harmed if a patient believed that his or her information 
might be disseminated to the public after their death. 
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ICOP1 03/12/2013 
Maidstone 
Magistrates 
Court 
UK ICO 
Prosecutions 
Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: 
Unlawfully accessing the medical records of 
approximately 1,940 patients registered with the 
surgery. Unlawfully obtaining or accessing personal 
data is a criminal offence under section 55 of the 
Data Protection Act 1998. The offence is 
punishable by way of ‘fine only’ - up to £5,000 in a 
Magistrates Court or an unlimited fine in a Crown 
Court. 
No discussion of harm: However, was fined a total of £996 
and ordered to pay a £99 victim surcharge and £250 
prosecution costs. 
ICOP2 23/05/2013 
West 
Hampshire 
Magistrates 
Court 
UK ICO 
Prosecutions 
Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: A 
former manager of a health service based at a 
council-run leisure centre in Southampton has 
been prosecuted by the ICO for unlawfully 
obtaining sensitive medical information relating to 
over 2,000 people. Paul Hedges took the 
information hoping to use the data for a new 
fitness company he was setting up. 
Individual distress: 'The council became aware of their 
former employee’s actions when they received complaints 
about patients being approached by Mr Hedges; who had 
since set up a similar service using the Active Options name 
and branding.' In addition, he was fined £3,000 and ordered 
to pay a £15 victim surcharge and £1,376 prosecution costs. 
ICOP3 12/03/2013 
West 
Hampshire 
Magistrates 
UK ICO 
Prosecutions 
Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: Former 
receptionist at GP office unlawfully obtaining 
sensitive medical information relating to her ex-
husband’s new wife. Accessed the information on 
15 separate occasions over a 16-month period 
while working as a receptionist at the Bath Lodge 
Practice. The breach became apparent after Phillips 
left her job and sent a text message to her ex-
husband’s partner referring to highly sensitive 
medical information taken from her medical 
record. 
Individual distress: New wife was harassed by the ex-wife 
referring to highly sensitive medical information taken from 
her medical record. In addition, she was fined £750 and 
ordered to pay a £15 victim surcharge and £400 prosecution 
costs. 
 171 
Incident 
No. 
Case Name 
and Date 
Source Abuse Type Abuse Cause Harm 
ICOP4 12/01/2012 
Liverpool City 
Magistrates 
Court 
UK ICO 
Prosecutions 
Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: A 
former health worker has pleaded guilty to 
unlawfully obtaining patient information by 
accessing the medical records of five members of 
her ex-husband’s family in order to obtain their 
new telephone numbers. 
Individual distress: The defendant’s father-in-law contacted 
the hospital after receiving nuisance calls that he suspected 
were made by his former daughter-in-law. Having changed 
his phone number in July 2009 following unwanted calls 
from Ms Kechil, he was immediately concerned that there 
had been a breach of patient confidentially.  She was fined 
£500 and ordered to pay £1,000 towards prosecution costs 
and a £15 victim surcharge. 
ICOM1 
(Also in  
In09, G28 
and Ti08) 
British 
Pregnancy 
Advice Service 
7 March 2014 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Technical security 
breach 
Third party: A hacker threatened to publish 
thousands of names of people who sought advice 
on abortion, pregnancy and contraception. BPAS 
retained call back information unnecessarily of 
9,900 people which accessible to the hacker. BPAS 
also did not store passwords securely or ensure 
communications secure. 
Potential distress - emotional and physical: Some of the call 
back details were from individuals whose ethnicity and social 
background could have led to physical harm or even death if 
the information had been disclosed by the attacker.  
ICOM2 North East 
Lincolnshire 
Council 29 Oct 
2013 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Lost hardware Human error: An unencrypted USB memory stick 
containing personal and sensitive personal data 
was lost on the data controller’s premises. 
Potential distress (physical and emotional): Following the 
incident, the data controller carried out a risk assessment for 
the potential damage and distress to the data subjects. The 
internal report estimated that the loss of the sensitive 
personal data is likely to lead to the ill health of those 
affected through the disclosure of the data or due to a break 
in the services, which they were receiving. The likely damage 
and distress to the data subjects is substantial due to the 
volume of data which has been lost, and that the data 
subjects are children aged 5 -16, some of whom are deemed 
vulnerable (and their families). The data subjects were not 
notified of the data breach. 
ICOM3 
(Also 
G07) 
NHS Surrey 12 
July 2013 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Non-secure disposal 
of hardware 
Maladministration:  In decommissioning hard 
drives, did not properly vet the 3rd party vendor 
and thus personal data belonging to thousands of 
patients on hard drives sold on an online auction 
site. 
Potential for individual distress: Approximately 1570 hard 
drives holding confidential sensitive personal data relating to 
an unknown number of patients and staff; The majority of 
the hard drives sold on the internet have not been 
recovered 
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ICOM4 
(Also 
TW23) 
North 
Staffordshire 
Combined 
Healthcare 
NHS Trust 13 
June 2013 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Human error: North Staffordshire Combined 
Healthcare NHS Trust, after several faxes 
containing sensitive personal data were sent to a 
member of the public in error. 
Potential for individual distress: because the ICO could not 
obtain confirmation that the member of the public 
destroyed the SPD received, potential in future for this 
information to be used to the disadvantage/detriment of the 
patients. 
ICOM5 Stockport 
Primary Care 
Trust 3 June 
2013 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Non-secure disposal 
of paper file 
Maladministration: Stockport Primary Care Trust 
fined following the discovery of a large number of 
patient records at a site formerly owned by the 
Trust by the purchaser of the site. 
Potential for Individual distress: because some of the data 
subjects were known to the purchaser who accessed the 
information thus causing embarrassment etc.; and data 
disclosed to a wider circle of people - five prospective 
purchasers had access to the site in total. 
ICOM6 
(Also in 
B05) 
Nursing and 
Midwifery 
Council 15 
February 2013 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Lost hardware Human error:  Nursing and Midwifery Council. The 
council lost three DVDs related to a nurse’s 
misconduct hearing, which contained confidential 
personal information and evidence from two 
vulnerable children. An ICO investigation found the 
information was not encrypted. 
Potential for individual distress: just that DVDs were never 
found (and thus potential for future use of SPD remains). 
ICOM7 London 
Borough of 
Lewisham 12 
December 
2012 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Loss of paper files Human error: a social worker left sensitive 
documents in a plastic shopping bag on a train, 
after taking them home to work on. The files, 
which were later recovered from the rail 
company’s lost property office, included GP and 
police reports and allegations of sexual abuse and 
neglect. 
Potential for individual distress: If disclosure resulted in 
extensive media coverage about individuals' personal lives; 
and potential to disrupt on-going legal case data related to 
the data in question. 
ICOM8 Devon County 
Council 10 
December 
2012 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Human error: Devon County Council social worker 
used a previous case as a template for an adoption 
panel report they were writing, but a copy of the 
old report was sent out instead of the new one. 
The mistake revealed personal data of 22 people, 
including details of alleged criminal offences and 
mental and physical health. 
Individual distress: The parents of the child being 
considered for adoption complained to ICO about the 
distress they had suffered; the unauthorised third parties did 
not return the report for 2 months. 
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ICOM9 Stoke-on-
Trent City 
Council 25 
October 2012 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Human error: A solicitor employed by the data 
controller was working on a child protection case 
and sent 11 emails (intended for Counsel 
instructed on the case) to the wrong email address 
by mistake. The emails varied in sensitivity but 
some of them contained confidential and highly 
sensitive personal data about the non-accidental 
injuries sustained by a child together with medical 
information relating to two adults and two 
children. 
Potential for harm: The 11 emails containing confidential 
and highly sensitive personal data were sent to a live email 
address via the internet and have not been recovered - 
importantly (to ICO): To the Commissioner’s knowledge the 
personal data involved has not been accessed or further 
disseminated and the security breach did not affect the child 
protection proceedings. 
ICOM10 
(Also in 
G10) 
Torbay Care 
Trust 6 August 
2012 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Maladministration: A monetary penalty of 
£175,000 was issued to Torbay Care Trust after 
sensitive personal information relating to 1,373 
employees was published on the Trust’s website. 
(Data publicly available for over 19 weeks, this file 
receiving 300 visits) 
Potential financial harm: risk for identity theft and thus 
financial loss. 
ICOM11 St George's 
Healthcare 
NHS Trust 12 
July 2012 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Human error: A monetary penalty of £60,000 was 
issued to St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust after a 
vulnerable individual’s sensitive medical details 
were sent to the wrong address. (Patient had not 
lived there for five years) 
Potential Distress: ICO considered it likely to cause 
substantial individual distress and would prejudice any 
criminal prosecution 
ICOM12 Belfast Health 
and Social 
Care Trust 19 
June 2012 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Non-secure disposal 
of data  
Maladministration: Confidential and sensitive 
personal data consisting of patient and staff 
records (some dating from the 1950s) were stored 
in one of the disused sites, namely Belvoir Park 
Hospital (the “site”). Whilst, CCTV used at first, 
'CCTV system monitoring the main entrance was 
not recording and the fire and intruder alarms had 
been isolated after developing faults.' Trespassers 
gained access to the site on several occasions to 
photograph the records, which were then posted 
on the internet. 
Potential distress: The contravention was of a kind likely to 
cause substantial distress to the data subjects and 
complaints were made by some of the affected individuals. 
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ICOM13 
(Also in 
B09, E02, 
E09, E10, 
In06, 
Ma12) 
Brighton and 
Sussex 
University 
Hospitals NHS 
Trust 1 June 
2012 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Non-secure disposal 
of hardware 
Maladministration: In decommissioning hard 
drives, did not properly vet the 3rd party vendor 
and thus personal data belonging to thousands of 
patients on hard drives sold on an online auction 
site, including data re: HIV positive patients. 
Potential harm to individuals: All the hard drives have not 
been recovered and that the data was extremely sensitive 
(re: HIV positive status) makes it likely the data could be 
misused in future to discriminate against them or otherwise 
cause harm. 
ICOM14 Central 
London 
Community 
Healthcare 
NHS Trust 21 
May 2012 
UK ICO 
Monetary 
Penalties 
Unauthorised 
disclosure of data 
Maladministration: Sensitive personal data was 
faxed to an incorrect and unidentified number. The 
contravention was repeated on 45 occasions over a 
number of weeks and compromised 59 data 
subjects' personal data. (Data re: patients receiving 
palliative care at the time of the security breach). 
Potential distress: ICO considered it 'likely to cause 
substantial distress to the patients' although no complaints 
received from data subjects. 
ICOD1 3 September 
2013, FOI 
Decision 
Notice re: 
Walsall Clinical 
Commissionin
g Group 
UK ICO 
Decision Notice 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
FOI request Potential distress: Disclosure of the data re: removal of the 
tattoos, from what body part etc. would have 'significant 
impact on the mental health of data subjects'. 
ICOD2 21 August 
2013, FOI 
Decision 
Notice re: 
Norfolk and 
Suffolk 
Probation 
Trust 
UK ICO 
Decision Notice 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
FOI request Potential: distress: Disclosure of the data re: complaints 
made about an NHS nurse, which would include info on her 
physical health would: 'Disclosure of this type of information 
is likely to have a highly distressing effect on the data 
subject." 
ICOD3 17 January 
2013, FOI 
Decision 
Notice re: East 
Herts Council 
UK ICO 
Decision Notice 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
FOI request Potential distress (detriment to physical health): Disclosure 
of data re: why the CEO left office, which was for health 
reasons, would increase the risk "to causing damage or 
distress to the health of the data subject." "A real risk that 
disclosure of the information might exacerbate the former 
Chief Executive’s health situation and have a detrimental 
effect upon her well- being." 
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ICOD4 5 March 2012, 
FOI Decision 
Notice re: Dr 
Barbara Allan, 
Dr Matthew 
Joslin, and Dr 
Tim Worden 
("The Docs") 
UK ICO 
Decision Notice 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
FOI request Potential distress and damage to institution: Disclosure of 
the data re: the Dr's absences would ‘likely to have four 
adverse effects. Firstly, it would erode their trust and 
confidence in their fellow partners doing what it said it 
would with their personal HR data. Secondly, it would reveal 
information from which one can derive information about 
the health or otherwise of the individual and where the 
default expectation is that health data would be kept 
confidential, the individual would have their expectations 
not recognised. Thirdly, the practice considered that the 
data subject would not expect that this information would 
be provided to enable the complainant to pursue them 
further. Fourthly, the practice explained that it was based in 
a small community and the wider dissemination of the 
information could lead to speculation about the doctor’s 
Fitness to Practice, whether accurate or not.’ 
EUC1 Z v Finland 
(19970 25 
EHRR 371, 405 
at para 95 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
By press/media: A Court of Appeal judgment 
revealed Z’s identity (wife of X, on trial for rape and 
manslaughter) and HIV-positive status without any 
‘cogent’ reasons. (see para 113 of the judgment). 
Whilst ultimately the identity of Z and her HIV-
positive status was disclosed by Finland’s largest 
newspaper, this made possible by the Finnish Court 
of Appeal who faxed the newspaper their 
judgment which confirmed her identity and HIV-
status. 
Individual distress and potential harm to broader public 
interest: ‘The publication of the information concerned gave 
rise to a violation of the applicant's right to respect for her 
private and family life as guaranteed by art 8.' (see para 113 
of judgment) Furthermore, ‘The court [found] it established 
that the applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary 
damage as a result of the disclosure of her identity and 
medical condition in the Court of Appeal's judgment. Finally, 
the Court recognised the great potential for harm to broader 
public interests – disclosure of such sensitive health data can 
‘…discourage persons from seeking diagnosis or treatment 
and thus undermine any preventive efforts by the 
community to contain the pandemic.’ (para 96) 
EUC2 Earl Spencer v 
United 
Kingdom 
(1998) 25 
EHRR 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
By press/media: the publication of private 
information about the applicants' marriage and 
medical condition and photographs taken with a 
telephoto lens (relating to bulimia and mental 
health problems of Countess Spencer - photos of 
her on grounds of private health clinic). 
Individual distress: emotional and physical -  “great personal 
distress” caused to the applicants, the consequent strain on 
their relationship and the effect on the second applicant's 
treatment. 
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EUC3 McGinley and 
another v 
United 
Kingdom 
[1998] ECtHR 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Non-use of data For organisational objectives: Withholding of 
documents, which would have helped applicants 
that were stationed on or near Christmas Island at 
the time of nuclear tests in 1958. This info would 
have helped them ascertain whether there was a 
link between their health problems and exposure 
to radiation. Internal UK government reasons (not-
disclosed) as reason for not disclosing. 
Individual distress: The issue of access to information which 
could either have allayed their fears or enabled them to 
assess the danger to which they had been exposed, was 
sufficiently closely linked to their private and family lives 
within the meaning of Article 8 as to raise an issue under 
that provision; Given the fact that exposure to high levels of 
radiation is known to have hidden, but serious and long-
lasting, effects on health, it is not unnatural that the 
applicants' uncertainty as to whether or not they had been 
put at risk in this way caused them substantial anxiety and 
distress. 
EUC4 MS v Sweden 
(1999) 28 
EHRR 313 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised access Against the wishes of the individual: Patient's 
records disclosed for purpose of assessing social 
security claim. Importantly: ‘It did not follow from 
the fact that she had sought treatment at the clinic 
that she would consent to the data being disclosed 
to the Office’ for the purposes of her workers 
compensation claim. 
Individual distress: The individual suffered individual 
distress because of a violation of her Article 8 Rights (under 
the ECHR) to the respect of private life. The medical records 
contained highly sensitive and personal data regarding a 
previous abortion, and were used for an entirely different 
purpose, without her consent. 
EUC5 Armoniene v 
Lithuania (App 
no 36919/02) - 
[2008] ECHR 
36919/02 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
By press/media: The respondent state's biggest 
daily national newspaper published an article 
which stated that the applicant's husband was HIV-
positive and that he was the father of two children 
by another woman who was also suffering from 
AIDS. 
Individual distress and financial harm:  The family had to 
move from their village. The newspaper article had 
humiliated the husband and the publication of information 
about his private life had caused him non-pecuniary damage, 
had an impact on his health, and a negative influence on his 
family life and his reputation as well as restricting his 
family's opportunities to interact with others. He died and 
wife brought suit based on such harms/damages. 
EUC6 Biriuk v 
Lithuania (App 
no 23373/03) 
[2008] ECHR 
23373/03 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Maladministration: Press disclosed HIV/AIDS 
status of woman, which was confirmed by hospital 
staff. 
Individual distress: Publication had humiliated her and 
caused her significant non-pecuniary damage. 
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EUC7 S and Marper 
v United 
Kingdom 
(2009) 48 
EHRR 50 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised 
retention 
Maladministration: DNA profiles and fingerprints 
were being retained indefinitely without regard to 
the nature or gravity of the offence with which the 
individual was originally suspected of or their age; 
there existed only limited possibilities for an 
acquired individual to have their data removed 
from the nationwide database or destroyed. 
Individual distress: 'The retention of the first applicant's 
data was to be considered especially harmful given his 
special situation as a minor and the importance of his 
development and integration in society'. 
EUC8 Szuluk v 
United 
Kingdom (App. 
No. 36936/05) 
- [2009] All ER 
(D) 02 (Jun) 
(ECtHR) 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: 
Requirement that claimant's medical 
correspondence be read by prison medical officer 
Individual distress and suboptimal clinical care:  He was 
concerned that his attempts to confirm that he was 
receiving adequate treatment in hospital might be regarded 
by the prison medical officer as criticism and that this might 
inhibit his relationship with his external medical specialist. 
The applicant further contended that there was an obvious 
risk that monitoring of medical correspondence would 
inhibit what a prisoner conveyed, thereby harming the 
quality of advice received. 
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EUC9 I v Finland 
(2009) 48 
EHRR 31 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised access Insufficient safeguards: Early in 1992, the applicant 
began to suspect that her colleagues were aware 
of her HIV positive status. She was a nurse at the 
same hospital she was receiving treatment from. At 
that time, hospital staff had free access to the 
patient register, which contained information on 
patients' diagnoses and treating doctors. Thus, the 
claim was based on the failure of the hospital ‘to 
guarantee the security of her data against 
unauthorised access, or, in Convention terms, a 
breach of the State's positive obligation to secure 
respect for her private life by means of a system of 
data protection rules and safeguards.’ (para 37) 
(However, ‘The Court of Appeal found that the 
applicant's testimony about the events, such as her 
colleagues' hints and remarks beginning in 1992 
about her HIV infection, was reliable and credible. 
However, it did not find firm evidence that her 
patient record had been unlawfully consulted (see 
para 15). 
Individual distress: The Court awarded I ERU 8,000 for 
individual distress caused by the need to change her place of 
work and the fact that the rumours about her HIV infection 
had affected her son's life. (She claimed for financial 
damages as well, but these were not awarded – these claims 
included compensation for the hospital ‘refusing’ to renew 
her employment contract and thus her subsequent 
unemployment; having to move house because of the 
rumors regarding her HIV status).  
EUC10 Gillberg v 
Sweden (App 
no 41723/06) 
[2010] 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Non-use of data Misinterpretation of legal obligations: Professor 
was a university professor (G) and complained that 
his conviction for misuse of office was in breach of 
the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
art.8 and art.10. G was director of the university's 
Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. He 
had refused requests from a sociologist (K) and a 
paediatrician (E) for access to confidential 
information, which formed part of a research 
project, claiming that he had promised absolute 
confidentiality to the families of the children 
concerned. 
No discussion on harm: Rather, a discussion about 
interference with rights – the non-use of data would impinge 
on K and E's rights under art.10, as granted by the Court of 
Appeal, to receive information in the form of access to the 
documents concerned and, under art.6, to have the court's 
judgments implemented. 
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EUC11 P and another 
v Poland (App. 
No. 57375/08) 
[2012] ECHR 
57375/08 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Maladministration: P had become pregnant after 
being brutally raped. She made an early decision to 
terminate the pregnancy. When seeking an 
abortion, the hospital issued a press release 
regarding her situation, causing P's circumstances 
to become national news. 
Individual distress and suboptimal clinical care: P became 
subject of national news media frenzy. She received texts 
from various unknown third parties harassing her. Upon 
discharge from the hospital, she was harassed by onlookers 
waiting outside. She was eventually forced to have the 
abortion 500km from home. 
EUC12 Mitkus v Latvia 
(App. No. 
7259/03) 
[2012] ECHR 
7259/03 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
By media/press:  The newspaper could have 
informed the public about the pending proceedings 
concerning the alleged negligence of the medical 
staff at Central Prison without publishing his 
picture, without the article losing much of its 
informative value, if any at all. 
Individual distress:  the respondent and requesting non-
pecuniary damages for moral and psychological harm caused 
to him when Rīgas Balss published the above-mentioned 
article, which included his photo in which he was fully 
recognisable. The applicant has furthermore indicated to the 
Court that as a result of the publication of the disputed 
article he was ostracised by other prisoners because of the 
information about his HIV infection 
EUC13 Avilkina and 
others v Russia 
(App. No. 
1585/09) - 
[2013] ECHR 
1585/09 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unauthorised 
disclosure 
Without consent of individuals/against wishes: 
Prosecutor's office instructing medical institutions 
to report incidents of refusal of transfusion of 
blood by members of religious organisation – 
information contained in applicants' medical files - 
without their consent. 
No discussion of harm: However discussion re: lack of 
proportionality and consideration of individual rights - the 
means employed by the prosecutor in conducting the inquiry 
did not need to be so oppressive for the applicants. There 
were options, other than ordering the disclosure of 
confidential medical information, available to the prosecutor 
to follow up on the complaints lodged with his office. In 
particular, he could have tried to obtain the applicants' 
consent for the disclosure and/or questioned them in 
relation to the matter. Nevertheless, the prosecutor chose 
to order the disclosure of the confidential medical 
information without giving the applicants any notice or an 
opportunity to object or to agree 
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EUC14 Ageyevy v 
Russia - (2013) 
34 BHRC 449 
LexisNexis EU 
Case Law 
Databases 
Unlawful disclosure Maladministration: 
The hospital and health authorities disclosed to third 
parties data concerning G that was medical, 
personal and sensitive, including his name, 
photographs containing, among other things, 
information of a medical character, and his detailed 
medical diagnosis and also authorised direct access 
of TV crews to G who was only three years old at the 
time and was not accompanied by his parents. Given 
that the authorities did not seek from the media 
involved any guarantees concerning the non-
disclosure of G's identity, and in view of the 
subsequent coverage of the events, which included 
the widespread dissemination of all of the 
mentioned data, the relevant information was in 
fact released to the public at large. 
Individual distress and financial harm: The applicants 
claimed compensation in the amount of 140,940 euros (EUR) 
in respect of their alleged pecuniary losses because of the 
loss of the first applicant’s job in a bank, which allegedly 
resulted from the publication in the media of the events in 
the present case. The Court considers that the applicants 
must have sustained stress and frustration as a result of the 
violations found. Making its assessment on an equitable 
basis, the Court awards the first applicant EUR 25,000 and 
the second applicant EUR 30,000 in respect of non-pecuniary 
damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 
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Table 24: Social media evidence of health or biomedical data abuse internationally 
70 incidents according to Twitter search criteria – overlaps with soft evidence highlighted in light blue, with hard evidence highlighted in dark blue. 
Incident 
No. 
Date Location Abuse Type Abuse Cause Harm 
TW1 
(Also on 
Ma18) 
25-Mar-14 US Technical security failure Maladministration: Stanford hospital and clinics and 
one of its former contractors allowed the medical 
information of 20,000 emergency room patients to be 
posted online for nearly a year. 
No direct mention of harm: However, there is a 
possibility for a $4.1M settlement, equating to victims 
receiving $100/each. 
TW2 25-Mar-14 USA Loss of hardware: Human error: A computer flash drive containing limited 
patient information on 586 children treated at Orlando 
Health's Arnold Palmer Medical Center was misplaced 
and treated as a data security breach. 
No direct mention of harm: however began contacting 
affected patients; they say no evidence that data was 
used. 
TW3 21-Mar-14 US Unauthorised disclosure Human error: Marian Regional Medical Center (part of 
Dignity Health) in California recently notified patients 
that electronic files with “limited patient information” 
was sent to the wrong contracted health insurance plan 
during the first week of March. The agent who received 
it promptly notified MRMC and the file was sent back. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW4 21-Mar-14 US Theft Third Party: The University of California San Francisco 
reports data breach after desktop computers stolen – 
personal & medical info for 9,000 patients 
compromised.  
Potential for financial harm: 'Information and assistance 
is being offered to those affected, and credit monitoring 
is being offered to those whose Social Security numbers 
were involved, officials said.' 
TW5 21-Mar-14 US Technical security failure Third Party: The number of UPMC employees that have 
been affected by a recent data breach at the University 
of Pittsburgh Medical Center now stands at 322. The 
breach allowed someone to use the employees' and 
patients’ personal information to electronically file 
fraudulent income tax returns.   
Individual distress and financial harm: Fraudulent tax 
returns filed based on information hacked, resulting in 
detriment to individual's credit rating. 
TW6 19-Mar-14 US Technical Security Failure  Third Party: Someone hacked the computers of a state-
licensed provider of services to the developmentally 
disabled and stole Social Security numbers and medical 
information for about 9,700 clients. 
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
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TW7 19-Mar-14 US Theft Third Party: The Dec. 2009 theft of laptops belonging to 
AvMed, a Florida-based health insurer, exposed the 
patient records of tens of thousands of its customers. 
Several victims later filed a putative class action lawsuit 
against AvMed. 
No harm: The victims of data breach ' suffered no direct 
losses or identity theft from the breach but nevertheless 
accused AvMed of negligence, breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment' and 
were still awarded a $3M settlement - 'The settlement is 
believed to be the first in which victims of a data breach 
are compensated without having to show they suffered 
any losses from the theft of their personal data'. 
TW8 19-Mar-14 US Technical security failure Maladministration: A company that provides medical 
transcription services has agreed to settle Federal 
Trade Commission charges that its inadequate data 
security measures unfairly exposed the personal 
information of thousands of consumers on the open 
Internet, in some instances including consumers’ 
medical histories and examination notes. 
Potential for individual harm (distress and financial): 
FTC brings such claims on the basis of the company 
being involved in fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair 
business practices. Can assume individual or financial 
distress because of nature of information lost: the data 
was indexed by a major internet search engine and were 
publicly available to anyone using the search engine.  
Some of the files contained notes from medical 
examinations of children and other highly sensitive 
medical information, such as information about 
psychiatric disorders, alcohol use, drug abuse, and 
pregnancy loss. 
TW9 19-Mar-14 US Theft Third Party: Los Angeles county and its contractor, 
experienced a theft of medical data on 165,000 
patients. The data may have included patients' names, 
Social Security numbers, and medical and billing 
information, birth dates, addresses and diagnoses. The 
data was stolen from a company hired by LA county to 
handle billing and collections. The suit alleges the 
company and the county did not notify affected 
patients in a timely fashion and that more stringent 
protection of private data is required.  
Individual distress and potential financial harm: 
individuals credit at risk - furthermore considered 
harmful that county did not notify victims. 
TW10 18-Feb-14 US Technical security failure Third Party: Minnesota's Olmsted Medical Center 
recently began notifying more than 500 former 
employees that their personal information may have 
been exposed via hacker. 
Potential for financial harm: no evidence of harm, but 
victims offered credit monitoring. 
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TW11 06-Feb-14 US Loss of paper files Human error: Some missing operating room schedules 
may have resulted in the disclosure of patient 
information for 874 people. 
Potential for financial harm: no evidence of harm, but 
victims offered credit monitoring. 
TW12 24-Jan US Technical security failure Maladministration: On December 12, Sidney Regional 
Medical Center learned that a previous version of their 
web site had been stored on a server without proper 
settings to block indexing by search engines. The 
mistake was discovered by a former applicant who was 
Googling her own name. 
Potential for financial harm: no evidence of harm, but 
victims offered credit monitoring. 
TW13 27-Dec-13 US Technical security failure Maladministration: A LabMD spreadsheet with Social 
Security numbers, medical codes and other 
information, about more than 9,000 people, was found 
on an online file-sharing network last year. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW14 14-Dec-13 US Technical security failure Maladministration: A dental clinic discovered 1,000s of 
their patients’ data online. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW15 04-Dec-13 US Theft  Self-gain: A former Owensboro Medical Health System 
(of Kentucky) employee, Ilene W. Bullington, sold 
patient information from February 2010 and August 
2012. 
Financial harm:  She used patient information such as 
names, birth dates and Social Security numbers to obtain 
financial loans that fluctuated from $300 to $7,000 
(using other's identities). 
TW16 24-Nov-13 US Technical security failure  Third Party: A teenager was suspected of hacking into 
the Sachem school district computer system, accessing 
student records that included Social Security numbers 
and confidential medical information. Calicchio posted 
the information on a website provided by 1Apps.com, 
and Sachemunspun.com, a community forum. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW17 06-Nov-13 US Theft Maladministration: Two laptops from an administrative 
office of the hospital group AHMC Healthcare Inc. 
("AHMC") in Alhambra, California were stolen. This 
compromised the health data of approximately 729,000 
individuals. Although the laptops were password 
protected, they were unencrypted. 
Potential for financial harm: they suggest credit 
monitoring by victims. 
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TW18 18-Oct-13 US Theft Maladministration: A data breach at the University of 
California Los Angeles (UCLA) exposed the personal 
information of more than 16,000 patients of the UCLA 
Health System. In September 2011, an external hard 
drive containing personal information of 16,288 UCLA 
patients was stolen from the home of a doctor working 
with the UCLA Faculty Group. The records dated from 
July 2007 through July 2011. The patient information 
on the lost hard drive was encrypted, but a piece of 
paper that had the password to decode the data also 
went missing. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW19 28-Sep-13 US Theft Maladministration: A laptop with unencrypted patient 
information was stolen from the Audiology Department 
at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center. The laptop was 
used for hearing screenings and as such, contained 
patients’ name, medical record number, date of birth, 
gender, date of service, and “brainwaves from testing”. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW20 07-Sep-13 US Theft Maladministration: Four unencrypted computers were 
stolen, which contained personal information on four 
million individuals. Included health insurance data, 
medical diagnoses and record numbers. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW21 12-Jul-13 US Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: The private 
information of nearly 3,000 Long Beach Memorial 
Medical Center patients may have been breached by an 
employee, including insurance information and the 
reason for admission. 
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
TW22 27-Jun-13 US Technical Security Failure Third Party: Florida's Sight and Sun Eyeworks Gulf 
Breeze recently began notifying 9,000 patients that 
their personal information had been accessed 
inappropriately. In a statement on its Web site, Sight 
and Sun stated that patients' names, addresses, Social 
Security numbers and medical records were accessed 
and copied. 
No direct mention of harm: Although, former 
employees Dr. Suzanne M. Day and Lynette Bramlett 
took patient data with them in order to solicit patients 
when they left to work for a competing optometry 
office.  
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TW23 
(Also in 
ICOM4) 
19-Jun-13 UK Unauthorised disclosure Human error: North Staffordshire Combined 
Healthcare NHS Trust was fined £55,000 following a 
breach of the Data Protection Act that resulted in the 
exposure of three patients' medical information. 
Employees of the Trust mistakenly sent 3 faxes to 
members of the public, including details on physical 
and mental health. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW24 26-May-13 US Non-secure disposal of 
paper files 
Maladministration: El Centro Regional Medical Center 
(ECRMC) was notified that the x-rays ECRMC had 
provided to a trusted vendor for digitization and 
destruction were missing from a storage warehouse 
and may not have been properly destroyed. 
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
TW25 
(Also in 
B4) 
25-Apr-13 UK Non-secure disposal of 
paper files 
Maladministration: An investigation has been launched 
into how confidential medical records were found in a 
garden in Londonderry. The Western Health Trust has 
confirmed that the documents contained "sensitive 
personal information" and said it had reported the 
breach to the Information Commissioner's office. The 
details of 13 women and four men were on eight A4 
sheets of papers," he said. "There are a few lines on 
each and they go into intimate detail about their 
treatment, condition and their past history." 
No direct mention of harm 
TW26 13-Apr-13 US Theft Maladministration: Oregon Health & Science University 
reported that a surgeon's unencrypted laptop was 
stolen from a vacation rental home in Hawaii. The 
stolen laptop contained medical record numbers, types 
and dates of surgeries, names of surgeons of 4,022 
patients, and (worst of all) the Social Security numbers 
for at least 17 confirmed patients. 
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
TW27 12-Apr-13 US Loss of hardware: Maladministration: The William Jennings Bryan Dorn 
VA Medical Center in Columbia, S.C., has informed 
7,405 patients about a recent data breach. The breach 
involves an unprotected laptop containing patient 
names, birth dates, respiratory test results and partial 
Social Security numbers. The laptop is yet to be found.  
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
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TW28 08-Apr-13 US Technical security failure Maladministration: Thousands of patients of a New 
York state hospital had their medical records exposed 
when they were left unprotected on a third party 
server for several months.  
Potential for individual distress: Auditors concluded 
that some patient records may have been accessed or 
downloaded by intruders, thus with potential for 
individual distress. 
TW29 29-Mar-13 US Loss of hardware: Maladministration: The University of Mississippi 
Medical Center is notifying patients, who visited 
between 2008 and January 2013, that their health 
information may have been stored on a laptop 
computer that's "missing".  Apparently, the device was 
not protected with laptop encryption like AlertBoot, 
which may have been a result of the laptop being "a 
shared device, used by clinicians". 
No direct mention of harm: 'UMMC has received no 
notifications from current or former patients regarding 
any unauthorized use of protected health or personal 
information pertaining to this breach.'  
TW30 20-Mar-13 US Unauthorised access Maladministration: The electronic medical records 
provider, Lawrence Melrose Medical Electronic Record 
of Melrose Massachusetts, experienced a data security 
incident in which an employee of a medical practice 
gained unauthorized access to patients’ personal 
information at six different healthcare facilities. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW31 10-Mar-13 US Non-secure disposal of 
paper files 
Maladministration: A dumpster full of medical 
documents was found after a medical practice moved 
premises. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW32 03-Dec-12 US Loss of hardware: Maladministration: The loss of an unencrypted 
handheld Palm device in the Continuum Home Infusion 
unit of the University of Virginia Medical Center has 
resulted in a data breach of protected health 
information. More than 1,800 patients or potential 
patients were affected. 
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
TW33 02-Dec-12 US Theft Maladministration: A company-owned laptop was 
stolen from the locked car of an Alere employee. The 
laptop contained patients' electronic health records, 
which include data such as: Names; Addresses; Dates of 
birth; Social Security numbers; and Diagnostic codes. 
Alere did not indicate whether the information was 
encrypted or if the laptop was password-protected. 
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
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TW34 30-Nov-12 US Unauthorised retention of 
data 
Self-gain: A former resident physician kept patient lists 
and notes regarding patients in violation of UAMS' 
policy after leaving the facility on June 3, 2010. The 
documents contained patient names, partial addresses, 
medical record numbers, dates of birth, ages, locations 
of care, dates of service, diagnoses, medications, 
surgical and other procedure names, as well as lab 
results. 
No direct mention of harm – However because the 
former EE used patient records in a court case against 
the former ER, documents were disclosed to 3rd parties 
and were at risk of being in the public court record. 
TW35 06-Oct-12 Zambia Theft Third Party: Thousands of cancer patients’ lives were 
put at risk following the looting of computers that store 
vital data for them at the Cancer Diseases Hospital, a 
heist that has shocked medical personnel. Theft of 
computer equipment included data storage devices. 
Individual distress and provision of suboptimal care: 
Operations at the hospital, where 350 patients are daily 
attended to, have screeched to a halt following the 
theft. 
TW36 27-Sep-12 UK Unauthorised disclosure Human error: A member of the public asked the CPS 
under the FOIA to provide figures for costs and 
resources used in the Metropolitan Police’s Operation 
Malone – the generic title given to investigations 
following a series of demonstrations by students 
against tuition fees in 2010 and 2011. FOI requester 
received a spreadsheet containing the names of 299 
demonstrators arrested not just through Malone, but 
also during the disturbances and later under another 
operation, code-named Brontide - included details of 
defending solicitors, plus some personal observations, 
including comment on individual medical issues. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW37 21-Sep-12 US Theft Maladministration: A doctor's unencrypted laptop was 
stolen while he was traveling abroad in 2010. 
No direct mention of harm: "Given the lack of patient 
harm discovered in this investigation, Mass. Eye and Ear 
was disappointed with the size of the fine, especially 
since the independent specialty hospital's annual 
revenue is very small compared to other much larger 
institutions that have received smaller fines." 
 188 
Incident 
No. 
Date Location Abuse Type Abuse Cause Harm 
TW38 12-Sep-12 UK Loss of paper files Maladministration: Confidential paperwork about 
mental health patients – including personal details, 
medical records and care plans – was found ‘blowing 
around’ a city centre street in Sheffield. 
Individual distress and institutional harm: “A big issue 
for people receiving treatment for mental health issues 
is paranoia about how their personal details will be 
handled - and something like this could make them 
reluctant to seek help or co-operate with health 
workers.' (Diminish public trust in mental health 
profession + individual distress) 
TW39 
(Also in 
ICOM11) 
12-Jul-12 UK Unauthorised disclosure Human error: At St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust in 
London, a vulnerable individual’s sensitive medical 
details were sent to the wrong address. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW40 21-Jun-12 US Theft Self-gain: Over a 17-month period, Laurie Napper used 
her position at the hospital to gain access to patients’ 
names, addresses and Medicare numbers to sell their 
information.  
No direct mention of harm 
TW41 16-May-12 US Technical security failure Third Party: A server at the DTS was breached and 
personal information on around 780,000 Medicaid 
recipients, including social security numbers of around 
280,000 Utah citizens. Hackers started downloading 
data from the server. 
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
TW42 01-May-12 UK Unauthorised disclosure Human error: Ayrshire woman whose records were 
transferred from her GP surgery without her 
knowledge. Mary Corbey's records were mistakenly 
sent to a doctors' practice in Manchester. The error 
meant she was removed as a patient at her own 
surgery. Ms Corbey only discovered the mistake when 
she went to the doctor with symptoms consistent with 
cervical cancer. She found she had been removed from 
screening programmes years earlier. 
Individual distress: emotional and physical.  
TW43 25-Apr-12 US Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: The South 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services 
(SCDHHS) discovered on April 10 that an employee of 
the state's Medicaid program had transferred personal 
information of 228,435 Medicaid beneficiaries to his 
personal email account. 
No direct mention of harm 
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TW44 24-Apr-12 US Theft Third Party: A man brought in several air force medical 
records dating from 2003 to 2007 that he found in his 
estranged wife's closet on April 17. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW45 19-Apr-12 UK Theft Third Party: A system used by Pharmacyrepublic 
Limited, to record the medication handed out to 
around 2000 patients, was stolen from one of its 
premises. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW46 30-Jan-12 UK Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: An ex-
girlfriend probed her ex-boyfriend’s medical records 
while working at Derriford Hospital. 
Individual distress - emotional, physical and financial 
harm: 'The court heard the data protection breach and 
its aftermath significantly affected Mr Grinyer's mental 
health, aggravating an existing paranoid personality 
disorder, causing severe stress, anxiety and a 
breakdown.' Led to loss of earnings and increased 
medical costs. 
TW47 24-Jan-12 US Unauthorised access Self-gain: An Atlanta, Georgia man was sentenced 
earlier this month to one year and one month in prison 
for intentionally accessing a computer of a competing 
medical practice, and taking personal information of 
the patients. The individual made this improper access 
in order to send marketing materials to patients at the 
other practice.  
Individual distress: harassed by marketing. 
TW48 
(Also in 
G16) 
31-Oct-11 UK Non-secure disposal of 
paper files 
Maladministration: In February 2011, Warwickshire 
NHS Trust disposed of records relating to the treatment 
of 18 patients in a communal waste bin at a residential 
apartment block. At University Hospitals Coventry in 
May 2011, a member of the public discovered details 
relating to a patient’s sensitive medical procedures and 
test results. These were “allegedly found in a bin 
outside Coventry University Hospital”, the ICO said. 
Potential Individual distress: "The Commissioner has 
taken into account the fact that a proportion of the 
personal data in question related to medical conditions 
and could potentially result in distress being caused to 
the individuals concerned." 
TW49 01-Oct-11 US Theft Third Party: Backup tapes from an electronic health 
care record were stolen from a data contractor's car 
containing personal and medical records of military 
patients and their families. 
No direct mention of harm 
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TW50 22-Aug-11 US Technical security failure Maladministration: Southern California Medical-Legal 
Consultants, which represents doctors and hospitals 
seeking payment from patients receiving workers' 
compensation, put their records on a website that it 
believed only employees could use. 
Individual distress and potential for financial harm 
(identity theft): one victim of the data breach - '"I'm 
totally disgusted about everything," he said, calling the 
breach "another kick in the stomach." 
TW51 10-Aug-11 UK Non-secure disposal of 
paper files 
Maladministration: Highly confidential medical files 
and records were found dumped in the grounds of an 
abandoned nursing home in Bradford. Included care 
plans, detailed health assessments and poignant 
photos of residents who had lived there until its sudden 
closure in 2008. 
Harm to institution: community distressed at cavalier 
way abandoned site treated and personal data left – 
diminished trust in NHS. 
TW52 
(Also in 
Ti09) 
03-Aug-11 Ireland Unauthorised disclosure Maladministration: Irish hospital outsourced 
transcription to the Philippines of medical records and 
GP letters. The identities of patients may have been 
disclosed and not all records were returned back. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW53 19-Apr-11 UK Non-secure disposal of 
paper files 
Maladministration: Piles of documents revealing 
student names, photographs, addresses, telephone 
numbers, dates of birth, and some files exposing 
sensitive medical information, were found in bin bags 
at City College. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW54 17-Mar-11 US Loss of hardware: Maladministration: Nine server drives and thus the 
data of 2 million customers, employees and health care 
providers were lost. IBM, which managed the 
company's IT infrastructure, informed Health Net that it 
was unable to locate server drives. 
Potential for financial harm: potential for identity theft. 
TW55 04-Jan-11 US Non-secure disposal of 
paper files 
Maladministration: 50 boxes of personnel records – 
with medical information – were found dumped 
outside Plano library after a company went out of 
business. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW56 22-Oct-10 US Loss of hardware: Maladministration: Keystone Mercy Health Plan and 
AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan lost a computer flash 
drive containing the names, addresses, and personal 
health information of 280,000 people. 
Potential financial harm (identity theft): "What's tragic 
is that this is a particularly vulnerable group of people," 
Peel said. "They tend to be vulnerable to identity theft, 
vulnerable to discrimination." Medicaid recipients are 
low-income people. 
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TW57 22-Oct-10 US Non-secure disposal of 
paper files 
Maladministration: Hundreds of folders containing 
medical records and Social Security Numbers were 
found at the Norman Recycling Centre. The files appear 
to be associated with two medical practices in the 
Norman, Oklahoma area. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW58 16-Oct-10 US Theft Third Party: UC Davis Medical Centre officials said 
financial documents and other data containing 
information about 900 patients were stolen in an 
August burglary of a West Sacramento courier service. 
Potential financial harm: potential for identity theft. 
TW59 07-Jul-10 US Loss of hardware: Human error: In November 2009, Health Net reported 
the loss of a portable external hard drive that contained 
seven years of medical and personal data on about 1.5 
million members across four states.  
Potential for financial harm (identity theft): In court, 
damages awarded in 'Two years of credit monitoring; $1 
million of identity theft insurance; and Reimbursement 
for the costs of security freezes'. 
TW60 11-Jun-10 US Unauthorised access For self-gain: A hospital was fined for a radiologist 
accessing the records of 177 patients with no "clinical 
reason to do so".  The radiologist "lost a baby because 
she was on drugs and wanted to see records of 
obstetrics to see what the pregnant mothers did to get 
help".  
No direct mention of harm 
TW61 11-Jun-10 US Unauthorised disclosure Maladministration: A hospital employee allowed a 
friend into a restricted area, where the visitor could 
overhear patients discussing their situation. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW62 11-Jun-10 US Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: One of the 
seven people who accessed the record of the patient 
did so because "she used to know the patient”, thus 
without legitimate basis. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW63 11-Jun-10 US Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: Seventeen 
security guards accessed the medical records of 33 
patients without legitimate reason.  
No direct mention of harm 
TW64 11-Jun-10 US Unauthorised access Without clinical or legitimate justification: Accessed 
patient information because they were "curious." 
No direct mention of harm 
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TW65 11-Jun-10 US Unauthorised disclosure Human error: Records were sent to a lawyer by 
accident.  A patient sues the hospital.  Lawyer 
representing the patient asked for test results for his 
case. Hospital sends the results, as well as the results 
for three other people. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW66 07-Apr-10 US Theft Third Party: Two laptops were stolen containing 
sensitive health information about more than 5,000 
patients in the John Muir hospital system.  
No direct mention of harm 
TW67 04-Feb-10 US Theft Third Party: University of California, San Francisco 
medical school are in the process of notifying 4,310 
patients that some of their personal information may 
have been exposed after a laptop was stolen from an 
employee in late November 2009. The information 
included patients' names, medical record numbers, 
ages, and clinical information, according to a UCSF 
statement. 
No direct mention of harm 
TW68 27-Jan-10 US Theft Third Party: BlueCross Blue Shield Insurance company 
had 57 hard drives stolen from their training facility. 
The hard drives contained audio and video files with 
identifying information for up to 500,000 members. 
Potential for financial harm: they are offering credit-
monitoring services to victims. 
TW69 03-Nov-09 US Technical security failure Third Party: A computer server storing data for a state 
mammography registry had been "targeted in a 
computer hack". When the staff discovered the breach, 
all data on the server was removed. The Registry 
collected data from participating mammography 
practices to advance knowledge about the most 
effective ways to improve breast cancer detection, 
understand risk factors, guide future research and 
inform policy makers. Post-breach the individual 
discovered that not only were her mammography 
records sent to a registry she didn't even know existed, 
but that her records may have been hacked. 
Individual distress: individual distressed by collection of 
data without her consent or knowledge. Individual 
distressed by lack of explanation for why certain data 
were collected and/or relevant to alleged ‘purpose’ -  
‘How do my Social Security and phone numbers factor 
into "their ability to detect cancer"? “Do even Social 
Security numbers have a greater chance of being 
diagnosed?” “Does an out-of-state phone number 
increase the benefit of early detection?” (Quotes from 
victim) 
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TW70 18-Feb-09 US Technical security failure Third Party: Someone illegally gained access to 17 
computer servers at the University of Alabama in 
November 2008. Info breached include lab data: 
names, addresses, birthdates and Social Security 
numbers of each person who has had lab work, such as 
a blood or urine test, done on the UA campus since 
1994. 
Potential financial harm: potential for identity theft. 
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Table 25: Soft newspaper evidence incidents  
 Article Date Source M Where Incident 
news1.  Mi01 140303 Inquest  Bristol Royal Hospital Six-month delay in treating Samuel Starr (chronic heart disease). Unclear if timely treatment would have 
changed outcome (death).  
news2.  Mi02 140301 Sunday 
People, report  
 Bristol Royal Hospital Hospital failed to declare death of Luke Jenkins, possibly to provide better figures for National Institute for 
Cardiovascular Outcomes Research’s league tables. Sir Bruce Keough ordered lawyer-lead inquiry into Ward 
32.  
news3.  Te09 140123 NAO  NHS England Leeds, 
Oxford, Colchester, 
North West London 
Hospitals Trust, Barnet & 
Chase Farm Hospitals) 
Falsifying waiting times (26% of cases) or keeping incomplete records (31%). Only 43% of cases were data 
properly recorded. Thousands of patients forced to endure long waits because of errors and manipulation of 
data. 
news4.  W01 131119 Health and 
Professions 
Council 
 Welsh Ambulance 
Service 
2 paramedics struck off. 1 failed to properly assess patient, who died. Both fabricated data after death. 
(Victim, 30 yr. old Sarah Thomas – The Telegraph) 
news5.  Te10 
G06 
Te11 
B02 
131114 
131109 
131106 
131105 
 
Inquest/ 
Monitor (Trust 
Watchdog) 
 
 Colchester Uni Hosp Te10 and inquest. Woman died after childbirth. Month before baby skull crushed by excessive use of 
forceps. Special measures for falsifying data. Staff bullied. Police considering whether to launch 
investigation.  
G06 Cancer records falsified to meet national cancer targets; ‘Initially that the records of the 22 patients 
appeared to have been changed ... However, sources close to the investigation now say that 6,000 or more 
patients referred to the Essex hospital between 2010 and 2013 may be caught up in the scandal’. 
Te11 Fiddling cancer waiting lists. Clerical staff had raised concerns with managers that ‘lives could be 
jeopardised’.  
B02 Of 61 cases reviewed, 22 showed people had been placed at risk of receiving care that was unsafe or not 
effective. Hospital bosses failed to investigate allegations. Trust written to 30 patients or next of kin offering 
to review treatment. 
news6.  W02 131004 ICO  Cardiff & Vale Consultant Psychiatrist looses data not securely fastened to bike’s child seat. Included a patient’s mental 
health tribunal report. ICO’s findings also showed that while the member of staff concerned could have 
accessed the file network remotely, thereby negating the need to take the information off-site, insufficient 
steps had been taken to make employees aware of that fact. 
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news7.  Ti04 
Ti06 
Ti10 
Ti14 
130901  
130120 
110612 
091227 
Health Service 
Executive 
 Ireland Ti04 Ireland. 18,000 envelopes (est. 80,000 people) received by HSE requesting Guthrie cards to be retained 
or returned, Supported by SADS Ireland. (Sudden Arrhythmia Death Syndrome or Sudden Adult Death 
Syndrome). 
Ti06 HSE (Ireland) to destroy over 1m blood samples. Doctors oppose this. Dept of Health did not take plea 
of SADS group into account. Samples used to identify criminals, but also badly burnt victims.  
Ti10 Irish families who are victims of SADS urge do not destroy samples on Guthrie cards 
G07 Irish hospital has kept children’s DNA since 1984. Guthrie cards. To date (2009) 1,548,300 samples. 
Anonymity but no consent. 
news8.  G07 130819 ICO  NHS Surrey Failed to check that the data destruction company had destroyed records properly. ICO: ‘one of worst data 
breaches ever seen’: Approx. 3000 patients 
news9.  B03 130621 ICO  CQC and Furness 
General Hospital, 
Senior CQC members in cover-up at Furness General Hospital where 16 babies died. May constitute a 
broader cover-up at CQC. Names of individuals originally redacted due to DPA – hiding behind legislation? 
Jeremy Hunt and ICO intervened due to ‘overriding public interest’.  
news10.  B04 130426 Public 
contacted 
Trust 
 NI Western Trust Records in bin bag thrown into lady’s garden. 17 Older patients, 6 with DNR. Breach reported to ICO 
news11.  S01 130331 ICO  Royal Oldham Hospital 16 Children’s’ notes on street found by member of the public in the street. Guardians informed 
news12.  B05 130215 ICO  NMC/ 
Cardiff 
NMC fined. 3 DVDs for court hearing related to offenses committed by nurse. ‘Highly sensitive’ info and 
evidence from vulnerable children. Contract worker to package and courier to a hearing. On arrival DVDs not 
in package, not encrypted, not found.  
news13.  In04 120930 Imperial 
College 
Healthcare 
NHS Trust 
 Imperial College Lost medical records for thousands of patients awaiting cancer test results. Serious computer problem + 
staff mistakes played havoc with waiting lists. 2,500 forced to wait longer than target, further unknown 
whether 3,000 suspected cases had received tests. Includes 74 cases where patient died. Took five months 
to inform GPs. 73 died, but Trust claimed that no one died waiting for results or care. Fined by NHS North 
West London. External review Terry Hanafin,  ‘serious management failure’.  
news14.  In05 120908 WA member 
asked to 
investigate by 
constituent 
 Wales and probably 
elsewhere 
Medical records sent to DWP and ATOS opened routinely by Royal Mail staff, to pre-sort (if not marked 
private and confidential). Came to light after constituent asked WA member to investigate.  
news15.  G10 120806 ICO  Torbay Care Trust Non-clinical data of 1,000+ NHS staff, but sexual orientation name, DOB, NI number. Reported by public. 
Spreadsheet viewed est. 300 times.  
news16.  B08 
B07 
120721 
120720 
Belfast 
Telegraph 
 Northern Trust, Caseway 
Hospital 
B08 Batch of 8 patient letters emailed to wrong person, handed over to the Belfast Telegraph. Trust did not 
immediately inform patient.  
B07 Received as a reply to her email regarding her mother’s health.   
news17.  H02 120622 FoI – Scottish 
LibDems 
 Scotland 104 cases of records were reported missing or stolen by NHS boards in Scotland last year. It follows the 
discovery last week of confidential patient notes dumped beside a bin in Dundee.  
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news18.  B09 
E10 
In06 
Ma12 
120601 
120601 
120601 
120601 
ICO  Brighton & Sussex B09 Sub-contractor did not decommission hard drives. Sold on eBay, inc HIV details. No charges brought 
against him. Sub-contractor removed 252+ hard drives, 232 offered on eBay. 
E10  ditto 
In6 ditto  
Ma12 ditto 
news19.  W03 120430 ICO  Aneurin Bevan HB Consultant mailed letter to secretary, not enough info to identify patient correctly, and patient’s name was 
misspelt. Report therefore sent to wrong patient.  
news20.  In09 
G28 
Ti08 
120420 
120413 
120311 
BPAS reported 
to police 
 BPAS  In09 Hacker James Jeffery stole 10,000 records from BPAS (British Pregnancy Advisory Service) website. 
Jailed for 2yrs 8mths. BPAS – health records were never at risk. However, since arrest 2,500 attempts to hack 
in, in third cases from North America and from Russia.  
G28 Jeffery member of hacking collective Anonymous.  
Ti08 ditto   
news21.  S03 120415 NHS sources  GE Healthcare - USA NHS technology supplier, GE Healthcare, sent 600,000 records to USA by mistake. Took one year to report 
incident. 
news22.  W04 120228 ICO  Greenbanks Homecare, 
Cardiff 
Details found in alley. Echo newspaper went to check and found more. Why? Greenbanks care home had 
moved, Alzheimer’s Society was sending mail to the old address.  
news23.  S04 120215 NHS 
Tayside/NMC 
 Royal Victoria, Dundee Nurse reads 10 records including friends’, sacked, stuck off 
news24.  S05 111126 Victim 
approached 
NHS Lothian 
 Edinburgh Royal Cleaner allegedly obtained patient details from PC – but hospital spokesperson maintained information was 
on floor plan screen about A&E.  
news25.  G12 
G13 
G14 
111113 
111110 
111109 
FoI - Guardian 
Healthcare 
Network 
Snapshot 
Survey 
 25 biggest Trusts in 
England 
G12 Survey: 72 actions across 16 Trusts. Increase in staff requesting social media guidance.  
G13 Of the 25 Trusts approached, 16 replied. FoI question: How many staff received warnings/dismissed for 
improper use of social media over last three years. Figures for 2008-2009 and October 2011 were compared. 
G14 Lists actions by Trust 
news26.  G16 111027 ICO  UH Coventry & 
Warwickshire 
Lost records twice. 18 records in bin in residential area, details of medical procedure in bin outside hospital 
news27.  Mi05 
In10 
111005 
111004 
ICO  Dartford & Gravesham Mi15 Paper records stored in wrong room, destroyed in error, undiscovered for 3 months 
In10 10,000 archived records destroyed by mistake. Put in disposal area b/c lack of space. Apparently no 
clinical risks 
news28.  S06 110924 ?  Scottish Government Scottish Government sent Inpatient Patient Experience survey to 903 dead patients. 
news29.  In11 110917 ICO  Eastern & Coastal Kent 
PCT.  
CD sent to landfill site in filing cabinet, 1.6 million at risk. Filing cabinet not recovered.  
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news30.  Ti09 110731 DPC  Tallaght Hospital, Ireland Personal medical records sent to Philippines for transcription. Including report from Consultant Psychiatrist, 
information probably to go to the Residential Institutions Redress Board which offers compensation to those 
who were abused in state care. 
news31.  S07 110615 ICO  London Health 
Programmes 
Unencrypted laptop missing, took 3 weeks to report to police. Records of 8.63ml people. One of 20 laptops 
lost or stolen, 8 now recovered.  
news32.  B13 
Ma10 
110218 
120718 
ICO 
 
 Moorgate Primary Care 
Centre 
B13 Nurse gave patient details to boyfriend (Personal Injury firm). Sacked. Pending court hearing stabbed 
daughter, unsuccessful suicide attempt, jailed 12 years. Perpetrator was in a ‘spiral of descent into despair’ 
leading up to the killing, a court heard.  
Ma10 ditto 
news33.  S08 110115 Public  Ross Hall & Nuffield 
Health Hospitals, 
Glasgow 
Paper and Dictaphone tape found in bin. Apparently sent recorded delivery to employee, incorrectly 
delivered. 
news34.  Ti13 100110 DPC  Children’s University 
Hospital Ireland 
2 data servers stolen, potentially 1m patients’ data at risk. Happened in 2007, the organisation saw no need 
to inform public.  
news35.  G23 091115 Coroner  Holloway prison Prisoner’s record falsified by nurse (suspended) after suicide; psychopharmaca not administered. Able to 
enter into EMIS system, but electronic audit revealed that no medication was issued on that day. Inquiry 
open. Prison governor ordered investigation into incident and potential abuse of EMIS.  
news36.  Mi11 091115 ICO  Maidstone & Tunbridge 
Wells 
3 stolen laptops in one month in Kent 
news37.  Ma26 091018 ICO  London Clinic (Harley 
Street) in particular, 
others also targeted 
Data from private hospitals sold illegally to undercover investigators - apparently, from men with access to 
IT companies in India, purportedly records from ‘transcription’ company. 100 records bought and all 
authentic. NHS records were included. ICO now investigating. London Clinic did not send material abroad, 
but had used IT company DGL Information Technologies UK to turn paper into e-records. DGL in turn had 
contract with Scanning And Data Solutions, who provide scanning service. SAD had further subcontracts, 
including one with Pune in India.  
news38.  S14 090507 None   BT led 5-country academic study with the University of Glamorgan. 300 hard-drives were bought at auction. 
One third had sensitive details, including NHS patient notes.  
news39.  E18 090403 Public 
 
 Southern General in 
Glasgow. 
Paper records stored in hospital corridor due to lack of space. Found by public, sent photo to Scottish Labour 
Party. 
news40.  S15 090116 ?  St Mary’s, Imperial 
College Health Care 
Trust 
Unencrypted laptop stolen. Taken from locked office. 14,000 patients records  
news41.  Ti2 140102 FoI - Scottish 
LibDems  
M Scotland 806 breaches in Scotland in 2009-2013. Greater Glasgow & Clyde, folder with 60 patients’ info at a bus stop. 
Patient letters found in hospital grounds.  
news42.  E02 
E09 
130813 
120806 
ICO M Brighton & Sussex  E02 Brighton & Sussex data (patients and staff) on hard drives sold online, incl. 1500 HIV positive individuals 
E09 ditto 
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news43.  E06 130214 FoI – Scottish 
Conservatives 
M NHS Scotland Internet misuse: blogs, Flickr, Facebook friends, and sex with patient contacted thru Facebook. 481 misuses 
since 2010. 30,000 nurses/midwives thought to use social media sites. However, incidence rates include 
swearing in emails. 
news44.  S02 121223 DOH M 9 NHS trusts, St 
Leonard’s Hospital 
Random breaches reported to DOH. How many affected is dealt with locally. Disk with 160,000 children’s 
records failed to arrive at St Leonard’s hospital. No evidence of data in wrong hands 
news45.  B08 120719 FoI - ? M the Five NI Trusts Breakdown of breaches 2008 to date. Including contact details for domestic violence victim given to violent 
ex-partner by social worker by mistake; message left on wrong answer-phone; notes left on car roof and car 
drives away; incorrect email recipient; records left in shop; snooping relative’s blood test results  
news46.  In07 120514 FoI – Channel 
4 Dispatches 
M UK DWP, staff disciplined for unauthorised disclosure. Breaches by DWP. Only 11 ‘serious cases’, but 4.57 cases 
daily. DOH does not collect details for all cases of unlawful access  
news47.  B11 
E13 
G15 
Ma15 
Te19 
111028 
111028 
111028 
111028 
111028 
FoI – Big 
Brother Watch 
M NHS Trusts England B11 July 2008-July 2011: 152 Trusts, at least 806 breaches. 5+ weekly. Social networking sites and 
inappropriately accessed med info of colleagues or family.  
E13 ditto 
G15 23 Social media; 129 details of colleagues/Family; 57 stolen or lost. Request sent to 428 Trusts (UK 
wide), 354 replies, 55 partial only, 74 not replying 
Ma15 802 incidents led to 102 sackings. 
Te19 ditto 
news48.  G18 
G19 
G20 
110504 
110504 
110504 
FoI – Guardian 
Healthcare 
M 71 London NHS 
organisations 
G18 30 Trusts responded. 899 breaches, a fifth by NHS Barnet. Various breaches inc. Memory stick, fax to 
wrong person, patient notes in bin, laptop theft (unencrypted).   
G19 List of 2008-2011 breaches  
G20 Health service staff mainly responsible for breaches, not IT or management. Losing devices or info / 
inappropriate disposal / giving out data in error.  
news49.  Ti12 100523 FoI – Sunday 
Times 
M British hospitals Secret blood database babies. UK since 1984. Examples Central Manchester UHT, Cambridge UHT, Great 
Ormond St, Alder Hey. Police and coroners can apply for access. 
news50.  S10 
Ma23 
100425 
100405 
? M NHS London 
 
S10 7 Trusts in London send patient data to India for processing. Fear of jigsaw attacks. 
Ma23 Data processing to be done in India. Despite pledge from DOH that no personal information would be 
sent overseas.  
news51.  Ma22 
G26 
G08 
100422 
061102 
130801 
Y M Unclear 
  
Ma22 Assorted cases plus Helen Wilkinson. Labelled alcoholic, former NHS manager. Error in coding. 2 year 
battle to amend record. Went on to form organisation The Big Opt Out. 
G26 Included this pre-2009 article, because relevant. 
G08 Follow-up article  
news52.  Ti15 090208 ICO M Inc Hospital Wembley ICO report, 2 computers stolen from hospital, 400 patients 
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news53.  G01 
G02 
Te04 
140225 
140224 
140224 
Health Select 
Committee 
Exclude-not 
breach 
x HSCIC/NHS IT G01 and G02 47m patient records were sold for £2,200 to Staple Inn Actuarial Society. Allegedly data used 
not for individual case assessment, but to examine the costs of critical illness. HSCIC is unable to provide 
information dating back to its predecessor, NHS IT. Financial impact: Higher premiums for <50s for critical 
illness cover.  
Te04 HSCIC admits data should not have been sold by its predecessor.  
news54.  B10 
E11 
In08 
120425 
120425 
120425 
FiO – ViaSat 
Exclude – 
summary 
could be 
double 
X 
M 
Inc. Midlothian Council B10 breakdown of breaches. 730 breaches, of which 178 NHS, 166 LA. 281 human error, 170 hardware/data 
stolen, 108 lost. 433 cases still to be decided. Private firms worst offenders. These figures from ICO include 
private firms.  
E11 ditto  
In08 ditto 
news55.  Ma18 
 
110909 exclude USA x USA Data on commercial website for nearly a year until breach discovered. Stanford Hospital. 20,000 patients’ 
emergency details.  
news56.  In13 110701 ICO 
Exclude – 
position 
statement 
x NHS England ICO says culture change needed. Criticises use of laptops, memory sticks etc. Five named HBs agreed to 
improve. 
 
news57.  G21 110420 FoI – ViaSat 
Exclude 
position 
statement 
x ICO 80% punishments are in the public sector, yet 59% of breaches are in the private sector. Too little 
punishment outside of public sector. List of breaches by sector 
news58.  B14 090809 Question 
posed by DUP 
MLA 
x NI Figures released by NI Health Minister. Nearly 100 medical records lost in 3 years. 8 cases of data breach in 5 
year period 
news59.  E15 
Mi13 
B15 
E16 
G24 
In17 
Ma27 
S13 
Mi12 
090526 
090526 
090525 
090525 
090525 
090525 
090525 
090525 
090329 
ICO 
Exclude - 
summary 
x NHS England 
Preston Prison 
Camden Primary Care 
Trust, Pancras Hospital 
E15 140 breaches. ICO action in 14 cases over last 6 [incorrect] months. GP downloaded 10,000 records onto 
unsecured laptop, later stolen and never retrieved. Memory stick 6,360 inmates Preston prison. Camden 
Primary 2,500 records on PC left beside skip near St Pancras hospital. Not recovered.  
Mi13 140 breaches in 4 months. inc. skip and memory stick 
B15 Breakdown of incidence rates of breach. Memory stick encrypted, but password on post-it on the stick.  
E16 ditto 
G24 Also Cambridge University Hospital memory stick, 741 patients. Found by car wash worker 
In17 Also 2,300 cancer patient unencrypted medical records, theft of desktop PC and laptop, Hull & East 
Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust. 2 laptops stolen from Central Middlesex hospital, desktop PC for Northwick 
Park Hospital after card security system disabled for maintenance. 361 patients’ test results lost.  
Ma27 ditto 
S13 ditto 
M12 ditto 
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news60.  Ma05 130502    Mary Kersewll, former biomedical scientist, asked by Biggleswade Health Centre in Bedfordshire to 
undertake urine test for kidney conditions she did not have. Paid for copy of her patient notes, not at 
surgery when she arrived, altercation and her arrest by police. Wrongly recorded – chronic kidney disease, 
heave smoker, living with Alzheimer’s, had had a hysterectomy and double hip replacement.  
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Table 26: Impact statements from newspaper articles 
 Patient/next-of-kin (10 statements) Citizens’ Voice (6 statements) 
Data loss and falsification/fabrication 
news1/In04 
Imperial College and lost medical records 
for thousands of patients awaiting cancer 
test results. 
 Patients Association ‘this is unacceptable … especially patients 
awaiting cancer results, where every day counts. … It’s unfair on the 
patients to have this stress and worry, and the trust should not have 
tried to hide the fact that they had lost these records’. 
Falsification/fabrication 
news9/B03 
CQC and Furness General Hospital cover-
up 
Bereaved father James Titcombe: ‘”We repeatedly asked why he 
didn’t need antibiotics and were reassured that he seemed fine and 
there was no reason to give them to him.” …He has led the campaign 
for a public inquiry into “serious systemic failures” … and called reports 
of a cover-up at the Care Quality Commission “shocking. …“It 
embodies everything wrong with the culture in the NHS.”’ 
 
news5/Te11 
Colchester University Hospital, where 
cancer records were falsified to meet 
national cancer targets 
The widow of one patient who ‘died of cancer last year …, after being 
denied vital scans and treatment for months, said she was left “crying 
down the phone” to medical staff, pleading for them to treat her 
husband.’  
‘The mother of a four-year-old boy who died of a brain tumour last 
year, after delays in treatment at the hospital … called for “justice” for 
her son, and said no-one at the NHS trust had been held accountable 
for the failings, or even disciplined.’ 
Patients' Association, ‘The target-driven culture and the fact that 
senior people in charge of our patients are prepared to falsify 
patients is deeply worrying. …There is a question of morality here. 
Dishonesty at this level is so serious and those responsible must be 
held to account.’ 
news3/Te09 
NHS England Leeds, Oxford, Colchester, 
North West London Hospitals Trust, 
Barnet & Chase Farm Hospitals) falsifying 
waiting times 
 Patients Association ‘It’s scandalous that hospitals have been able to 
get away with this. NHS trusts have been able to manipulate the 
figures … [which] means that we have no idea how many patients 
have been forced to wait far too long, increasing the risks to their 
health.’ 
news2/Mi02 
Bristol Royal Hospital failed to declare 
death of Luke Jenkins 
Parents believe Trust chiefs ‘covered up deaths and blatantly lied’.  
Human error 
news51/Ma22 
Patient incorrectly labelled alcoholic in GP 
surgery records 
‘I went ballistic. To be labelled an alcoholic – who had seen it? Who 
knows, literally hundreds could have seen it.’ 
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 Patient/next-of-kin (10 statements) Citizens’ Voice (6 statements) 
Ma05 
Patient found major errors in GP patient 
record. Had requested these, not 
available as agreed, arrested by police 
‘I was utterly shocked … it read like a post-mortem, it really did. … It 
could have been really dangerous. Who knows what implications these 
errors could have had if I’d been taken to hospital in an emergency?’ 
 
news19/W03  
Aneurin Bevan Health Board, where 
consultant mailed letter to secretary and 
report therefore sent to wrong patient. 
 Big Brother Watch: ‘It is incredible the Information Commissioner’s 
Office still requires permission from individual NHS bodies to 
investigate if they are failing to protect patient information. ... The 
Commissioner should be able to spot-check any organisation to 
ensure privacy is being taken seriously.’ 
news28/S06 
Scottish Government sent survey to 903 
dead patients. 
 Scotland Patients Association ‘branded the blunder “outrageous” 
and said grieving families deserved an apology. … “Someone should 
take a fall for this because it is absolutely shocking. It is unforgivable 
and I hope they extend an unreserved apology.”’ 
Unauthorised/inappropriate disclosure 
news37/Ma26 
London Clinic (not exclusively), Harley 
Street, data sold illegally to undercover 
investigators 
Nick Dawson, ‘But this is our life – this is your flesh and bones you’re 
talking about here. It’s just one step up from grave-robbing’ 
 
news24/S05 
Edinburgh Royal, cleaner allegedly 
obtained patient details from PC and 
harassed her 
Victim ‘I didn’t know who he was, what he was capable of. I didn’t 
know if he was just going to turn up at the house. It’s just wrong.’ 
 
news16/B08 
Northern Trust, Caseway Hospital and 
patient letters emailed to incorrect 
recipient 
Patient affected ‘This is a complete shock, I know nothing about it … I 
did [undergo the test], but nobody knows that. All that I got done, I hid 
that from my mother. She knows nothing about anything.’ 
 
news14/In05  
Wales and probably elsewhere. Medical 
records sent to DWP and ATOS opened 
routinely by Royal Mail staff 
John Williams. ‘People are sending very personal information and 
have a right to know this is happening; I feel like I’ve been misled.’ 
 
news49/Ti12 
British hospitals and Guthrie cards 
Shami Chakrabarti, (also member of Liberty): ‘“As someone who gave 
consent for my own baby to be tested, I’m horrified that anyone would 
breach my trust, keep my child’s sample for years on end and use it for 
all sorts of extraneous purposes.”’ 
GeneWatch: ‘”Giving mothers a leaflet does not amount to informed 
consent. No one who has just given birth is in a state to understand 
the full implications of how their baby’s genome might be used in 
future.”’ 
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Table 28: Journals, trade magazines and blogs future research search 
Journals 
Website and search terms Hits Relevant Comment 
BMJ Website 
"data AND protection AND health" 12779 - * = truncated after 300 
"harm AND health AND data" 12384 -  
"health AND data" 8802 -  
"biomedical AND data" 281 -  
"genetic AND data" 633 -  
"patient AND record" 3597 -  
"patient AND data" 9028 -  
"patient AND abuse" 1534 -  
Total 49038 -  
Journal of Health Organisation and Management 
"data AND protection AND health" 55 0  
"harm AND health AND data" 45 0  
"health AND data" 381 0  
"biomedical AND data" 28 0  
Total 509 0  
BMJ News 
"data AND protection AND health" 301 6  
"harm AND health AND data" 207 0  
"health AND data" 3043 0*  
"biomedical AND data" 144 2  
"genetic AND data" 152 0  
"health AND record" 1257 0*  
"patient AND record" 992 0*  
"abuse AND patient" 430 3*  
Total 6526 11  
BMJ Comment 
"data AND protection AND health" 462 1*  
"harm AND health AND data" 985 0*  
"biomedical and data" 411 0*  
"genetic AND data" 509 0*  
"health AND record" 2077 1*  
"patient AND record" 2013 0*  
"abuse AND patient" 718 0*  
Total 7175 2 
  
Trade Magazines 
Website and search terms Hits Relevant Comment 
Computer Weekly 
"health AND data AND harm" 97 1  
"health AND data" 100 0  
"biomedical AND data" 89 0  
"genetic AND data" 100 0  
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"health AND record" 100 0  
"patient AND record" 100 2  
"patient AND abuse" 87 0  
Total 673 3  
SC Magazine 
"health AND data AND harm" 6 3  
"health AND data" 161 28† † = truncated after 40 
"biomedical AND data" 2 0  
"genetic AND data" 1 0  
"health AND record" 29 20  
"patient AND record" 16 15  
"patient AND abuse" 1 0  
Total 216 66  
Professional Security 
"health AND data AND harm" 62 1  
"health AND data" 229 8†† † = truncated after 280 
"biomedical AND data" 0 0  
"genetic AND data" 9 0  
"health AND record" 51 0  
"patient AND record" 126 7  
"patient AND abuse" 51 0  
"health AND record" 601 7††† † = truncated after 300 
Total 1129 23 
  
Blogs 
Website and search terms Hits Relevant Comment 
Privacy International 
"harm AND health AND data” 3 0 
 "health AND data" 28 0 
 "biomedical AND data" 0 0 
 "genetic AND data" 6 0 
 "health AND record" 5 0 
 "patient AND record" 1 0 
 "abuse AND patient" 1 0 
 Total 44 0 
 Science and Society (Duke) 
"harm AND health AND data" 1 0 
 "health AND data" 4 0 
 "biomedical AND data" 0 0 
 "genetic AND data" 7 0 
 "health AND record" 5 0 
 "patient AND record" 2 0 
 "abuse AND patient" 1 0 
 Total 20 0 
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Datonomy  
"harm AND health AND data" 5 0 
 "health AND data" 30 2 
 "biomedical AND data" 1 0 
 "genetic AND data" 3 0 
 "health AND record" 8 0 
 "patient AND record" 5 0 
 "abuse AND patient" 0 0 
 Total 52 2 
 BTO Solicitors 
"harm AND health AND data" 1 0 
 "health AND data" 8 0 
 "biomedical AND data" 0 0 
 "genetic AND data" 0 0 
 "health AND record" 13 0 
 "patient AND record" 0 0 
 "abuse AND patient" 0 0 
 Total 22 0 
 Field Fisher Privacy and Information Law 
"harm AND health AND data" 0 0 
 "health AND data" 12 0 
 "biomedical AND data" 0 0 
 "genetic AND data" 0 0 
 "health AND record" 5 0 
 "patient AND record" 2 0 
 "abuse AND patient" 0 0 
 Total 19 0 
 Hogan Lovells Chronicle of Data Protection 
"harm AND health AND data" 24 0 
 "health AND data" 124 7 
 "biomedical AND data" 0 0 
 "genetic AND data" 6 0 
 "health AND record" 38 5 
 "patient AND record" 15 3 
 "abuse AND patient" 1 0 
 Total 208 15 
 Pogowasright 
"harm AND health AND data" 19 2 
 "biomedical AND data" 1 0 
 "genetic AND data" 24 0 
 "health AND record" 135 7 
 "patient AND record" 38 7 
 "abuse AND patient" 6 0 
 "health AND data" 203 17 
 Total 426 33 
  
